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1
Individual Accounts and 
Social Security Reform
Defined	 contribution	 pension	 plans	 providing	workers	with	 indi-
vidual accounts dominate pension plan growth worldwide. Contribu-
tions are made into the accounts, usually by workers and sometimes 
by employers. The return on the investment of the funds is credited to 
the account. The participating worker usually has some choice over the 
investment	of	the	account	and	bears	the	resulting	financial	risk.	At	re-
tirement, the participant can convert the account balance to an annuity, 
receive	it	as	a	lump	sum,	or	take	benefits	through	phased	withdrawals,	
depending on the rules governing the plan.
As	recently	as	the	early	1980s,	defined	contribution	plans	were	an	
unimportant	source	of	 retirement	 income.	 In	contrast,	defined	benefit	
plans have traditionally been the plan chosen by most countries for so-
cial security and by most employers who provide pensions for their em-
ployees.	Such	plans	provide	benefits	determined	by	a	formula	that	usu-
ally takes into account the worker’s earnings and years of service. The 
risk	associated	with	the	financing	that	underlies	defined	benefit	plans	is	
not borne by the worker but by the plan sponsor or an insurance compa-
ny. While there has been impressive growth in the number of countries 
that	have	adopted	mandatory	defined	contribution	plans,	social	security	
programs	worldwide	are	still	dominated	by	defined	benefit	plans.	
As	 the	 popularity	 of	 mandatory	 defined	 contribution	 plans	 has	
spread, the names by which such plans are called have multiplied. 
Those	names,	which	have	political	 significance,	 differ	 in	 focus	 as	 to	
what element of the plan is stressed; some examples include personal 
retirement accounts, retirement savings accounts, private accounts, and 
individual accounts. This book follows the terminology used in publi-
cations of the National Academy of Social Insurance and refers to them 
as individual accounts.
Countries have adopted mandatory individual accounts primarily 
in Latin America and in Central and Eastern Europe, where the prede-
cessor	social	security	plans	faced	serious	financial	problems,	but	Hong	
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Kong, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are other notable examples. 
Twelve Latin American nations have adopted them, accounting for 
roughly half the population of Latin America, although only about half 
the labor force of these countries is covered (Gill, Packard, and Yermo 
2005).	Voluntary	defined	contribution	plans	have	grown	in	importance	
in many high-income countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), particularly in the English-speak-
ing countries of Australia, Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. In the United States, 401(k) plans—an employer-
provided individual account plan typically requiring employee contri-
butions—have grown rapidly and are now the most common type of 
pension plan (USDOL 2005). 
The structure of the book is as follows: after this general introduc-
tion, the second chapter introduces the topic of individual accounts, 
discusses the framework used to analyze them, and looks at the key 
issue of risk. The third chapter surveys the main issues in the social 
security reform debate and looks at social security reform involving 
individual accounts, as well as the use of individual accounts in social 
security	systems	around	the	world.	The	fourth	and	fifth	chapters	treat	
issues	 in	 the	financial	management	of	 individual	accounts:	 the	fourth	
chapter	looks	at	those	issues	that	arise	when	agents	(the	officers	of	cor-
porations and the managers of mutual funds) manage investments; the 
fifth	chapter	discusses	problems	that	individuals	encounter	as	a	result	
of their own investment decisions. Chapter 6 examines labor market 
issues	arising	from	individual	accounts.	Specifically,	 it	 looks	at	 these	
accounts’ effects on workers’ behavior and on income distribution. The 
seventh chapter discusses the forms in which individual accounts pay 
benefits	and	the	taxation	of	individual	accounts.	Chapter	8	provides	a	
summary of the book. 
Appendices A and B provide information relevant to the U.S. So-
cial Security reform debate but treat topics that are of less general in-
terest than those covered in the chapters. They present more technical 
subjects and are offered for readers who may have a more detailed in-
terest in these areas. Rate-of-return guarantees, discussed in Appendix 
A, have been included in some proposals but have not been an aspect 
of the proposals associated with the Bush administration. Contribution 
evasion, discussed in Appendix B, has not been an issue in the reform 
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debate, but it may be an important issue for self-employed workers and 
workers who are paid in cash. 
IT	BeGIns	wITh	A	PoLITICAL	DeCIsIon	
Including individual accounts in social security is a political de-
cision. However, that choice results from the interplay of a country’s 
underlying cultural, economic, and demographic forces, as well as the 
financial	status	of	its	social	security	plan.	As	influenced	by	a	country’s	
culture,	 retirement	 income	 systems	 reflect	differing	political	philoso-
phies concerning individualism versus collective social responsibility 
and	the	roles	of	government,	employers,	the	financial	sector,	families,	
individuals, and private charity. 
In countries where social solidarity and communal responsibility 
for the less fortunate are important values, government plays a major 
role	in	retirement	income	through	traditional	defined	benefit	plans	that	
provide social insurance. In countries placing a high value on individual 
responsibility and free choice, the private sector’s role is larger, either 
through voluntary employer-provided plans or through individual ac-
counts that are part of the social security system. Some countries favor 
individual accounts as a way of widening the range of personal choice 
and increasing reliance on the private sector. Even those countries, 
however, maintain a large mandatory element in their social security 
programs by requiring participation.
Ideology is a component of the political culture, but economic and 
demographic factors also affect the structure of retirement income sys-
tems. In upper-income countries, the development of domestic capital 
markets, containing the skilled personnel and the regulatory structure 
required	to	ensure	their	efficient	functioning,	plays	a	part	in	determin-
ing the possible role of individual accounts. In the United States, the 
development of 401(k) plans, providing workers with a familiarity with 
the functioning of individual accounts, has doubtlessly paved the way 
for the increased acceptability among American voters of individual 
accounts as a part of Social Security, although the replacement of de-
fined	benefit	plans	with	401(k)	plans	as	the	dominant	plan	type	has	also	
raised	the	level	of	financial	risk	borne	by	American	workers.1
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Population aging is a fundamental demographic force affecting re-
tirement income systems. It occurs both through increased life expec-
tancy and through reduced birth rates. It raises the ratio of retirees to 
workers, reducing social security’s internal rate of return that workers 




by raising the old-age dependency ratio (the ratio of retirees to work-
ers), favors the development of funded pensions, which can be either 
defined	benefit	or	defined	contribution.	Funded	pensions	have	a	reserve	
for	paying	future	benefits.	
Although population aging is often cited as a reason for switching 
from	a	 traditional	 social	 security	plan	 to	 a	defined	contribution	 indi-
vidual	account,	defined	contribution	plans	are	not	immune	to	the	effects	
of demographic change. Increased life expectancy at retirement age 






counts? The answer depends in part on whether those plans are add-ons 
to social security or carve-outs that reduce the value of social security 
benefits.	This	book	considers	public	policy	issues	concerning	individual	
accounts as part of a national social security system. It analyzes poli-
cies several countries have adopted. International experience provides 
insights as to the range of policy options and the effects of different 
approaches. 
This book has several themes. First, the desirability of individual 
accounts in social security reform depends on their role in retirement 
income and whether they reduce or supplement social security. Thus, 
the plans cannot be judged in isolation, but must be evaluated according 
to their role in the retirement income system. 
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Second, while individual accounts as part of social security can 
be designed so that they are simple and benign, having little or no ef-
fect on the behavior of workers, generally they are complicated in their 
structure and effects. The complexity of individual accounts is often 
not appreciated in policy debates, in part because of the comparatively 
short history of experience with them in social security systems. Policy 
analysts, for example, generally have treated them as not affecting the 
behavior of workers, believing that they are similar to voluntary savings 
plans. Because the actual details of plan structure are important, this 
book provides descriptive detail about the operations of the major types 
of mandatory individual accounts.
Third, risk in individual accounts occurs in many different forms, 
not	solely	because	of	the	financial	market.	This	topic	is	raised	in	vari-
ous sections of the book. From most perspectives, individual accounts 
are	riskier	than	are	defined	benefit	plans	in	high-income	countries	that	
have well-managed social security systems. The aspects of risk affect 
the role of individual accounts in providing retirement income.
This book relies primarily on economic analysis and foreign experi-
ence for assessing mandatory individual accounts, but it also discusses 
401(k) plans and the Thrift Savings Plan for federal government work-
ers. The focus is on issues relevant to including individual accounts in 
social security in the United States and in other high-income countries. 
International comparisons of individual accounts may be particu-
larly useful for U.S. policymakers. While the U.S. experience is limited 
to voluntary plans, a number of countries have experience with indi-
vidual accounts that are part of social security. The relevance for the 
United States of the policy experience in other countries is assessed, 
taking into consideration, for example, additional sources of retirement 
income that may affect the structure and functioning of individual ac-
counts. International experience, when properly applied, can provide 
insights for the United States into both the successes and the failures of 
other countries’ policies. In some cases, the lessons from policy failures 
are	 that	 the	problems	are	fixable;	 in	other	cases,	 the	 failures	 indicate	
problems inherent in the particular structure of an individual account 
system. 
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The	BIG	PICTuRe:	The	RoLes	oF	TRADITIonAL	soCIAL	
seCuRITy	PLAns	AnD	InDIvIDuAL	ACCounTs
Much of this book focuses on the microeconomics of how manda-
tory individual accounts function. The big picture, by contrast, concerns 
how	these	plans	fit	into	a	retirement	income	system	(World	Bank	1994;	
Gillion et al. 2000). To conclude this chapter, I will comment on issues 
affecting the big picture.
Most recent reforms of social security have been driven in part by 
the need to restore solvency to traditional systems in the face of popula-
tion aging. In this context, add-on individual accounts generally have 
no	effect	on	solvency	because	their	financing	is	independent	of	that	of	
the traditional social security program. Carve-out individual accounts 
generally worsen solvency issues over a transition period lasting de-
cades	because	of	the	need	to	continue	financing	the	benefits	in	the	tradi-
tional social security program. Thus, in social security reform debates, 
it is important to separate the issues of individual accounts and social 
security solvency.
Some analysts have focused on social insurance issues and the pre-
vention of old-age poverty (Gill, Packard, and Yermo 2005). Within 
this framework, the roles of different types of pension plans are com-
pared, based on their ability to provide insurance by transferring in-
come across people and to shift income from the individual’s working 
period to retirement. One view is that the need for social insurance is di-
minishing as the risk of old-age poverty declines. The contention is that 
the function of mandatory savings for retirement should occur through 
individual accounts, but that poverty prevention should occur though 
mandatory	defined	benefit	plans.
Other analysts, however, have focused on the ability of different 
types of pension plans to spur national savings and economic growth 
(World Bank 1994). They argue that mandatory individual accounts 
should be used to encourage savings and growth. In this context, it is 
important to distinguish between carve-out and add-on accounts. Carve-
out accounts are less likely to add to national savings, in part because 
they	 replace	benefits	 that	were	 already	provided	 and	 in	 part	 because	
they	reduce	the	financing	for	the	traditional	social	security	program.
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Another perspective places relatively more emphasis on risk-bear-
ing by workers and the risks of different types of pension plans (Gillion 
et al. 2000). Analysis indicates that in countries where policy risk is 
relatively small, mandatory individual accounts generally are consider-
ably more risky than are traditional social security plans.
The	GoAL	oF	The	BooK
The primary goal of this book is to provide a better understanding of 
how individual accounts would work if they were adopted in the United 
States as part of Social Security reform. It is important when new ap-
proaches are being considered to carefully think about how they might 
work, evaluating both their positive and their negative aspects. That is 
done by using the tools of economics and learning from the experiences 
of other countries. The next chapter will acquaint the reader with differ-
ent	types	of	defined	contribution	plans	and	the	financial	structure	and	
management of individual accounts. It will also detail the many risks 




include the self-employed in the U.S. context.
Turner.indb   7 2/6/2006   10:28:27 AM
Turner.indb   8 2/6/2006   10:28:27 AM
9
2




a broader perspective than most of the remainder of the book. Although 
the focus of the book narrows in subsequent chapters, the following 
types	of	defined	contribution	plans	are	discussed	in	this	book.
voluntary	Defined	Contribution	Plans
These exist in Ireland, Canada, and the United States and are preva-
lent in about a dozen other countries. Employers provide the plans vol-
untarily in order to attract the caliber of employee they wish to hire.
Mandatory Individual Accounts 
Argentina, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Poland, Sweden, and Hong Kong 
have these plans (Gillion et al. 2000). The large majority of countries 
around	 the	 world,	 however,	 provide	 social	 security	 old-age	 benefits	
through	a	mandatory	defined	benefit	system,	based	on	principles	of	so-




These are found in Switzerland, Australia, and Denmark (Rein and 
Turner 2001). Such plans have become the foundation for a mandatory 
system in some of the high-income countries of the OECD, where wide-
spread employer-sponsored pensions have existed for many years on a 
voluntary	basis.	These	mandated	plans	can	be	either	defined	benefit	or	
defined	contribution;	in	Switzerland,	a	hybrid	combining	both	defined	
Turner.indb   9 2/6/2006   10:28:27 AM




Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands have quasi mandating of 
employer-provided plans, but this is not a statutory requirement. Rath-
er, it derives from a legal framework that supports collective bargain-
ing and from the resulting contractual agreements between labor unions 
and employers that cover most workers in the country. 
voluntary	Carve-out	Individual	Accounts	(vCos)
In the United Kingdom, these plans allow workers to voluntarily 
substitute	 an	 alternative	 for	 part	 of	 social	 security.	Called	 “contract-
ing	 out”	 in	 the	United	Kingdom,	 this	 type	 refers	 to	 a	 system	where	
workers	or	firms,	depending	on	the	arrangements,	can	voluntarily	with-
draw from part of social security if they provide a replacement pension 
plan at least as generous. (See Box 2.1, Voluntary Carve-Out Accounts 
around the World.)
Provident Funds
A number of former British colonies, such as Singapore, have these 
government-managed individual accounts. Provident funds are national 




Malaysia and Indonesia have large provident funds. A number of coun-
tries in Africa and the Caribbean have terminated their provident fund 
plans	 in	 favor	 of	 traditional	 defined	benefit	 plans	 that	 provide	 social	
insurance.
The contribution rate in different types of plans varies considerably 
based on the role of the plan for the retirement income system. Table 
2.1 shows the contribution rate for some individual account plans in dif-
ferent	countries.	While	contribution	rates	for	traditional	defined	benefit	
social security programs have risen in a number of countries, the rates 
for mandatory individual account plans have been stable.
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The	FInAnCIAL	sTRuCTuRe	oF	InDIvIDuAL	ACCounTs
The	preceding	section	described	types	of	defined	contribution	plans	
but did not present a structure for how they relate to each other. This 
section	highlights	important	differences	among	types	of	defined	contri-
Box	2.1	voluntary	Carve-out	Accounts	around	the	world
Voluntary carve-out accounts (VCOs) are often a transitional 
feature of mandatory pension systems, being offered to workers 
above	a	certain	age	as	a	way	of	“grandfathering”	them	into	a	pro-
gram	 that	 is	being	modified	 for	new	participants.	They	are	 less	
commonly an ongoing feature available to new workers entering 
the labor force. The United Kingdom, however, has such a system 
of	“contracting	out”	of	 the	state	pension	scheme	as	an	ongoing	
aspect of its retirement income system.a VCOs were proposed in 
the United States in 1935 in the Clark amendment to the original 
Social Security Act; they were rejected because voluntary partici-
pation was viewed as inconsistent with the redistributive nature 
of the U.S. Social Security system (Schieber and Shoven 1999). 
Defined	benefit	VCOs	are	used	in	Japan	and	the	United	Kingdom;	
however, among the high-income countries of the OECD, only 
the	United	Kingdom	allows	VCOs	to	be	defined	contribution	in-
dividual account plans. 
VCOs are also used by Colombia and Peru in their individual 
accounts systems (Gillion et al. 2000). VCOs are a feature of the 
provident funds in India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Fiji, and Gambia. Ma-
laysia allows VCOs for teachers, the military, the self-employed, 
and domestic workers. In Greece, workers with approved pension 
plans	providing	at	least	equivalent	benefits	are	allowed	out	of	the	
entire public system. 
a It goes by the name of the State Second Pension (S2P) Scheme. Before April 
2002 it was called the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS).
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Chile Administradoras de 
Fondos de Pensiones
10.0
Denmark ATP Flat amount
Mexico Administradoras de 
Fondos de Retiro
6.5














Italy Notional account 33.0
Sweden Notional account 16.5
Voluntary, 
group
Canada Registered Pension Plan 18.0 max.






Canada Registered Retirement 
Savings Plan
18.0 max.
United States Individual Retirement 
Account
$4,000
($4,500 if age 50+)
NOTE: There are generally minimum and maximum limitations on the earnings to 
which the contribution rates apply. Maximum contribution rates in voluntary plans 
may be lower if the worker contributes to another plan. The maximum contribution 
rate in the United Kingdom for Personal Pensions is higher for workers aged 40 and 
older. Some countries have two tiers within their social security system, or have both 
voluntary and mandatory plans, and thus are listed twice in the table.
SOURCE: Gillion et al. (2000); ISSA (2003).
Table 2.1  Contribution Rates in Individual Account Plans in Selected 
Countries, 2005
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bution plans by looking at the incentives that motivate their provision 
and their relationship to social security plans. 
Four	Pathways	to	Pension	Coverage:	Degrees	of	Compulsion
Countries have developed a dizzying variety of policies to encour-
age	the	development	of	both	defined	contribution	and	defined	benefit	
plans. The resulting plans, however, can be grouped into four pathways 
to pension coverage; these are differentiated by the degree of incentive 
or compulsion provided to workers to participate in the plan (Rein and 
Turner 2001). In terms of degree of compulsion, these four categories 
include 1) unrestrained choice for the worker (including whether to par-
ticipate in a pension plan), 2) a compulsory arrangement determined by 
collective bargaining between employers and trade unions, 3) a choice 
between two alternatives—participating in a pension provided either by 
the government or by the private sector—and 4) a government-imposed 
mandate. Often a country uses multiple pathways to encourage pension 
coverage and participation.
1)	voluntary	participation,	with	tax	incentives	
The pathway the United States uses to encourage employers to pro-
vide	pension	coverage,	both	defined	contribution	and	defined	benefit,	
is voluntary with tax incentives. Employers are not required to provide 
pensions, and employees are not required to be covered. The only com-
pulsion is that regulations stipulate that an employer who voluntarily 
offers a plan must cover, or offer coverage to, most or all workers. 
A strength of this policy is that it maintains free choice for workers 
and employers. However, practically without exception, no more than 
half the workforce is covered in countries that use this approach (Dailey 
and Turner 1992). With this approach, coverage rates tend to be rela-
tively low among low-wage workers (Hinz and Turner 1998). 
A variant of this approach is automatic enrollment with an opt-out: 
individuals are automatically enrolled in a plan but have the option of 
opting out. Another variant is to require that employers offer a plan but 
not require that the employee participate. These two options maintain 
the voluntary approach but with added degrees of compulsion. These 
approaches are alternatives to outright mandates.
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2)	Collective	bargaining
A second pathway to expanding pension coverage, and one with 
an element of mandating, is widespread collective bargaining. In some 
countries where all or most of the labor force is covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement, a high percentage of workers have pension cov-
erage through plans resulting from collective bargaining. Countries us-
ing this approach include France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, 
and Sweden. This strategy can only be used when a large portion of the 
labor force is covered by a union or where, as in the Netherlands, under 
law a collective bargaining agreement can be mandatorily extended to 
other	firms	in	the	same	line	of	business.	This	approach	is	thus	not	fea-
sible for the United States, with its low level of union membership. 
3)	voluntary	carve-outs
The remaining two pathways to pension coverage, voluntary carve-
outs and mandatory individual accounts, are the focus of this book. 
The voluntary carve-out approach involves requiring participation in 
a retirement income plan but permits a choice between participating in 
social security or in an alternative private plan. With voluntary carve-
outs, the employer and the worker may reduce or end their contribution 
to social security if the worker participates in a private sector plan that 
provides	benefits	meeting	at	least	minimum	requirements.	For	workers	
who choose the voluntary carve-out, the smaller contribution to social 
security	 lowers	 the	 benefit	 the	 worker	 ultimately	 receives	 from	 that	
source,	but	the	worker	receives	an	added	benefit	through	the	individual	
account. An advantage of voluntary carve-outs is that they maintain 
free choice, and they may encourage private sector provision of pen-
sion plans.
In Japan, voluntary carve-outs have been provided on a fairly neu-
tral basis with respect to the incentive for participation—the govern-
ment has neither subsidized nor disfavored participation. The United 
Kingdom, in the past, has encouraged voluntary carve-outs by provid-
ing them on a subsidized basis. Voluntary carve-out accounts were pro-
posed for the United States by President George W. Bush in his second 
inaugural address and his subsequent State of the Union message.
The voluntary nature of this approach may create the problem of 
adverse	selection.	With	adverse	selection,	the	workers	who	most	benefit	
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from taking a voluntary carve-out leave the social security system, erod-
ing	its	financial	base.	For	example,	in	the	United	States,	depending	on	
the way voluntary carve-outs would be structured, and on the extent to 
which the Social Security system redistributes income from upper-in-
come to lower-income workers, individuals with higher incomes may be 
more likely to take a voluntary carve-out than those with lower incomes. 
For these reasons, some observers view full mandating as preferable.
4)	Mandating





types of arrangements. The mandatory approach can either compel em-
ployers to provide a pension plan for their workers or require workers to 
have an individual account plan with a third-party provider. 
Australia and Switzerland mandate employer provision of pen-
sions. In Sweden, the government collects the pension contributions 
and distributes them to the mutual funds chosen by workers, with the 
employer’s only role being to transmit the workers’ contributions to the 
government. Mandatory pension systems that supplement a traditional 
social security program often do not cover all workers; they may ex-
clude low-wage, part-time, and short-tenure workers.   
Relationship to Social Security
An alternative approach to understanding the different types of in-
dividual accounts is to classify them according to their relationship to 
social security. Pensions can either be add-ons to or carve-outs from 
social security. An add-on is a pension plan that supplements the social 
security	benefit.	The	social	security	benefit	is	unaffected	by	the	provi-
sion of the add-on. A carve-out, by comparison, replaces part or all of 
the	social	security	benefit	(Box	2.2).	In	reforms	that	completely	replace	
an old system with a new one (such as in Sweden), this distinction can 
get blurred. However, it is a major distinction in reforms such as the 
type being considered in the United States.
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Add-ons and carve-outs can be either voluntary or mandatory. This 
taxonomy results in four categories of pension plans: voluntary add-ons, 
mandatory add-ons, voluntary carve-outs, and mandatory carve-outs. 
This	book	focuses	on	three	of	 these	four	 types	of	defined	contribution	
pensions: mandatory add-ons, voluntary carve-outs, and mandatory 
carve-outs. Table 2.2 provides examples of countries in these categories.
Box	2.2	The	Difference	between	Add-on	and	Carve-out	Accounts
An add-on account is an individual account that is added to an 
existing social security program. A carve-out account is an indi-
vidual	account	that	replaces	benefits	in	an	existing	social	security	
program. While these distinctions are clear when individual ac-
counts are combined with social security programs that already 
exist, the distinctions can be fuzzy when a new social security 
program is enacted. 
In the United Kingdom, an earnings-related social security 
program was not established until the 1970s. At that time, there 
were	already	well-established	employer-provided	defined	benefit	
plans. Contracting out (voluntary carve-outs) was permitted to 
protect the existing employer-provided pensions rather than re-
duce	the	benefits	in	an	already	existing	social	security	program.	
In	Sweden	in	1999,	an	existing	defined	benefit	social	security	
program was replaced with a smaller program (receiving lower 
contributions) and new mandatory individual accounts. From the 
U.S. perspective, the Swedish individual account system can be 
considered to be an add-on because it comes on top of a generous 
base program supported by a payroll tax of 16 percent. Further, it 
does	not	reduce	the	benefits	of	a	preexisting	program	since	it	was	
created at a time when a new social security program was being 
established. However, from the Swedish perspective, it might be 
considered a mandatory carve-out in that it reduces the level of 
contributions	going	to	the	defined-benefit	social	security	program,	
relative to the old program that was replaced.
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Full or Partial Replacement of Social Security
A further dimension of carve-outs is the extent to which they re-
place social security. Carve-outs can either partially or completely sup-
plant the existing social security system. 
The	role	of	defined	contribution	pensions	within	the	retirement	in-
come system is often expressed by the imagery of tiers of programs. 
The World Bank (1994) has favored a three-level approach in which 
the	first	tier	is	a	basic	government-provided	benefit	program	designed	
to alleviate poverty; the second tier is a mandatory, funded, privatized 
program; and the third tier is a voluntary, funded program. The number 
of tiers in this framework can be increased by recognizing the role of 
an	antipoverty	benefit,	informal	intergenerational	transfers,	private	sav-
ings, and work in old age.
The World Bank framework recognizes the important distinction 
between a partial replacement of social security in a three-tier system 
and the full replacement of social security in a single-tier or two-tier 
approach. With this expanded framework, individual accounts can 
be	incorporated	in	a	social	security	system	in	five	ways:	1)	voluntary	
carve-outs that partially replace social security (for example, in the 
United Kingdom), 2) voluntary carve-outs that fully replace social se-
curity (Colombia), 3) mandatory carve-outs that partially replace social 
security (Uruguay), 4) mandatory carve-outs that fully replace social 
security (Chile), and 5) mandatory add-ons to social security (Sweden). 
Table 2.3 provides examples of countries in the different categories of 
individual accounts. 
The approaches that are most relevant for the debate in the United 
States are voluntary carve-outs that partially replace social security and 






Add-on Canada, United States France, Switzerland
Carve-out Japan, United Kingdom, 
Colombia, Peru
Chile, Mexico, Uruguay
SOURCE: Rein and Turner (2004).
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mandatory add-ons. For that reason, much of this book focuses on the 
experience of the United Kingdom and Sweden when drawing on for-
eign experience. Chile is also often viewed as a model for social secu-
rity reform. Although its particular form of full replacement of social 
security is not being seriously considered in the United States, there are 
lessons to be learned from aspects of its experience. Table 2.4 provides 
an overview of the individual accounts in these three countries.
In comparing the retirement income systems for various countries, 
it is important to keep in mind key economic and demographic differ-
ences. Table 2.5 compares the United States with Chile, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom. Chile and Sweden have considerably less than 
one-tenth the population of the United States (the United Kingdom’s 
population	 is	 also	much	 smaller—about	 one-fifth	 that	 of	 the	 United	
States), and Chile has much lower per capita income. The poverty rate 
in Sweden is markedly below that in the United States. Such factors af-
fect the operation of the retirement income systems of these countries.
FInAnCIAL	MAnAGeMenT	oF	InDIvIDuAL	ACCounTs
Another dimension of the structure of individual accounts is their 
financial	 management.	 Both	 add-on	 and	 carve-out	 accounts	 can	 be	
managed at least three ways: 1) the Chilean model of individual ac-














Partial carve-out United Kingdom Uruguay
Full replacement Colombia, Peru Chile, Mexico
NOTE: Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
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Table	2.4		overview	of	Mandatory	Individual	Accounts	in	Chile,	sweden,	and	the	united	Kingdom
Country
Chile Sweden United Kingdom
Type of DC systema Mandatory full replacement 
of social security
Small add-on to social 
security
Voluntary carve-out from 
social security
Role in retirement income system Major Supplemental Shared role
Contribution rate for mandatory  
DC plana
10% 2.5% Variable, depending on age






contributions, but individual 
accounts held with 
service providers
Individual choice Choice of pension fund 
manager, each manager 
offers 5 different funds
Choice of up to 5 funds from 
over 600 mutual funds
Choice of insurance company 
or other service provider
Rate-of-return guarantee for 
investments
Guarantee relative to return 
received by other plans
No No
Rate-of-return guarantee for  
annuity conversion
No Yes, a minimum of 3% No
Mandatory annuitization No Yes Yes, at age 75
Cost-of-living	indexation	of	benefits Yes No Yes
Mandatory	survivors	benefits Yes, for women No No
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of mandatory employer-provided pensions, and 3) the Swedish model 
of individual accounts managed by a government clearinghouse. With 
the Chilean model, the accounts are managed in a decentralized fashion 
by private sector pension fund management companies. In Chile, indi-
vidual workers choose a pension fund management company and direct 
their employer to send their contribution to that company each month. 
With the Australian model, accounts are managed by individual em-
ployers, and each employer establishes a plan for company employees. 
In Sweden, the government plays a major role in the management 
of individual accounts. The government serves as a clearinghouse to 
which employers send their workers’ contributions. The government 
also acts as a record keeper and disburses the appropriate amounts to 
each of the pension funds in which a worker has elected to invest. 
This book does not consider mandates that require employers to 
provide pensions, based on the political judgment that that approach is 
the least likely to be chosen by the United States, and instead focuses on 
the Chilean and Swedish models for pension fund management. Thus, 
the Australian approach is not considered, though some lessons are 
drawn from aspects of its experience.
The Chilean model involves decentralized management by pension 
funds, while the Swedish model involves centralized management by 
a government clearinghouse. The Swedish model has the advantage of 








Population (millions) 293 16 9 60
Population 65+ (%) 12.4 7.8 17.3 15.7
Life expectancy  
at birth (yrs.)
77.4 76.4 80.3 78.3
GDP per capitaa (000s $) 37.8 9.9 26.8 27.7
Population below 
poverty line (%)
12 21 1 17
a Gross domestic product per capita.
SOURCE: CIA (2005).
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having lower administrative costs than the Chilean model, but it in-
volves a larger role for the government, illustrating the trade-off be-
tween these factors. Many people favoring individual accounts do so in 
part because they believe this policy will lead to a reduced role for the 
government in the provision of retirement income. With individual ac-
counts, there may be a reduced government role in the sense that payroll 
taxes are reduced, but at the same time the government bureaucracy 
may grow because of the role of the government clearinghouse.
eLeven	RIsKs	In	MAnDAToRy	InDIvIDuAL	ACCounTs
The risks in individual accounts should be viewed in the context of 
all sources of retirement income a worker expects to receive. The risks 
are greater if the individual accounts replace a stable base of social 
security	benefits	than	if	the	individual	accounts	are	an	add-on	to	social	
security. It may be optimal for most workers to diversify and bear the 
risks	 both	 of	 the	 traditional	 social	 security	 program	 and	 of	 financial	
market assets, though that does not necessarily imply a mandated indi-
vidual account system.
While	 financial	market	 risks	 are	 clearly	 an	 issue	with	 individual	
accounts, there are numerous other kinds of contingencies that are less 
frequently considered. Many of the concerns regarding risks in indi-
vidual	accounts	do	not	even	arise	in	defined	benefit	plans.	This	section	
introduces the types of risk that affect pension participants in individual 
accounts. The topic is dealt with in greater detail subsequently in the 
book. 
Individual accounts can be invested in government bonds and con-
structed with various guarantees, and thus some of the risks they com-
monly entail are not necessarily inherent. Adding guarantees, however, 
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efit	plans	it	is	primarily	borne	by	the	employer	or	by	an	insurance	com-
pany. The increasing role of individual accounts, both as voluntary and 
as	mandatory	plans,	raises	the	importance	of	the	financial	risk-bearing	
by workers and retirees. Some analysts argue that individual accounts, 
when they are the primary source of retirement income, place too much 
financial	market	risk	on	workers	(Ferguson	and	Blackwell	1995).	When	
these accounts play a minor role, however, being provided on top of a 
secure,	low-risk	base	of	traditional	social	security	and	a	defined	benefit	
employer-provided pension plan, the concerns are less serious. 
Especially for low-income workers who rely to a large extent on so-
cial	security	benefits	for	retirement,	it	is	important	that	this	source	pro-
vide	stable	benefits,	at	least	for	a	substantial	part	of	retirement	income.	
Workers generally are risk-averse, and some—women, low-income 
workers, and those with limited education—are especially so (Hinz, 








of expected rates of return by investing in more secure assets such as 
government bonds, by purchasing an insurance company product, or by 
establishing rate-of-return guarantees (discussed in Appendix A). 
If a person were to maintain a constant portfolio mix over his or her 
career, the possibility of a large loss would increase as the worker came 
closer to retirement because the account balance would be larger. Work-
ers can offset this risk by gradually moving into bonds, but because of 
inertia it appears that many do not make that change (Turner 2003). 
By contrast, as workers approach retirement age, the risk of a large 
loss in social security decreases. This occurs for two reasons. First, in 
the	United	States,	Social	Security	benefits	are	based	on	an	individual’s	
career average earnings, and most of those amounts would already be 
known as a worker got closer to retirement. Second, most reform pro-
posals are designed so that they do not affect workers aged 55 and older; 
thus,	the	chance	of	legislative	changes	altering	benefits	is	considerably	
less for older workers than for younger workers.
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Agency risk
In	 addition	 to	 financial	market	 risk	 on	 stock	 investments	 arising	
from swings in the macroeconomy, individual account participants are 
also	subject	to	losses	from	improper	financial	management	of	their	in-
vestments. Agency risk occurs because the pension participant’s invest-
ments are handled by agents rather than directly by the individual. The 
agents include mutual funds and the corporations whose shares the pen-
sion participant holds. This risk is borne by the plan sponsor in funded 
defined	benefit	plans	but	by	the	worker	in	individual	accounts.
Individual management risk
Individual management risk arises from individual errors in man-
aging pension investments. Evidence has accumulated that many indi-
viduals systematically make errors in managing pension investments, 
and that these errors affect their retirement income (Turner 2003). An 
example of individual management risk is the tendency of some people 
to buy a stock or mutual fund after its price has risen and to sell it after 
its price has fallen, resulting in a buy-high-and-sell-low pattern. Indi-
vidual	management	 risk	does	not	 occur	 in	 traditional	 defined	benefit	
social security plans but does arise in individual account plans.
Policy risk
Policy risk results from changes in national tax and retirement in-
come	policy	that	affect	the	level	of	benefits	received	from	a	pension.	
Such	changes	can	affect	participants	in	both	defined	benefit	plans	and	
individual accounts. In the voluntary carve-out plans in the United King-
dom,	every	five	years	 the	Government	Actuary’s	Department	 (GAD)	
resets	the	key	parameter	determining	the	generosity	of	the	benefits	re-
ceived from social security and from the carve-out individual account. 
Public policy risk is greater in many countries for young participants 
in traditional social security programs than for those in individual ac-
counts.	As	previously	discussed,	financial	risk	is	typically	higher	than	
policy risk for workers near retirement.
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Risk of adverse labor market outcomes
The unemployment risk to retirement income stems from the work-
er experiencing periods of joblessness. Unemployment and being out 
of	the	labor	force	have	less	of	an	impact	on	benefits	in	the	U.S.	Social	
Security program than they do in an individual account plan because 
benefits	are	based	on	a	person’s	35	highest	years	of	earnings.	At	least	
for many individuals who have full careers of work, a period of unem-
ployment may have no effect on their Social Security retirement ben-
efits	but	would	affect	benefits	in	an	individual	account	plan.	
Retirement	 benefits	 are	 influenced	more	 by	 unemployment	when	
workers are young than when they are old because of the impact of 
interest compounding. Related to this, being out of the labor force for 
any	reason	has	a	bigger	effect	on	retirement	benefits	for	workers	in	an	
individual account when they are young than when they are old. For 
example, young women who take off time to rear children may greatly 
reduce	their	retirement	benefits	in	an	individual	account	plan.
Related to unemployment risk is the possibility of receiving lower 
pay than expected. This could be due to changes in the fortunes of the 
employer or industry where one works, or it could be because of per-
sonal	issues	such	as	poor	health.	Defined	benefit	social	security	plans	
provide	insurance	against	these	situations	since	their	benefit	formula	is	
designed to provide redistribution to lower-earning workers.
Risk of disability
The risk of becoming disabled before retirement and unable to work 
is not dealt with by individual accounts. Workers who become disabled 
at a young age only have the amount that has accumulated in their ac-
counts. This contingency must be dealt with outside individual accounts 
through the purchase of disability insurance.
Risk of premature death
The risk of premature death is that of dying young and leaving be-
hind	juvenile	dependents	(Nyce	and	Schieber	2005).	Defined	contribu-
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ter protection. With individual accounts, this situation must be handled 
separately through the purchase of survivors insurance.
Risks at and in Retirement
Replacement rate risk
Replacement rate risk involves the possibility that workers will 
have a lower income replacement rate than expected. The income re-
placement rate is the percentage of preretirement earnings provided by 
retirement income and is affected by the risks associated with both the 
financial	market	 and	 the	worker’s	 preretirement	 earnings.	 In	 defined	
benefit	plans	the	worker	bears	part	of	this	risk	(the	part	arising	because	




be required in an individual account system to convert their account 
balances into an annuity by using the account balance to purchase an 
annuity from a life insurance company. Annuitization risk arises be-
cause	of	 changes	 in	 interest	 rates	 and	 reflects	 the	possibility	 that	 the	





Longevity risk for workers occurs both before and during retire-
ment, and it has both a cohort and an individual component. First, there 
is the element related to changing cohort mortality rates up to the point 
of retirement. This situation affects the annuity value if the individual 
decides to annuitize the account balance, or the amount the person can 
take out through phased withdrawals if not choosing to annuitize. Sec-
ond, longevity risk after retirement for people who annuitize their indi-
vidual accounts is borne by the annuity provider, typically an insurance 
company. Alternatively, individuals who do not annuitize their account 
balances face the prospect of living longer than expected and not hav-
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concern is not an important issue before retirement for reasonable levels 
of	inflation.	However,	if	benefits	are	not	price-indexed,	inflation	after	
retirement	will	erode	their	real	value.	Traditional	defined	benefit	social	
security plans usually provide full price-indexing, while that typically 






age structure that occur because of changes in rates of birth and mortali-
ty. The old-age dependency ratio can be measured as the ratio of retirees 
to	workers.	It	acts	as	a	shadow	price	for	social	security	benefits	(Turner	
1984). If there is one retiree for every four workers, it costs each worker 
$0.25	to	raise	the	benefit	level	of	the	retirees	by	$1.	If	the	old-age	de-
pendency ratio doubles and there is one retiree for every two workers, 
it	costs	each	worker	$0.50	to	raise	the	benefit	level	of	retirees	by	$1.	
Pay-as-you-go	defined	benefit	plans	are	subject	to	the	risk	of	changes	in	
the old-age dependency ratio, while individual accounts are not. 
In sum, when considering different ways of providing social secu-
rity	benefits,	in	nearly	all	respects	individual	accounts	are	riskier	than	
a	well-managed	defined	benefit	social	security	plan	such	as	is	found	in	
the United States. This is true for risks related to the issues of individual 
management investments, adverse labor market outcomes, disability, 
premature death, earnings replacement, annuitization, longevity, and 
inflation.	Traditional	social	security	plans	are	riskier	for	older	workers	
with respect to changes in the old-age dependency rule, and for younger 
workers with respect to changes in public policy.
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ConCLusIons
Individual accounts can be categorized either with respect to the 
incentive for their provision or with respect to their relationship to so-
cial security pensions. Combining these two approaches, social security 
reform	using	individual	accounts	can	occur	 in	five	different	ways:	1)	
voluntary carve-outs that partially replace social security (United King-
dom), 2) voluntary carve-outs that fully replace social security (Colom-
bia), 3) mandatory add-ons to social security (Sweden), 4) mandatory 
carve-outs that partially replace social security (Uruguay), and 5) man-
datory carve-outs that fully replace social security (Chile). Of these ap-
proaches, this book, in the context of possible U.S. reforms, focuses on 
three: voluntary carve-outs that partially replace social security, man-
datory add-ons, and mandatory carve-outs that partially replace social 
security. The effects of individual accounts depend on which type of 
account is being considered. It is important to distinguish between add-
ons and carve-outs.
Another dimension of the structure of individual accounts is their 
financial	management.	For	either	add-on	or	carve-out	accounts,	 indi-
vidual accounts can be managed in at least three ways: by using the 
Chilean model, the Australian model, or the Swedish model. This book 
focuses	on	the	Chilean	and	Swedish	models	of	financial	management	
as being the approaches most relevant for the United States to consider. 
When considering overall approaches, the book focuses on Sweden and 
the United Kingdom as leading examples of the add-on and carve-out 
approaches.
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Individual Accounts in Social 
Security Reform: The Debate
A high-stakes debate is raging among politicians, policy analysts, 
and concerned citizens over the use of individual accounts for Social 
Security reform in the United States. Some participants are partisans 
with strongly held positions that are rooted in fundamental differences 
in political philosophy. Some politicians and other commentators have 
used	the	words	“looming”	and	“crisis.”	
Mandating individual accounts appeals to some people on both eco-
nomic and ideological grounds. From the economic standpoint, they 
argue that mandatory individual accounts would increase savings and 
reduce government’s role in the economy. From the ideological per-
spective, they contend that those pensions would enhance individual 
freedom, private property ownership, and personal responsibility, while 
reducing government’s role in the economy (President’s Commission 
2001). 
Others, however, argue that individual accounts that fully or partial-
ly	replace	a	traditional	defined	benefit	social	security	system	may	entail	
too	much	financial	market	risk,	especially	for	vulnerable	retirees	(Gil-
lion et al. 2000). Individual accounts that are carve-outs would generate 
high	transition	costs	over	a	period	of	decades	to	pay	benefits	already	
promised in the old system. Individual accounts that are add-ons to so-
cial security, however, may be viewed differently because they retain 
social security as the traditional base of retirement income. They do not 
involve transition costs because they do not reduce funds allocated to 
pay	for	social	security	benefits	already	promised.
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The	PRos	AnD	Cons
why	some	Countries	use	Individual	Accounts	for	social	security
Some	 policy	 analysts	 and	 international	 financial	 institutions,	 in-
cluding the World Bank, have advanced a number of reasons for us-
ing individual accounts for social security (World Bank 1994). These 
arguments differ between plans that reduce an existing social security 
program and those that are an add-on to such a program. 
Those who argue for individual accounts as part of social security 
reform, whether as mandatory add-ons or as voluntary carve-outs, gen-
erally believe such accounts would result in the following economic 
advantages:
• Improved functioning of capital markets
• Increased national savings
•	 Higher	real	(inflation-adjusted)	rates	of	return
• Improved functioning of labor markets
• Reduced overall level of risk for workers 
These issues are discussed in turn.
Improved functioning of capital markets
Some observers have credited individual accounts with encourag-
ing the development of national stock markets and increasing national 
savings	in	countries	in	which	financial	markets	were	poorly	developed	
before	their	introduction	(Piñera	2001).	Such	effects	on	financial	insti-
tutions are less likely to occur in the United States, which already has 
an established capital market. 
Increased national savings 
One of the most complex aspects of the debate is how individual ac-
counts would affect savings. Individual accounts may increase national 
savings by substituting a funded account for an unfunded one; how-
ever, critics argue that the accounts could instead substitute for savings 
that would otherwise occur, especially among higher-income work-
ers, many of whom already have substantial savings (Gale and Scholz 
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1994). Substitution for other forms of savings would be less likely to 
occur among lower-income workers because of their lower probability 
of having savings. To the extent that substitution occurs, any positive 
effect on savings is diminished. 
Substitution could also occur through workers’ taking on additional 
debt to offset the added savings. Workers could do so to avoid the re-
duction in consumption that would occur if savings were to increase. 
For example, homeowners could increase their mortgage debt by re-
financing	their	homes.	The	additional	debt	could	offset	the	increase	in	
financial	market	assets	held	in	individual	accounts.	
Substitution that would offset increased savings would be espe-
cially likely with voluntary carve-out individual accounts, as opposed 
to mandatory accounts; this would occur because the workers likely to 
choose them have higher incomes and would already have savings in 
taxed accounts outside pension plans. They could switch their taxed 
savings into a tax-preferred individual account and, because of the tax 
advantage, would need to save less to reach a given target amount. 
Further, some argue that boosting national saving can be accom-
plished through other means and should not be considered a function of 
social security. For example, an alternative would be to reduce the fed-
eral	deficit	by	raising	non–social	security	taxes	and	cutting	non–social	
security spending (Cutler 1999).
Analysts opposed to mandatory individual accounts also have ar-
gued that, for the same reasons that social security is compulsory (i.e., 
because	many	people	would	not	save	sufficiently	on	their	own),	people	
will want to have access to their individual accounts before retirement. 
That also would reduce any positive effect on savings. The experience 
with Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) may be instructive. Be-
cause of political pressure, the law has been relaxed over the years since 
the inception of IRAs in 1974, allowing easier access to these accounts 
before retirement.
The effect of individual accounts on national savings also depends 
on other changes that are made in the government budget. If the govern-
ment	were	to	finance	the	transition	to	individual	accounts	with	increased	
government borrowing, that would offset whatever increase in savings 
might occur among workers, in terms of net savings in the economy. 
The	transition	cost	is	the	cost	of	paying	for	benefits	that	have	already	
been	promised	but	for	which	additional	financing	would	be	needed	if	
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privatizing	reduces	the	financing	of	the	existing	social	security	system.	
This transition cost can be large, and the transition period can last for 
five	decades	or	longer.	In	Chile,	for	example,	the	transition	cost	peaked	
at	nearly	5	percent	of	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP)	during	the	first	
decade of the reform, and even after 40 years the transition cost is pro-
jected to be more than 1 percent of GDP (Edwards 1998).
In the United States, Social Security has temporarily accumulated 
a large trust fund. With voluntary carve-out accounts, the amount in 
the	trust	fund	would	be	reduced,	as	money	paid	out	in	benefits	would	
not be replaced by payroll taxes. Some economists have argued from a 
national perspective that the increase in the trust fund has been offset by 
non–Social	Security	deficits.	This	shift	in	government	financing	from	
income taxes to payroll taxes may have increased savings to the extent 
that income taxpayers have a higher marginal propensity to save than 
payroll taxpayers (Diamond and Orszag 2004).  
As is the case in other countries, a fundamental issue concerns 
whether encouraging national savings should be a primary responsibili-
ty of Social Security. Some commentators have argued that government 
tax and budgetary policy should assume that role (Gillion et al. 2000).
In sum, although the issues regarding social security and savings 
are unresolved, a shift to individual accounts, particularly voluntary 
carve-out accounts, may not increase national savings. In any case, 
there are other aspects of national economic policy that affect savings; 
thus, encouraging savings need not be a requirement of social security 
reform, especially if the proposed reforms reduce the insurance protec-
tions provided by social security.
high	real	rates	of	return
Some supporters of mandating individual accounts have projected 
high real rates of return, and indeed that has been the case in Chile. 
For each of the seven Chilean pension fund management companies 
(Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones, or AFPs) in 2002, the real 
rate of return over the period 1982–2002 averaged at least 10 percent. 
Although these returns are high, they represent gross rates of return not 
subtracting fees and expenses. Once fees and expenses are taken into 
account, the cumulative average real rate of return is 6.8 percent for 
low-income workers and 7.1 percent for high-income workers.
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However,	even	these	adjusted	figures	overstate	the	rates	of	return	
received by workers because they are simple average rates of return, 
while the geometric average is the appropriate measure (Williamson 
2005). The geometric average provides the rate of return that if earned 
continuously over the period would produce the actual ending balance. 
A	Chilean	brokerage	firm	used	data	for	the	years	1982–1998	and	cal-
culated an average real geometric rate of return net of expenses of 5.1 
percent. By comparison, if the worker had instead purchased Chilean 
90-day bank deposits each month, the average compound rate of return 
would have been 7.2 percent (CB Capitales 1999; Williamson 2005). 
Individual account holders in other countries have not fared as well; 
the systems in Sweden, Hungary, and Poland, for example, experienced 
negative	real	rates	of	return	for	their	first	few	years	of	operation	because	
of the downturn in world capital markets during the early 2000s. These 
results highlight the fact that systems should not be judged based on 
rates of return experienced over a short period, which are subject to ran-
dom	fluctuations.	An	extended	time	period	is	more	relevant	for	judging	
a long-term investment such as social security. Nonetheless, short-term 
fluctuations	 in	 capital	markets	 can	be	a	major	 risk	 for	 individual	 ac-
count participants who are nearing retirement. 
In the United States, debate has arisen over the appropriate rate of 
return to credit individual accounts when prospectively comparing them 
with Social Security. Some correction should be made for the greater 
financial	risk	inherent	in	individual	accounts	that	are	invested	in	equi-
ties, with the extreme argument being that the rate of return credited 
should be that on bonds because the higher return on equities is due to 
the risk premium on equities. In any case, comparisons of rates of return 
between social security and individual accounts need to make some 
adjustment for risk.
Improved functioning of labor markets
Some policy analysts have thought that converting to individual ac-
counts would reduce contribution evasion—the failure of workers and 
employers	to	make	required	payments—because	benefits	would	be	tied	
more closely to payments (World Bank 1994). Contribution evasion, 
however, remains a problem in many of the Latin American countries, 
especially among lower-paid or temporary workers and among employ-
ees in the informal sector (Bailey and Turner 2001). The informal sector 
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consists of casual employment that evades government regulation and 
taxation. Contribution evasion for social security occurs even in highly 
developed countries such as the United States, mainly in the under-
ground economy and among self-employed workers. (See Appendix B 
for further discussion of contribution evasion.)
Reduced level of retirement income risk 
Some argue that the use of individual accounts would reduce the 
overall level of risk that workers face concerning their retirement in-
come (President’s Commission 2001). The choice between government 
or private provision of retirement income is affected by an assessment 
of	the	risks	associated	with	each	method,	including	the	risks	of	financial	




It is important to distinguish between add-on and carve-out indi-
vidual accounts. The opposition to individual accounts by some people 
concerns their use as carve-out accounts. Some policy analysts and in-
ternational	financial	institutions,	such	as	the	International	Labor	Orga-
nization (Gillion et al. 2000), have argued against using carve-out in-
dividual accounts. Perhaps the chief rationale against mandating carve-
out	accounts	is	that	they	place	too	great	a	burden	of	financial	risk	on	
low-income workers, especially when the plans replace part of a tradi-
tional	social	security	program,	reducing	the	base	level	of	benefits.	With	
mandatory individual accounts that are an add-on to social security, the 
argument	concerning	financial	market	risk	is	weakened.	
With mandatory individual accounts, the worker has an asset that is 
invested	in	the	capital	market	and	bears	the	risk	of	financial	market	fluc-
tuations. When the worker reaches retirement, he or she generally also 
bears	the	risk	of	fluctuations	in	interest	rates	in	determining	the	annuity	
value of the account balance. Workers differ in their attitudes toward 
financial	market	risk	and	in	their	knowledge	about	these	markets.	Typi-
cally, low-income workers are more risk-averse and less informed than 
higher-income workers concerning the investment of their retirement 
income.
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A response to this criticism concerning risk-bearing in carve-out 
individual accounts is that workers may have the option of investing 
their accounts in low-risk assets. Further, it has been argued that risks 
would be reduced by diversifying sources of retirement income instead 
of relying exclusively on a pay-as-you-go system. Underfunded social 
security systems are also subject to the risk that workers will not receive 
all	of	the	benefits	promised	or	that	contribution	rates	will	be	raised,	al-
though those risks are generally considerably smaller for older workers 
than	capital	market	risks,	in	part	because	benefit	cuts	and	tax	increases	
impose political costs on policymakers.
A further issue is the extent to which guarantees are incorporat-
ed within the system (see Appendix A at the end of the book). Many 
countries with mandated individual accounts incorporate rate-of-return 
guarantees (for example, Argentina and Chile), but a sizable number, 
including Australia and Sweden, do not (Turner and Rajnes 2001). Such 
guarantees	mitigate	 the	 adverse	 effects	 of	market	fluctuations	 on	 ac-
count holders.
Issues Arising from Mandatory Individual Accounts
Private sector management of individual account investments is 
generally viewed as the most important aspect of the substitution of a 
private role for a government role in the provision of social security. Fi-
nancial management, however, is only one of several retirement income 
functions that can be privatized. Other functions include record keeping 
for	the	accounts	of	beneficiaries,	the	choice	of	fund	managers,	collec-
tion of contributions and disbursement to fund managers, annuitization 
of	benefits,	disbursement	of	nonannuitized	benefits,	and	the	insurance	
or	provision	of	guarantees	for	promised	benefits.	All	privatized	social	
security systems maintain government involvement in some of these 
functions, which sometimes is extensive (Turner and Rajnes 1998).
In developing social security systems with individual accounts, 
countries must consider the extent to which worker choice is allowed. 
Generally, the greater the range of choice, the greater the system’s ad-
ministrative cost because of the added complexity in administering the 
program. Will workers be allowed to choose from few investment funds 
or many? Will they be allowed to transfer money across funds at any 
time or once a quarter? How many funds will they be allowed to hold 
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at one time? These are some of the typical questions countries adopting 
such a system must resolve.
voLunTARy	CARve-ouT	ACCounTs
The issues arising from incorporating individual accounts into social 
security depend on the type of accounts used. Although the literature 
on individual accounts is extensive, of the basic types of individual ac-
counts, the least attention has been paid to voluntary carve-out accounts 
(exceptions include Blake 1995; Turner and Rajnes 1995; Gustman and 
Steinmeier 1998; Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser 1998; Disney, Pa-
lacios, and Whitehouse 1999; Orszag and Greenstein 2001; and NASI 
2005). Yet voluntary carve-outs can be the most complex type of indi-
vidual account. (See Box 3.1 for some of the problems the United King-
dom encountered with voluntary carve-out accounts.)
With a voluntary carve-out, the worker has a choice. He or she can 
remain in the social security system or withdraw from it, either partially 
or fully, depending on the structure of the voluntary carve-out.  In ex-
change for a reduction in both current taxes and future social security 
benefits,	 the	worker	 is	obliged	 to	contribute	 to	an	 individual	account.	
The employer’s contributions to social security may also be transferred 
to the individual account. 
In the mid-1990s, the United States considered a carve-out health 
insurance	reform	based	on	“pay	or	play”	(Turner	and	Rajnes	1995).	Vol-
untary carve-outs for social security had been proposed in the United 
States in 1935 as the Clark Amendment to the original Social Security 
Act; however, these were rejected by Congress because voluntary par-
ticipation was thought to be inconsistent with the redistributive nature of 
the U.S. Social Security system (Schieber and Shoven 1999).  
The genesis of voluntary carve-outs in the United Kingdom came 
from completely different reasons from those motivating President 
Bush’s proposal as put forth in his 2000 and 2004 presidential cam-
paigns. The United Kingdom was quite late in establishing an earn-
ings-related social security program; this was not done until the 1970s. 
At that time, a well-established private pension sector was already in 
place. 
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Box	3.1		Problems	encountered	with	voluntary	
Carve-out	Accounts	in	the	united	Kingdom
Since 1988, the United Kingdom has allowed employees to volun-
tarily withdraw from part of social security by reducing their contribu-
tions	and	receiving	lower	benefits.	Instead,	employees	contribute	to	an	
individual account. In 2005, a pension commission in the United King-
dom proposed abolishing this system (Pensions Commission 2005). This 




Insurance companies are encouraging many policyholders to stop 
contributing to their VCOs and to return to the traditional social secu-
rity	program.	The	British	government	determines	the	benefit	offset,	the	
amount	by	which	social	security	benefits	are	reduced	for	workers	who	
choose the VCO. Although not its intent, the government set the VCO 
benefit	offset	so	that	it	is	no	longer	favorable	for	most	workers	to	take	the	
VCO,	according	to	some	British	insurance	companies.	Every	five	years,	
the British government determines the amounts that are credited to indi-
vidual accounts for workers taking a VCO. In 2002, interest rates were 
low, but the British government expected that they would rise. Thus they 
credited individual accounts at a lower level, assuming workers would 
be able to earn higher rates of return on their accounts. When interest 
rates did not rise, the amount workers were earning on their investments 
in	their	VCO	accounts	was	insufficient	to	compensate	them	for	the	re-
duction	in	their	social	security	benefits.	Two	large	insurance	companies,	
Prudential and Norwich Union, sent letters to their 750,000 policyhold-
ers with VCOs telling them that they would be better off leaving their 
VCOs and returning to the traditional social security program (Money 
Marketing 2004). In 2004, 500,000 people abandoned VCO pensions 
and returned to the state system (Cohen 2005).
The	Government	Paid	Large	subsidies	to	Participants	in	the	 
Individual Accounts 
VCOs resulted in a large government subsidy in the early years. The 
British	 government	 initially	 established	 a	 favorable	 benefit	 offset	 for	  
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Box	3.1		(continued) 
workers to encourage them to choose VCOs. It subsequently estimated 
that the present value of the savings due to the reduction in future ben-
efits	was	$22	billion	less	than	the	cost	to	the	government	in	incentives	
provided to take a VCO. The cost to the government in incentives to take 
a	VCO	was	roughly	twice	as	much	as	it	saved	through	reduced	benefit	





accounts, even when those accounts are inappropriate for the individual, 
may have taken advantage of VCO participants. In the United Kingdom, 
with	the	“pensions	mis-selling”	scandal,	more	than	two	million	people	
contributed to VCO accounts who would have been better off remain-
ing in social security. Those affected represent more than 40 percent of 
workers who initially took VCOs with personal pensions, and the com-
pensation	they	will	receive	from	financial	service	providers	as	a	result	
of being misled is approximately $20 billion. The people mis-sold were 
primarily lower-wage workers (Gillion et al. 2000). 
There	Is	a	Long	Lag	between	the	Collection	and	Crediting	of	 
Contributions	to	the	vCos	
The government does not credit contributions to VCOs until 18 
months after the start of the tax year in which the worker made the con-
tributions, and it pays no interest during this period. While a system 
could be established to credit accounts more quickly, such a system 
would increase administrative costs because it would require more re-
cord keeping.  
vCos	have	high	Administrative	Costs	
In 1998, the combined effect of the fees charged on VCO accounts 
equaled an average reduction in yield of 3.2 percent per year for people 
who had participated in these plans for 10 years and a projected rate of 
1.7 percent per year for people who would stay for 25 years (Blake and 
Board 2000).
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Voluntary carve-outs were permitted in the United Kingdom not to 
reduce a preexisting social security program but to protect a preexisting 
defined	benefit	private	pension	system.	Later,	 for	 ideological	 reasons	
relating to the encouragement of individual responsibility by Margaret 
Thatcher’s Tory government, workers were allowed to establish private 
accounts to reduce their participation in social security.
Generosity	of	the	Trade-off	
The trade-off between contributions to an individual account and 
reductions	in	future	social	security	benefits	is	probably	the	most	impor-
tant aspect of the structure of voluntary carve-outs, and it is the most 
difficult	 feature	 to	 structure	 to	 avoid	distortions	 in	 the	 retirement	 in-
come system. 
The smaller the reduction in the worker’s future social security ben-
efits	that	accompanies	the	reduction	in	the	worker’s	social	security	pay-
roll taxes, the more favorable to the worker is the voluntary carve-out, 
and the more likely it is to be chosen. However, another directly related 
trade-off exists: the more favorable the voluntary carve-out is to the 
worker, the more costly it is to the government. A generous voluntary 
carve-out may result in a substantial subsidy of individual accounts by 
the traditional social security system or by government general revenue 
(Box 3.2).
The problem of setting the trade-off’s generosity is highlighted by 
the report of the President’s Commission (2001), which in its three pro-
posals set three different rates. It proposes reducing future social secu-
rity	benefits	the	worker	will	receive	by	an	amount	based	on	the	decrease	
in payroll taxes that is compounded by a real interest rate ranging from 
2.0 to 3.5 percent.1 President George W. Bush suggested a real rate of 
3.0	percent	(above	inflation)	during	his	second	term.	
The	benefit	offset	determines	the	voluntary	carve-out’s	effect	on	so-
cial security’s long-run solvency. If workers are required to forgo a por-
tion	of	benefits	actuarially	equivalent	to	what	would	have	been	paid	for	
by the reduction in their social security payroll taxes, social security’s 
finances	will	not	be	affected	over	the	long	run.	A	transition	effect	oc-
curs, however, because social security contributions are decreased years 
before	benefit	payments	are	reduced.	If	the	benefit	offset	deviates	from	
actuarial equivalence, it will affect the desirability to workers of taking 
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the	carve-out	and	will	have	a	long-run	effect	on	social	security	finances,	
which could be either positive or negative. Since it is expected that the 
U.S. Treasury will pay, on average, a real rate of return of 3 percent on 
its bonds that are issued specially for Social Security and are held in the 
Social Security Trust Fund (President’s Commission 2001), the rates 
of 2.0 and 2.5 percent for determining the reduction in Social Security 
benefits	imply	that	the	individual	accounts	would	be	subsidized	by	the	
Social Security system. 
The carve-out is like a long-term loan to a worker from the social 
security system. The worker borrows from future social security ben-
efits,	with	the	loan	being	the	reduction	in	social	security	contributions.	
Workers receive the rate of return actually earned on their individual 
accounts, which would be an expected 3 percent real (but with some 
interest risk) if they were to invest in Treasury bonds. Workers repay the 
loan	through	reduced	receipt	of	social	security	benefits	at	the	rate	speci-
fied	by	the	carve-out.	If	 that	rate	were	2	percent	real,	workers	would	
receive a government subsidy of 1 percent per year on the balance in 
their individual account because they would effectively be borrowing 
from the government at 2 percent and receiving a rate of return of 3 per-
cent on the investment of this borrowing. If the rate were 3 percent, as 
Box	3.2		voluntary	Carve-outs	in	Japan
In Japan, voluntary carve-outs from social security can be done 
only	by	using	employer-provided	defined	benefit	plans.	Nonethe-
less, aspects of the Japanese experience are relevant for assessing 
voluntary carve-outs that use individual accounts. In any type of 
carve-out	system,	it	 is	difficult	 to	calibrate	 the	requirements	for	
the carve-out plan. In Japan, many employers have decided that 
they	are	unable	to	obtain	the	financial	rate	of	return	necessary	to	
provide	 the	 benefits	 required	 of	 voluntary	 carve-out	 plans.	The	
percentage of the Japanese labor force participating in voluntary 
carve-out plans has declined from a peak of 40 percent in the mid-
1990s to 18 percent in 2004 (Takayama 2005). Thus, as in the 
United Kingdom, there has been a large decline in the percentage 
of the workforce participating in voluntary carve-outs.
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proposed by President Bush, there would be no expected subsidy over 
the long term. 
A risk-free interest rate is credited to workers’ hypothetical ac-
counts	for	determining	the	benefit	offset	since	it	is	presumably	applied	
to the account with certainty, while the investment earnings they actu-
ally receive on their accounts are risky. Whether workers take the vol-
untary carve-out would depend on three factors: how risk-averse they 
are, what other investments they have, and what special tax incentives, 
if any, the government would provide.
The	structure	of	the	Trade-off	between	Contributions	 
and	Benefits
For a voluntary carve-out account, the trade-off between reduced 
contributions	 to	 social	 security	 and	 reduced	 benefits	 from	 it	 can	 be	
structured	in	various	ways.	For	example,	the	cut	in	benefits	can	be	the	
same percentage as that in the worker’s social security contributions. If 
social security contributions by the worker are reduced by x percent, the 
future	benefits	accrued	during	that	period	are	also	reduced	by	x percent. 
The	reduction	in	social	security	benefits	with	a	carve-out	can	be	set	as	
an equal percentage for all workers choosing to take the carve-out. This 
way may be the simplest administratively.
Age neutrality





the	 difference	 in	 accrual	 patterns	 between	 traditional	 defined	 benefit	







for workers to take the voluntary carve-out when young but not when 
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older. The problem of switching incentives can be addressed by making 
the choice of a carve-out irrevocable. However, such an arrangement 
raises issues of equity if the terms of the trade-off are subsequently 
amended, which they almost certainly would be. The British system 
gives workers greater freedom of choice, allowing workers to switch in 
or out once a year.
Rather than having a single rebate rate for all workers, the United 
Kingdom has an array of age-related rates. The rebate is the amount that 
is deposited in the individual account for workers taking the voluntary 
carve-out. Younger workers receive lower rebates on their payroll taxes 
(known as National Insurance contributions) than do older ones since 
individual accounts of equal lifetime generosity are more favorable than 
defined	benefit	plans	for	younger	workers	because	of	the	differing	ac-
crual patterns. This difference generally occurs between accrual patterns 
in	individual	accounts	and	those	in	defined	benefit	plans.	In	2001–2002,	
a 20-year-old received a 4 percent rebate, while a 50-year-old received 
the maximum rebate of 9 percent. Age-related rebates designed to keep 
the contracting-out arrangements age-neutral are complex, expensive to 
administer, and probably poorly understood by workers. 
The	rebate’s	size	is	generally	not	fixed	in	a	voluntary	carve-out	sys-
tem but can be expected to be revised over time. The rebate structure in 
the United Kingdom is reevaluated by the Government Actuary every 
five	years	to	take	into	account	increases	in	life	expectancy	and	changes	
in interest rates. The rebates have been calculated based on the expense 
in	the	private	sector	of	providing	a	replacement	benefit,	with	an	amount	
added to the rebate as an incentive to take it. 
Gender	neutrality	
A further problem in designing voluntary carve-out individual ac-
counts is to structure the trade-off so that it is gender-neutral. Because 
women have a longer life expectancy than men, a gender-blind trade-off 
will not be gender-neutral in effect. The trade-off in the United King-
dom is not gender-neutral, but it encourages men and women to take 
the voluntary carve-out at different ages. For example, in the late 1990s, 
93 percent of eligible men in Britain aged 45–54 chose the individual 
account, whereas only 32 percent of eligible women in that age group 
did so (Whitehouse 1998). For many years, Japan structured its volun-
tary carve-out with different rebates for men and women, but, now that 
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views of gender equity have changed, that is no longer the case (Turner 
and Watanabe 1995). An additional issue relates to the way changes in 
life	expectancy	affect	benefits	in	a	voluntary	carve-out	account	and	in	
social security.
In sum, voluntary carve-out accounts are complex to design and 
to	operate.	It	is	difficult	to	set,	in	a	cost-neutral	and	nondistorting	way,	







About 30 countries have made individual accounts part of their so-
cial security system. This section discusses the features of mandatory 
individual accounts in selected countries around the world. 
South America and the Caribbean
Twelve countries in South and Central America and the Caribbean 
have incorporated individual accounts into their social security pro-
grams (Gill, Packard, and Yermo 2005). In all except Chile’s example, 
the reforms have resulted in workers paying higher mandatory contri-
butions for retirement income plans. The countries adopting individual 
accounts copied some features of the landmark Chilean reform but di-
verged in other respects. 
Three approaches have been taken (Mesa-Lago 1997). First, di-
rectly following Chile’s example, the countries of Bolivia, El Salvador, 
and Mexico have closed their social security systems to new entrants 
and substituted a mandatory individual account system (mandatory full 
carve-out). All other reformed countries in Latin America have retained 
their traditional social security system in some respect.  
Second, Uruguay has introduced a mixed system. All workers par-
ticipate in both a mandatory social security program, which was reduced 
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during the reform but is still dominant, and a mandatory individual ac-
count program (partial replacement or mandatory partial carve-out). 
Because	 of	 considerations	 about	 financial	 risk,	 low-income	 workers	
only participate in the traditional social security program. 
Third, Colombia and Peru have two competing programs, in which 
workers either choose the government-run system or a substitute, pri-
vately managed plan.
Chile
Because the Chilean reform has been a model for other countries, 
it is considered here in more detail. Although the main features of the 
initial Chilean reform are well known in the pension world, the Chilean 
system has evolved through frequent legislated changes, so that it con-
tinues to be a leader in the area of social security reform. The Chilean 
reform is based on the Chicago School (derived from the University 
of Chicago) or neoliberal economic principles of free choice, private 
ownership	rights	to	social	security	benefits,	and	private	sector	invest-
ment and administration of pension accounts through competition in the 
marketplace.  
In 1981, Chile reformed its social security system in a way that rev-
olutionized	thinking	about	social	security.	It	became	the	first	country	to	
replace	its	publicly	managed	pay-as-you-go	defined	benefit	system	with	
privately managed individual accounts. In the new system, private cor-
porations, known as Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs) 
or Pension Fund Administrators, manage the investment of the funds.   
Workers are required to contribute 10 percent of their pretax salary, 
up to a ceiling, to a private pension fund of their choosing. The ceil-
ing	is	indexed,	rising	monthly	at	the	rate	of	inflation.	Workers	can	also	
make voluntary contributions, though few do. An additional amount—
ranging from 2.50 to 3.74 percent of a worker’s earnings—is levied to 
finance	disability	benefits,	preretirement	survivor	benefits,	and	for	gen-
eral administrative expenses, including a commission. Contributions 
are withheld by employers from employee pay and transferred monthly 
to the AFP of the worker’s choosing. These payments are tax deduct-
ible. Thus, the government subsidizes pensions through the tax system. 
Employers do not contribute.
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The Chilean mandatory pension system began with 12 AFPs and 
reached a high of 23, but the number has declined, so that in 1999 there 
were eight, and in 2005 there were six. Most of the reductions in AFPs 
have resulted from mergers, allowing workers to maintain their account 
with the merged AFP. 
Initially, each AFP could offer only a single fund, but that limit was 
raised with the addition of a low-risk fund for older workers in response 
to	criticism	that	 the	system	placed	too	much	financial	market	risk	on	
workers nearing retirement. Since August 2002, employees have had a 
further expanded range of investment funds to choose from. The new 
law	allows	employees	to	select	one	of	five	funds	offered	by	the	AFP.	
The	five	fund	types	are	denoted	as	A	through	E,	going	from	highest	to	
lowest risk. Men aged 56 and older and women aged 51 and older are 
prohibited from investing in Fund A. Retirees are limited to investing in 
one of the three funds with the lowest level of risk (C, D, and E). 
The default for participants not choosing an investment is an im-
portant feature of an individual account. In Chile, rather than having a 
single default, employees who fail to make a selection are assigned to 
a fund according to their age, with older employees being defaulted to 
a lower-risk fund:
• Fund B—up to age 35 for both males and females,
• Fund C—ages 36–55 for males and ages 36–50 for females, or
• Fund D—age 56 and over for males; age 51 and over for 
females.
Fund A (for men up to age 55 and women up to age 50) and Fund 
E (no age limits) are not used for defaults. The younger age limits for 
females	than	males	for	fund	types	C	and	D	reflect	the	fact	that	females	
are able to retire at younger ages than males: females may retire at age 
60 and males may retire at age 65 with an old-age pension. Workers can 
take their retirement at younger ages if they have saved enough in their 
accounts to meet government-set minimum standards.
Even though the Chilean pension system is privatized, meaning that 
it has private sector management, the government still maintains a large 
role in the retirement income system. For workers contributing for at 
least	20	years,	the	system	provides	a	guaranteed	minimum	benefit.	For	
workers contributing for fewer years, the government provides an anti-
poverty	benefit.	If	an	AFP	is	unable	to	provide	the	minimum	mandatory	
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rate of return, the government terminates the AFP and guarantees the 
minimum rate of return. 
Proponents of the Chilean model claim that its advantages stem 
from its adherence to free market principles. It gives workers clearly 
defined	property	rights	in	their	pension	contributions.	These	rights	are	
believed to decrease the political risks to social security—that govern-
ment	will	 legislate	changes	that	will	reduce	the	value	of	 the	benefits.	
It	provides	 individual	 choice	as	 to	pension	 fund	manager.	 It	 “acts	 as	
an engine of, not an impediment to, economic growth; and enhances 
personal	freedom	and	dignity”	(Rodriguez	1999).	However,	the	“own-
ership	society”	has	not	proven	to	be	universally	popular	in	Chile;	many	
workers do not contribute to the system.
Asia 
Few Asian countries have used individual accounts for social secu-
rity.	Under	the	“two	systems,	one	country”	policy,	Hong	Kong	main-
tains a separate social security system from the rest of China. In 2000, it 
began a mandatory individual account system under which workers and 
employers both contribute 5 percent of wages into funded individual 
accounts. Workers can voluntarily contribute higher amounts. 
As in 401(k) plans, pension fund managers are chosen by employ-
ers, and employees can select only from among the funds provided 
by that manager (Fox and Palmer 2001). Fund managers typically of-
fer several different choices, with a guarantee fund commonly being 
provided. Some guarantee funds ensure return of capital, while others 
guarantee a minimum rate of return. Hong Kong also maintains a fund 
to compensate participants for losses that are due to illegal activities by 
fund managers. The system in Hong Kong is not multipillar (providing 
income from more than one source) since the individual account sys-
tem will be the primary source of retirement income for most workers 
participating in it. 
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia
In 1998, Hungary established mandatory individual accounts, re-
quiring	contributions	of	8	percent,	while	maintaining	a	defined	benefit	
plan as the primary system, with that plan receiving contributions of 22 
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percent. A key difference between the reforms in Hungary and those 
in Poland is that Hungary made little change in its existing plan, while 
Poland completely restructured social security, instituting a notional ac-
count system. 
A notional account system is a hybrid having features of both de-
fined	benefit	and	individual	accounts.	Hungary	maintains	an	individual	
account	for	each	worker,	as	a	defined	contribution	plan	would.	How-
ever, these are called notional accounts because they are solely book-
keeping entities. Each worker’s account is credited with contributions 
and with interest earnings on accumulated account balances, but these 
credits are not tied to actual investments. The plan may be run on a pay-
as-you-go basis, or it may have investments managed in the same way 
as	defined	benefit	plans.	
Russia has introduced funded individual accounts (Turner and 
Guenther 2005). Beginning in 2004, 4 percent of the employer’s contri-
butions could be paid to private funds rather than to the State Pension 
Fund. That percentage increases to 6 percent in 2006 (Sandul 2002).  
oeCD	Countries
Unlike	in	other	OECD	countries,	the	basic	social	security	benefit	in	
Australia is income-tested and asset-tested. About 70 percent of retir-
ees	receive	it.	An	income-tested	benefit	is	a	benefit	that	workers	must	
qualify for by proving that their income falls below a set level. Australia 
has never had an earnings-related social security program. 
To	supplement	the	income-tested	benefit,	Australia	has	introduced	a	
privatized retirement income system, called the Superannuation Guar-
antee. That system mandates private sector employer-provided pen-
sions that are primarily individual accounts. The contribution rate is 
9 percent of salary. Because the government pension is unfunded, the 
change represents a move toward a funded system. 
Because contributions are enforced by legislation and paid into 
funds administered and invested by the private sector, the Australian 
government has introduced extensive safeguards to ensure that employ-
ees’ pension entitlements are secure. This regulation has resulted in in-
creased complexity, added costs, and a heavy burden on trustee boards 
responsible for overseeing the funds’ management.  
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Sweden has instituted a mandatory individual account system that 
incorporates lessons learned from the experiences of Chile and other 
countries, particularly in ways to reduce administrative costs. This 
individual	account	 system	reflects	a	desire	 to	 increase	 the	amount	of	
prefunding in the Swedish retirement income system and place greater 
emphasis on the role of the capital market and individualism (Harrys-
son and O’Brien 2003). 
In	1999	and	2000,	Sweden	replaced	its	traditional	defined	benefit	
social security program with a notional account plan supplemented by 
a mandatory funded individual account. As described earlier, in a no-
tional account system, each worker has an account that is credited with 
contributions	and	interest	earnings;	however,	the	system	is	financed	on	
a pay-as-you-go basis, so the individual accounts are not funded, and 
the balances are bookkeeping entries. Out of a total contribution rate of 
18.5 percent of earned income, 16.0 percent is for the notional account 
system and 2.5 percent is for individual accounts, called the Premium 
Pension. Starting in 2000, Swedish workers were allowed to choose 
from 460 different funds to manage their pension investments, with the 
default being a government-run fund. By 2005, the number of funds 
exceeded 600. 
The Premium Pension system is administered by a new government 
agency, the Premium Pension Authority (in Swedish, Premipensions-
myndigheten, or PPM, as it is known). The PPM acts as a clearinghouse 
and record keeper for the funded individual account system. This agen-
cy was needed because the individual account system includes a broad 
range	of	activities	that	would	have	been	difficult	to	undertake	within	the	
traditional functions of the Swedish Social Insurance Agency. In addi-
tion, a central agency is expected to help keep administrative costs low 
because of scale economies in administration (Palmer 2001). 
The United Kingdom encourages contracting-out to individual ac-
count plans. While every developed country has a social security sys-
tem, the United Kingdom is unusual in giving every employer and em-
ployee the option of contracting-out of part of social security. Contract-
ing-out in Japan is available on a more limited basis and only through 
employer-provided	defined	benefit	plans.	
Contracting-out in the United Kingdom has developed into a highly 
complex system. In 1986, the United Kingdom passed an act designed, 
by using individual accounts, to encourage contracting-out (voluntary 
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carve-outs) from the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS), 
which	 is	 a	 defined	benefit	 plan.	Previously,	 contracting-out	 had	only	
been	possible	with	employer-provided	defined	benefit	plans.	That	law	
allowed workers to leave SERPS or their employer-provided, contract-
ed-out	defined	benefit	plan	by	using	a	personal	pension	called	an	Ap-
proved Personal Pension. Workers with personal pensions were permit-
ted to recontract into social security (SERPS) if that later appeared to 
be favorable. 
The United Kingdom replaced SERPS with a pension program 
called the State Second Pension (S2P), which took effect April 2002. 




connected to earnings. This arrangement provides greater incentive for 
lower-income earners to stay in the plan and for middle- and higher-
income earners to leave. 
Employees who contract out receive a rebate on their social secu-
rity	contributions.	The	amount	is	intended	to	reflect	the	savings	to	the	
government from not having to pay the pension to that participant. The 
money is paid directly into the employee’s contracted-out pension fund. 
Contracting-out has declined in popularity in the United Kingdom; it 
reached a peak of 69 percent of the workforce in 1991 and had dropped 
to 61 percent by 2001.
ConCLusIons
This chapter presents a broad overview of pension mandating and 
social security privatization around the world.  It discusses issues in 
the social security reform debate relating to individual accounts and 
describes the main features of mandated and privatized systems in sev-
eral countries. Mandating has been far more common an approach than 
voluntary carve-outs. Some of the complexities of structuring the re-
bate	for	a	voluntary	carve-out	are	described.	The	difficulties	in	design-
ing voluntary carve-outs that are age- and gender-neutral and neutral in 
their	effect	on	the	financing	of	traditional	social	security	programs	are	
among the reasons few countries have adopted them.    
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prepared the various proposals.
Turner.indb   50 2/6/2006   10:28:30 AM
51
4
Agency Risk and the Management 
of Individual Account Investments 
by Corporations and Mutual Funds
The three-year decline in world stock markets starting in 2000 
and the dramatic plunge of technology stock prices made clear that 
individual	 account	 participants	 face	 substantial	financial	market	 risk.	
However, participants are also vulnerable to improper management of 
their investments, as evidenced by the corporate scandals at Enron and 
WorldCom. 
Participants in individual accounts may face risk at three levels of 
investment	management:	1)	financial	management	of	corporations,	2)	
management	 of	 investments	 by	mutual	 funds	 and	 other	 financial	 in-





own income rather than that of the shareholders. The problems arising 
when agents manage investments result in agency risk for participants 
in individual accounts.
In	considering	financial	management	by	corporations,	this	chapter	
examines whether participants in individual accounts have adequate 
protection.	 For	 financial	 management	 by	 mutual	 funds,	 the	 focus	 is	
on	conflicts	of	 interest	 in	mutual	 funds,	 the	 level	of	 fees	participants	
pay, and the transparency of those fees. The chapter also considers the 
possible role of government as an investment manager. The following 
chapter	takes	up	problems	arising	from	financial	management	by	indi-
vidual participants.
Turner.indb   51 2/6/2006   10:28:30 AM
52   Turner
FInAnCIAL	MAnAGeMenT	In	MAnDAToRy	 
InDIvIDuAL	ACCounTs
The Swedish Premium Pension system and the Chilean mandatory 
individual accounts exemplify issues that arise in the institutional man-
agement of investments in individual accounts. 
The	swedish	Premium	Pension	system
The Swedish Premium Pension system, with its mandatory 2.5 per-
cent contribution, provides individual accounts designed to reduce the 
administrative burden on employers and to limit advertising costs and 
administrative expenses for service providers by using centralized man-
agement through a government agency. It provides an example of how 
individual accounts might be managed in the United States.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Premium Pension is administered 
by a government agency established for this purpose, the Premium Pen-
sion Authority (PPM). As a clearinghouse and record keeper for the 
individual accounts, the PPM collects contributions, disburses them to 
mutual	 funds,	 and	makes	 benefit	 payments.	A	 central	 agency	 should	
help keep administrative costs low because of scale economies (Palmer 
2001b). 
When considering the administrative costs of pension systems, gen-
erally the focus is on the institutions managing the investments and the 
pension system, and the important issue of the costs borne by employ-
ers is ignored. The administrative burden on employers varies greatly 
by type of individual account. The Premium Pension places a minimal 
administrative burden on employers. Employers withhold contributions 
from employees’ pay, aggregate the tax and contribution withholdings 
for their employees, and make a single monthly tax and contribution 
payment to the National Tax Authority. 
Swedish employers only report information on the individual work-
er’s earnings once a year to the government. Therefore, individual pen-
sion	rights	cannot	be	established	until	workers	have	filed	 the	 income	
data for their income taxes and these statements have been consolidated 
with employers’ reports. Collecting contributions and then posting them 
to the workers’ accounts takes the National Tax Authority and the PPM 
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18–24 months or longer from January of the year in which the contribu-
tions were made. When the tax authorities have determined individual 
pension rights, they inform the PPM as to how much each worker’s 
account should be credited, and the PPM transfers that amount to the 
workers’ accounts. 
In the interim before individual workers’ pension rights have been 
established, pension contributions are placed in a fund at the National 
Debt	Office.	The	rate	of	 return	paid	on	 the	 fund	 is	close	 to	 that	paid	
on government debt. Because government bonds in Sweden are se-
cure, they provide a guaranteed rate of return for the Premium Pension 
participants. 
Workers can challenge the income and contribution statements that 
the tax authorities provide, and errors in record keeping inevitably oc-
cur. In December 2001, the National Tax Authority informed the PPM 
that	it	had	changed	income	and	contribution	figures	for	50,000	workers	
(out of approximately 4.5 million). The tax authority had understated 
the income and therefore the pension contributions for 11,000 people 
(Reid 2002). This problem raises the issue of whether workers should 
be compensated for the shortfall in investment income if the shares that 
should have been credited have appreciated. 
When the National Tax Authority has informed the PPM of the 
amount credited to each worker, workers select how to invest their an-
nual contributions. At the same time, all new labor market entrants al-
locate their initial contributions to mutual funds. Workers also can elect 
to place their contributions in their spouse’s account instead of in their 
own. This feature allows spouses to choose a form of earnings sharing 
to	determine	their	household	pension	benefits,	which	can	be	used,	for	
example, to supplement the account of a wife who is out of the labor 
force rearing children.
The PPM places all the workers’ contributions for a year, plus the 
accumulated	interest,	in	the	mutual	funds	over	a	period	of	four	to	five	
days. For example, in the second week of April 2001, the PPM received 
20 billion Swedish crowns (SEK), the contributions from 1999 (Jarven-
paa	2001).	In	the	first	week	of	February	2002,	the	PPM	placed	approxi-
mately SEK20 billion from the funds into the Swedish Premium Pen-
sion system, which was the amount of the contributions plus interest for 
the year 2000 (PPM 2002). Thus, the system treats all workers equally 
with regard to the timing of the investment of their contributions in the 
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mutual funds. Workers can make daily interfund transfers of money 
already invested except during the blackout period, when the annual 
contributions are being placed.  
The PPM keeps all records of the individual accounts and fund 
share values. It aggregates individual transactions concerning interfund 
transfers at the PPM at the end of each day and then transmits a net 
purchase or redemption to each fund. The PPM matches buy and sell 
orders internally, limiting its transactions with fund managers to the net 
amount of the individual transactions. This procedure greatly reduces 
the mutual funds’ transaction costs compared to a system in which mu-
tual	funds	receive	contributions	for	and	make	benefit	payments	to	indi-
vidual participants.
A system design issue is the number of choices an individual ac-
count system offers to workers. One view posits that the greater the 
range and number of options, the better able are workers to make a 
selection that suits their personal situation. An alternative position is 
that, beyond a point, more choices raise the likelihood of errors in de-
cision making by individuals lacking a sophisticated understanding of 
investments. 
Swedish workers have far more investment choices than do par-
ticipants in any other type of mandatory individual account. Initially 
in 2000, the Premium Pension offered a choice of 455 mutual funds; 
by 2005, that number had risen to more than 600. More than 80 mutual 
fund companies participate in the system; nearly half of these compa-
nies are managed outside Sweden.  
Swedes have shown a strong preference for domestically managed 
funds, with foreign funds receiving only 4 percent of all contributions 
(Weaver 2002). This suggests that many participants have chosen mu-
tual fund companies with which they are familiar, rather than trying to 
evaluate the choices.
One reason for allowing participants to select from among numer-
ous funds, including international ones, is that the Swedish stock mar-
ket is small; if only a few domestic funds were available, they eventu-
ally would dominate the market. Any mutual fund company licensed 
in Sweden may participate in the Premium Pension system. Generally, 
licensed	funds	must	meet	 the	European	Union’s	portfolio	diversifica-
tion requirements. Swedish equity funds, however, are exempt because 
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the Swedish equity market is dominated by one company, Ericsson 
(Weaver 2002). 
The PPM provides participants with a booklet that lists all avail-
able funds. Further, it provides this listing without charge to the funds, 
which results in free advertising to those interested in the Swedish mar-
ket.	For	this	reason,	it	would	appear	desirable	to	charge	a	flat	fee	for	
companies to participate, reducing substantially the number of funds 
with few investors. 
The booklet divides the funds into categories and subcategories, 
including domestic and international stock funds, mixed stock-bond 
funds, and bond funds. Derivatives funds are considered to be too risky 
an investment for social security accounts and thus are not included as 
an option. 
Most of the funds are equity funds; of these, about 10 percent are in-
dex funds, investing passively in a broad stock market index rather than 
actively researching and picking securities. Index funds tend to have 
the lowest fees of any funds because they are passively managed: there 
is no fee for paying analysts to study stocks and make subsequent buy 
and sell decisions since those activities are not undertaken. Passively 
managed funds also have low portfolio turnover costs because they do 
relatively little trading. 
Participants can invest in bonds through about 70 bond funds in 
addition to about 80 generation funds. The mix of stocks and bonds 
in these funds varies with the participants’ age; the percentage held in 
bonds increases with age so that older workers hold less risky portfo-
lios. One-quarter of the funds invest primarily in Sweden. 
In addition to a wide range of domestic and foreign funds, Swedish 
workers also can invest in one of two government-managed funds. A 
government organization, the Seventh Swedish National Pension Fund, 
is the default fund for workers who do not make their own choice. It 
manages the money for those workers who do not choose a fund or 
funds. This fund has more than three times as many participants as the 
fund most frequently designated by choice (PPM 2002). As of 2002, the 
default fund held about 30 percent of the assets invested in the Premium 
Pension system, and roughly 40 percent of the participants invested in 
it.1 The second government fund is an alternative for workers who want 
the government to manage their individual account. To participate in 
this fund, workers must specify it.   
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The Seventh Swedish National Pension Fund (Sjunde AP-fonden, 
or Seventh AP Fund, or AP7) manages both funds with an independent, 
appointed board that functions as a fund manager. The default fund is 
heavily invested in equity. Its equity holdings cannot exceed 90 percent 
of the total value in this fund or fall below 80 percent. Of the equity 
holdings, as much as 75 percent can be invested in foreign stocks. In 
2001, the default fund invested 90 percent of its assets in Swedish and 
international	equities.	In	2002,	that	figure	had	declined	to	82	percent	in	
equities, of which 17 percent were in Swedish holdings and 65 percent 
were in foreign ones (Sjunde AP-fonden 2003b, p. 4). 
The Swedish default fund has a much riskier portfolio than is typi-
cal of default funds in 401(k) plans with automatic enrollment of par-
ticipants. Those default funds—presumably at least in part because of 
worries over legal liabilities if losses are incurred—typically consist of 
fixed-income	securities.	Part	of	 the	Swedish	default	 fund	 is	managed	
actively, and part is managed passively, invested in broad indexes. Part 
of the fund’s passive portion is invested in an indexed bond fund.  
One concern with funded mandatory pensions is the risk of political 
interference by government in investment decisions and capital mar-
kets. The broad range of funds and few limitations on the choices of 
funds offered in the Swedish system greatly reduce the concern that the 
government may manipulate the investment process or limit the range 
of investment choice on political grounds.
An issue that arises with government management of pension in-
vestments is whether investment decisions should take social issues 
into	account	rather	than	be	based	solely	on	financial	considerations	of	
risk, liquidity, and expected return. The two Swedish government funds’ 
investment strategies incorporate environmental and ethical concerns. 
The funds invest only in companies that adhere to the international 
conventions Sweden has signed on human rights, child labor, the envi-
ronment, and corruption. They will not invest in companies that have 
violated United Nations human rights standards, child labor standards, 
International Labor Organization standards concerning the treatment of 
workers, and international conventions against bribery, corruption, and 
environmental degradation. These restrictions on investments do not 
apply to nongovernment-managed funds, although some voluntarily 
follow them. 
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Because of these restrictions, the Swedish government funds do not 
invest in some large, well-known companies. The government funds 
invest in between 2,000 and 2,500 companies worldwide, and during 
summer 2001, the government funds screened all of these companies 
for adherence to the standards. The results indicated that approximately 
30 companies violated the conventions, so they were excluded from the 
portfolio.2 While the funds’ policy only excludes companies that have 
violated international conventions, broken laws, or admitted wrongdo-
ing, companies that have been banned on that basis include the Coca-
Cola Company, Exxon Mobil Corporation, Liz Claiborne, and Sears, 
Roebuck and Company, according to the Seventh Swedish National 
Pension Fund’s (AP7) annual report (Sjunde AP-fonden 2003a, pp. 19–
20). Because most new workers entering the system are in the default 
fund, they are not investing in Coca-Cola and these other prominent 
companies.	This	raises	a	question	of	whether	participants	are	sacrificing	
rate of return for social goals.
Marketing costs have added greatly to the expense of mandatory 
individual accounts in some countries, as discussed later in this chapter. 
To avoid that problem, in Sweden the mutual fund management com-
panies participating in the system know the total investment from the 
Premium Pension but not the identities of individual investors. Because 
fund managers do not know their clients, it is expected that entry costs 
to the Swedish market would be reduced for non-Swedish funds. Mu-
tual funds only need to offer investment management services; they do 
not need to spend money acquiring distribution channels, which means 
they	do	not	need	to	hire	numerous	sales	agents	and	open	retail	offices	
(Herbertsson, Orszag, and Orszag 2000).
While the investment returns earned by individual accounts may 
have a large effect on their popularity, it is not reasonable to judge a 
well-managed system by such returns, because a pension system can-
not earn better rates of return than are available in the capital markets. 
Because of world equity markets’ decline during the period 2000–2002, 
many funds earned negative rates of return over this period. The total 
return	for	 the	AP7	Fund,	 the	default	 fund,	was	−7.4	percent	 in	2000,	
−10.6	percent	 in	2001,	and	−26.7	percent	 in	2002.	This	compares	 to	
a total return for the PPM index (the capital-weighted average for all 
PPM	system	funds	open	for	active	choice)	of	−10.6	percent	in	2001	and	
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Chile’s mandatory individual accounts provide further evidence as 
to	issues	encountered	in	investment	management.	Chile	permits	firms	
to freely enter into and exit from the pension fund administration (AFP) 
market, even of foreign companies, provided that minimum capital re-
quirements are met. The AFPs compete for participants. Workers are 
free to select the AFP of their choice, and for a number of years they 
could switch their accounts among pension providers as often as they 
wished. Since 1997, participants have only been able to change AFPs 
after meeting a minimum stay requirement of six months, a restriction 
implemented to decrease administrative costs that resulted from fre-
quent shifts in AFPs by some workers. This policy limits free choice 
but appears to eliminate excessive changing of AFPs by some par-
ticipants. This activity was driven by the commissions the AFP sales 
force received for attracting new members and by incentives, such as 
small appliances, provided to participants to induce them to switch. The 
Swedish Premium Pension system, by contrast, has no minimum stay 
requirement, but it also does not have a sales force marketing to indi-
vidual participants and trying to entice them to switch funds.
The AFPs have a high proportion of Chilean pension assets in gov-
ernment	bonds.	This	figure	generally	has	been	around	40	percent	of	the	
assets in the system, but it reached a peak of 47 percent in 1986 (Ro-
driguez 1999). The large percentage of pension investments in Chilean 
government bonds appears to be counter to the philosophy of the Chil-
ean free enterprise model of investing in the private sector. 
TIeRs	oF	FInAnCIAL	MAnAGeMenT
Several issues have arisen concerning investor protections in the 
first	two	of	the	three	tiers	of	pension	investment	management:	financial	
management by corporations and by mutual funds. 
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Tier	one:	Corporations	
Financial	market	scandals	during	the	early	years	of	the	twenty-first	
century raised questions as to whether pension participants, along with 
other	 investors	 in	financial	markets,	had	adequate	protections	in	U.S.	
capital	markets	against	conflicts	that	arise	from	the	separation	of	corpo-
rate ownership and control. 
Conflicts	of	interest	in	corporations
The collapse of Enron Corporation and other corporate scandals 
exposed weaknesses in the safeguards that protect U.S. investors. Ar-
thur	Andersen	 LLP,	 the	 external	 accounting	 and	 auditing	 firm	 hired	
by	Enron,	did	not	detect	and	correct	inaccuracies	in	Enron’s	financial	
statements. Enron’s board of directors did not prevent the company 
from	distorting	its	financial	statements.	Thus,	investors	relied	on	false	
financial	 statements.	Even	 though	 the	 accounting	firm	and	 the	 board	
of directors are supposed to act independently to protect the interests 
of investors, including pension participants whose individual accounts 




Because of bad accounting, Enron was able to conceal billions of 
dollars	of	liabilities	so	that	its	financial	position	appeared	to	be	much	
more favorable than it actually was. This raises the issue of whether the 
laws	governing	financial	disclosures	by	corporations,	and	their	enforce-
ment, are adequate. 
Analysts	 on	Wall	 Street	 and	 the	 credit	 rating	 firm	 that	 evaluated	
Enron failed to detect problems and may have failed to adequately in-
vestigate	Enron’s	finances	before	advising	investors.	They	have	argued	
in their defense that they relied on the accounting information that was 
available.	 Nonetheless,	 financial	 analysts	 face	 potential	 conflicts	 of	
interest:	gaining	investment	banking	business	for	their	firms,	preserv-
ing good relations with the companies they cover, and supplying buy 
rather than sell recommendations to the mutual fund industry (Baer and 
Gensler	2002).	These	potential	conflicts	cast	doubt	on	 the	usefulness	
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of	 information	 provided	 by	 some	financial	 analysts	 and	 credit	 rating	
firms.	
Compounding	problems	concerning	the	quality	of	financial	 infor-
mation, two large banks were implicated in the fall of Enron Corpora-
tion for hiding billions of dollars in loans. The concealment made it 
appear that Enron had less debt than was actually the case. While not 
admitting	guilt,	the	banks	paid	millions	of	dollars	in	fines	to	the	Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Even	with	full,	accurate,	and	transparent	disclosure	of	relevant	fi-
nancial information, corporations may not be good stewards of their 
shareholders’ funds. They may overpay their top executives, paying 
millions of dollars a year for the management of even poorly run cor-
porations. Or they may disburse funds in ways that are counter to at 
least some shareholders’ interests (such as by donating to the political 
campaigns of particular candidates or to charities).
Tier	Two:	Mutual	Funds
Because individual account participants generally invest in mutual 
funds rather than in individual stocks, the second tier of management 
affecting investment value for individual account participants concerns 
mutual	 funds	and	pension	 fund	management	companies.	Conflicts	of	
interest arise in the management of mutual funds just as they do in the 
management of corporations (Mahoney 2004).
Preferential treatment
In 2003, the New York State Attorney General charged that at least 
one U.S. mutual fund provided preferential treatment to some investors. 
These individuals were allowed to trade after the market had closed, 
based	on	the	market	closing	price.	Thus,	these	investors	could	benefit	
from information that became available after market closing that would 
affect the price of the mutual fund. This illegal practice allowed some 
investors	to	benefit	at	the	expense	of	others.
Does competition reduce costs?
The designers of the Chilean system thought that market competi-
tion would ensure the lowest possible administrative costs as pension 
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fund providers competed for participants on the basis of fees. To en-
courage competition by permitting free movement of workers between 
funds, the Chilean pension fund management companies, or AFPs, are 
not permitted to charge exit fees when workers change AFPs. 
Commissions charged by the AFPs in Chile are set competitively, 
meaning that their level is not regulated by the government. However, 
there is little price competition in commissions, because no AFP adver-
tises that it offers low fees. Instead, advertising focuses on the service 
provided	or	on	building	a	brand	image,	such	as	for	financial	stability.	
In	addition,	AFPs	have	offered	financial	incentives	to	workers	to	switch	
companies. This type of competition has not led to the free market re-
sult expected, that of reduced fees. Instead, high expenses relating to 
advertising and marketing have increased costs. The sales force in the 
system rose from 3,500 in 1990 to 15,000 in 1995 (OECD 1998).
In the United Kingdom, competitive forces alone were also not suf-
ficient	 to	drive	down	charges	on	retail	financial	products.	As	a	 result	
of this apparent market failure, the government introduced individual 
account Stakeholder plans in 2001, subject to a statutory maximum an-
nual charge of 1 percent of asset values, with no entry or exit charges. 
Because of this regulatory limit, providers of Stakeholder pensions have 
greatly	 reduced	 the	amount	of	“free”	advice	 they	provide	 to	workers	
trying to decide whether to choose these accounts (Bolger 2001). Some 
insurance companies have argued that a cap on fees of 1 percent for an 
individually	marketed	financial	product	is	too	low	and	have	decided	not	
to	offer	it.	The	fee	cap	has	since	been	raised	to	1.5	percent	for	the	first	
10 years of an account, after which it can be no more than 1.0 percent. 
One of the reasons for the high level of fees is that providers of these 
pensions must determine whether they are an appropriate investment 
for the individuals who participate.
The	costs	of	maintaining	a	financial	account	are	largely	fixed,	not	
varying	by	the	size	of	the	balance.	Consequently,	financial	institutions	
often	charge	flat	 fees	 for	maintaining	accounts,	which	 fall	 especially	
heavily on low-income workers because of their relatively small ac-
count	balances.	In	part	because	of	the	fixed	charges,	Australia	has	ex-
empted low-income workers from mandatory individual accounts. This 
exemption is similar to the practice in Denmark, which excludes those 
who work less than 10 hours a week from the mandatory individual 
accounts. 
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Comparative administrative costs
The operation of the Swedish Premium Pension system differs from 
that of most other mandatory individual accounts. Sweden has tried to 
reduce costs by implementing a central agency to manage the accounts. 
This approach raises the question of whether the Swedish system has 
lower administrative costs than the system in Chile or the one in the 
United Kingdom.  
The administrative costs in the Chilean system in 1998 averaged 
1.36 percent of account balances. Chile currently has the lowest admin-
istrative costs, as a percentage of assets, of any Latin American manda-
tory pension system, according to one study, because of its large base of 
assets and longer experience (James, Smalhout, and Vittas 2002). Ad-
ministration costs tend to fall as assets grow; this is due to economies 
of scale and learning by doing.
In Sweden, even when the 0.30 percent fee paid to the PPM (the 
government management agency) is included, a substantial portion of 
the money contributed to this new system has been invested in funds 
where the administrative expenses are about half that in Chile. 
Participants in Sweden generally have picked low-fee funds: in 
2000, 48 percent of the money invested in the system was put in funds 
with fees ranging from 0.25 to 0.49 percent (Palmer 2001b). Thus, with 
the addition of the 0.30 percent fee paid to the PPM, nearly half of 
the money in the system was invested in funds with total fees ranging 
from 0.55 percent to 0.79 percent, compared to average fees in Chile of 
1.36 percent. The total fee in Sweden averaged 0.95 percent of assets in 
2000 (Palmer 2001b) and was 0.85 percent in 2001 for nongovernment 
funds (Engström and Westerberg 2003). The fee paid by participants in 
the default fund, which was the option in which the most money was 
invested, was only 0.17 percent in 2002, resulting in a total fee of 0.47 
percent (Engström and Westerberg 2003).  
The total fees (including the PPM fee) in Sweden are similar to 
those for large, actively managed mutual funds in the United States but 
higher than those for passively managed U.S. funds. For example, the 
Vanguard Group offers passively managed equity funds with annual 
fees about half those paid in Sweden—less than 0.20 percent of account 
balances. Fees may tend to be lower in large countries than in small 
ones, however, because of economies of scale in administrative costs.
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The PPM employs a little more than 200 people to run the sys-
tem. That number does not include the employees of the mutual funds. 
Because the United States is roughly 30 times larger than Sweden in 
population, the experience of the PPM implies that a government bu-
reaucracy of more than 6,000 people would be needed to run a similar 
system in the United States.
The 0.30 percent fee participants pay to the PPM in Sweden is in-
tended	to	permit	the	organization	to	become	self-financed	over	the	long	
run. However, the PPM had to borrow from the government because 
of high start-up costs, so the reported PPM fee understated the actu-
al initial expenses. Two offsetting effects are expected on future fees. 
Authorities anticipate that the end of the start-up period, coupled with 
growth in the accounts, will reduce expenses relative to the asset base. 
Conversely,	the	increase	in	expenses	for	annuitizing	benefits	and	pro-
viding	benefit	payments	will	cause	fees	to	rise.	On	net,	the	PPM	expects	
its fee to fall.
The fees for the Chilean system do not include the cost of annui-
tizing	 benefits	 or	making	 other	 forms	 of	 benefit	 payments.	The	 fees	
in Sweden also basically do not cover this cost because the system is 
new	and	few	people	are	claiming	benefits.	A	potentially	major	differ-
ence in administrative expenses between Sweden and Chile is the cost 
of annuitization. In Sweden, there is no separate fee for annuitizing an 
account, which is mandatory and is done through the PPM. The aver-
age fee for annuitizing in Chile as of 1999, for those workers choosing 
that option, was 5.25 percent of the account balance (SAFP 2001). An 
earlier study calculated the fee based on the difference between the rate 
of return from buying a Chilean 20-year Consumer Price Index–linked 
bond and the average internal rate of return paid to annuitants; it found 
that	benefits	were	reduced	by	10.20	percent	(Valdés-Prieto	1994).	The	
percentage taken by the fee may decrease over time as the size of the 
account balance being annuitized increases.
The United Kingdom’s decentralized individual accounts are par-
ticularly expensive; the high cost led the British government to develop 
Stakeholder pensions. A U.K. study found that the costs of switching 
funds decreased account balances by about 15 percent on average. The 
costs	of	annuitizing	benefits	trimmed	the	value	of	benefits	received	by	
about 10 percent. Taking into consideration all costs borne by workers, 
the	value	of	benefits	was	cut	by	40	to	45	percent	(Murthi,	Orszag,	and	
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Orszag	2001).	These	figures	do	not	include	the	costs	of	the	government	
agency supervising the system, which are not charged to workers but 
are borne out of general government revenue.
Thus, the British approach is more costly than that of Chile. The 
Swedish system is the least expensive in terms of administration, while 
the costs of large, passively managed U.S. equity funds are even less. A 
Swedish-type model operated in the United States could result in lower 
fees than in Sweden because the large size of the U.S. labor market 
would allow for greater economies of scale in mutual fund manage-
ment.	Including	the	cost	of	providing	annuitized	benefits,	fees	of	about	
0.5–0.6 percent of assets might be feasible.
TRAnsPARenCy	In	InDIvIDuAL	ACCounTs	AnD	The	
DIsCLosuRe	oF	Fees
“Transparency”	 refers	 to	 participants	 receiving	 clear	 information	
that is adequate to allow them to make informed choices. Transparency 
is	desired	in	financial	transactions,	including	those	in	retirement	income	
systems. The transparency of competing methods of providing social 
security	benefits	is	an	issue	in	the	reform	debate.	Proponents	of	indi-
vidual accounts have argued that those accounts are transparent while 
defined	benefit	plans	are	not	(World	Bank	1994).	They	view	individual	
accounts as being transparent because the cost to workers, measured as 
the	amount	 that	participants	contribute,	 is	clearly	 identified,	as	 is	 the	
amount	accumulated	in	their	individual	accounts.	Furthermore,	benefits	
received are based on the returns on the individual accounts, and those 
accounts do not involve the transfer of resources across persons. With 
defined	benefit	social	security	systems,	workers	may	have	difficulty	un-
derstanding who is helped from the resource transfers across different 
groups of participants. 
Individual account participants need transparency so that they can 
compare the fees of different mutual funds or pension funds. Competi-
tion concerning fees will not occur if participants do not know how 
much they are being charged. Transparency may lead to competitive 
pressures on service providers to reduce fees, and individual participants 
would be better able to judge the performance of their pension service 
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provider and to understand the effect of fees on their accumulation of 
assets. Inadequate disclosure may be a factor in the large variance in 
charges and expenses of 401(k) plans (Economic Systems Inc. 1998). 
What appears to be a small difference in fees can mean thousands of 
dollars to a worker over the life of an individual account. 
Ensuring that greater information is provided to consumers, when 
balanced against the costs of providing that data, generally is consid-
ered to be a legitimate activity of government, rather than an intrusive 
extension of regulatory powers. The issues concerning social security’s 
transparency	have	three	components:	expenditures,	benefits,	and	the	re-
lationship	between	expenditures	and	benefits	(Table	4.1).	Expenditures	
have two components: mandatory contributions and fees. This section, 
based on the research of Korczyk and Turner (2003), examines the 
transparency of the fees charged participants in individual accounts. It 
addresses the question: Do participants know how much they are pay-
ing in fees and expenses on their individual accounts? The focus is on 
fees incurred during the accumulation phase before retirement.
Types of Individual Account Fees
Individual account fees include those charged by plan administra-
tors and fund managers and transaction costs for security purchases and 
sales.	Fees	reflect	administration	costs:	collecting	contributions,	keep-
ing records, communicating with participants, educating participants 
about	financial	matters,	preparing	reports	for	the	government,	comply-
ing with ongoing government requirements, updating plans to maintain 
Table 4.1  Issues in Pension Transparency for Social Security Systems
Components 			Defined	contribution 						Defined	benefit
Costs Disclosure of fees Uncertain future costs
Benefits Depends	on	financial	
markets
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compliance	with	changing	legal	requirements,	and	disbursing	benefits	
(Table 4.2). Charges also arise from the cost of managing investments: 
the	bid-ask	spread	in	the	buying	and	selling	of	financial	assets,	as	well	
as transaction costs and fees for researching alternative investments. 
Some fees can be allocated to different participants based on their 
cost-generating activities, or the fees can be spread over all participants. 
Charges can be front-loaded, meaning that they are paid at the same 
time as contributions, or they can be back-loaded and charged on exit. 
They	can	be	imposed	as	a	flat	annual	rate,	annually	as	a	percentage	of	
assets or contributions, or itemized based on fee-generating activities. 
Some of the largest fees are completely hidden. Brokerage commissions 
are included in the cost of shares (raising their cost) and are not broken 
out as separate fees in shareholder reports (Norris 2003). The essential 
issue, however, is the need for funds to disclose in a readily understand-
able manner the aggregate amount of fees charged against the assets or 
contributions to an individual’s account. In that way, the participant can 
make an informed decision when choosing among funds. 
Table	4.2		The	structure	of	Fees	in	a	Mixed	(equity	Bond)	Mutual	Fund
Fees and expensesa Amount ($ 000s)
Investment advisory services 20,725
Distribution services 20,028
Transfer agent services 5,676
Administrative services 999
Custodian 708
Registration statement and prospectus 675
Postage, stationery, and supplies 643
Reports to shareholders 235
State and local taxes 116
Directors’ compensation 106




NOTE: Figures in the source are unaudited.
a For the six months ending April 30, 2003.
SOURCE: American Funds Capital Income Builder (2003).
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Survey of Transparency in Individual Account Fees 
Transparency in individual accounts depends on how and to what 
extent participants receive information about the fees they pay. The fol-
lowing discussion explains how this issue is addressed in the United 
States, Australia, Chile, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
The United States’ Thrift Savings Plan
The Thrift Savings Plan provides individual accounts for U.S. fed-
eral government workers that are similar to 401(k) plans for private 
sector workers. It is one of the largest pension plans in the world. Par-
ticipants receive statements, which provide information as to beginning 
assets, contributions, withdrawals, investment earnings, change in mar-
ket value, and ending assets. While the statements appear to give a com-
plete	accounting	of	inflows	and	outflows	determining	the	difference	be-
tween beginning and ending assets, they provide no information about 
the amount by which participants’ accounts have been reduced by fees. 
Information about the calculation of fees is contained in descriptions 
of	the	plan,	but	nowhere	can	the	participant	find	the	total	amount	that	
he or she paid. In addition, fees arising from transactions costs in the 
purchase and sale of securities are not disclosed. These fees are hidden 
in the net investment returns. It would be more transparent to separate 
gross investment returns from fees (Box 4.1).
401(k)	plans
Like the Thrift Savings Plan, 401(k) plans do not disclose to par-
ticipants the total amount in fees charged to them. Under Department 
of Labor (USDOL) regulations, a Summary Plan Description must 
include any provision that may result in the imposition of a fee on a 
participant (Huss 2003). However, information on the schedule deter-
mining the actual amount of fees charged generally is not contained in 
such documents because the information may differ if service providers 
are changed. The data may be in the documents of the service provid-
ers to the plans. For investments involving mutual funds, the fees on 
a percentage basis relative to assets are available in the mutual fund 
prospectuses. 
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Box	4.1		Is	the	Thrift	savings	Plan	a	 
Model for Social Security Reform?
The Thrift Savings Plan is an individual account plan that the 
federal government provides for its employees. It is a possible 
model for individual accounts as part of Social Security.
how	the	Thrift	savings	Plan	works
The Thrift Savings Plan is similar to 401(k) plans in the pri-
vate sector. Federal government employees are not required to 
contribute, but can contribute up to 14 percent of their pay. The 
federal government automatically contributes 1 percent of pay 
for all eligible employees hired since 1983, whether or not they 
contribute. If workers choose to contribute, it also makes match-
ing	contributions.	Workers	have	a	choice	of	five	broad-based	in-
vestment funds, plus a lifecycle fund that automatically shifts its 
portfolio more into bonds as workers approach their expected re-
tirement	date.	Workers	can	withdraw	benefits	at	age	59½	and	con-
tinue working for the federal government. They can receive loans 
from their accounts while working. Workers are not required to 
annuitize	their	account	balances	or	to	provide	survivor’s	benefits.	
Workers participating in the Thrift Savings Plan also contribute 
fully to Social Security and in addition have an employer-pro-
vided	defined	benefit	plan.	Thus,	 their	 investments	 in	 the	Thrift	
Savings Plan are on top of a solid base of Social Security and a 
defined	benefit	pension	plan.
The Thrift Savings Plan as a Model  
for Social Security Reform
Add-on accounts, such as the Thrift Savings Plan, do not reduce 
traditional	Social	Security	benefits,	and	 they	do	not	worsen	 the	
financing	of	Social	Security	because	they	do	not	affect	the	contri-
butions paid into it. In these respects, the Thrift Savings Plan may 
be a good model for Social Security reform.
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A Department of Labor ruling permits certain fees to be charged to 
individual accounts based on participants’ activities that generate costs, 
such	as	requesting	a	benefit	payment	(Huss	2003).	Thus,	fees	for	some	
services may be clearly disclosed to participants. However, even plan 
sponsors may not know how much in fees their participants are being 
charged for other services, such as those supplied by record keepers, 
investment managers, and other service providers. This situation arises 
because plan sponsors have consistently favored the imbedded and in-
visible mutual fund pricing model, rather than explicitly accounting for 
and paying for custodial, record keeping, and other services (Rosenblatt 
2001). 
About one-third of 401(k) assets are invested in mutual funds (Jossi 
2003). The SEC regulates mutual funds and prescribes what fees and 
expenses borne by investors must be disclosed and in what format. By 
law, mutual funds disclose some fees and expenses in a standardized 
Box	4.1		(continued)
In some other respects, however, the Thrift Savings Plan 
has features that may not be a good model for Social Security 
reform. Workers are allowed to take loans from their accounts 
while working. They can begin withdrawing from their accounts 
at	age	59½	while	working.	They	can	retire	at	age	57	and	begin	
collecting	 benefits.	These	 features	may	 reduce	 the	 amount	 that	
would be available in the accounts for retirement needs at older 
ages. Also, workers can make interfund transfers daily. That al-
lows some workers to try to time the market, which generally is 
inappropriate for long-term investing. Workers are not required 
to annuitize their account balances. Though that feature may be 
satisfactory for an add-on account because adequate annuitiza-
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table near the front of the prospectus. They disclose them as an expense 
ratio, which is the annual ratio of expenses divided by assets. An indi-
vidual participant’s fee as determined by the expense ratio is debited 
from the shareholder’s assets every month. Pension participants may be 
charged the expense ratio for retail clients or a lower institutional rate. 
Mutual funds are not required to disclose, however, and conse-
quently do not disclose all of the fees and expenses charged to partici-
pants’ individual accounts. For example, they do not disclose expens-
es incurred in buying and selling securities. These costs appear to be 
about 0.5 to 1.0 percent of assets annually for actively managed mutual 
funds (Baer and Gensler 2002). Under what are called soft dollar ar-
rangements, mutual fund investment advisers use part of the brokerage 
commissions they pay to broker-dealers for executing trades to obtain 
research and other services. Because these expenses are not disclosed 
and the soft dollar costs are combined with transaction charges, this ar-
rangement adds further to the lack of transparency in fees that 401(k) 
participants bear  (USGAO 2003). 
The remaining two-thirds of 401(k) funds in the United States not 
invested in mutual funds are invested in guaranteed investment con-
tracts (GICs), separate insurance company accounts, bank collective 
funds, and employer stock. Many of these vehicles disclose even less 
information about fees than do mutual funds. The problem is especially 
acute in plans operated by insurance companies (Jossi 2003). Typically, 
fees and expenses on GICs, offered by insurance companies, and on 
bank deposit accounts are not disclosed to the purchaser; only the net 
rate of return is provided. 
In sum, 401(k) plan participants rarely, if ever, know how much 
they have paid in fees. Even if they were to try to obtain that informa-
tion,	under	current	business	practices	in	the	financial	services	sector	it	
would generally not be possible for them to receive a complete account-
ing of the fees they had been charged (Box 4.2).
Australia
International experience offers useful models for providing transpar-
ency in the fees charged to individual account participants. Australia re-
quires mutual funds and pension plans to disclose fees that workers pay. 
The rule applies both to establishing an account and to providing the pe-
riodic statements. Thus, when a pension plan or mutual fund provides a 
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report of account activity, which typically includes the opening balance, 
contributions, withdrawals, investment earnings, gains or losses, and 
end-of-period balance, it also shows in Australian dollars the amount in 
fees charged the account holder. Consequently, the system in Australia 
provides a possible model for the transparent disclosure of fees. 
Chile
Pension	funds	in	Chile	levy	a	fixed	administrative	fee	and	a	charge	
on contributions (Whitehouse 2001). Because the charge on contribu-
tions is in addition to the mandatory payment of 10 percent of earnings, 
participants are presumably well aware of the fees they are assessed, al-
though they may have little understanding of the impact on their retire-
ment income. This approach is also used by Colombia, El Salvador, and 
Peru (Bateman 2001). Participants, however, do not know how much 
they pay in fees arising from the buying and selling of assets by the 
pension fund providers.
sweden
The mandatory Premium Pension system in Sweden has a complex 
fee	structure.	It	charges	a	fixed	annual	fee	of	0.3	percent	of	the	account	
Box	4.2		The	effect	of	Fees
Given the large variation in the level of fees charged on in-
dividual	accounts,	the	effect	of	fees	on	benefits	at	retirement	can	
be substantial. Consider two different situations, both of which 
involve a worker contributing $1,000 a year to an individual ac-
count over a career of 30 years. In the low-fee situation, where 
fees are 0.2 percent a year, the worker receives a real rate of return 
of 3 percent. In the high-fee situation, where fees are 1.2 percent 
a year, the worker receives a real rate of return of 2 percent. After 
30 years, the low-fee worker has an account balance of $47,575, 
while the high-fee worker has an account balance of $40,568. The 
difference between the account balance of the high-fee worker 
and that of the low-fee worker is roughly equal to seven years of 
contributions.
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balance and a money management fee. The 0.3 percent fee is collected 
by each mutual fund from the assets that it manages and is transmitted 
to the PPM, which administers the system, for its expenses. 
The money management fee is complex. Each mutual fund charges 
a management fee. Funds must charge the same money management 
fees in the Premium Pension system as they charge in retail markets. 
The fund companies’ contracts with the PPM stipulate, however, that 
some of the fee must be returned to the PPM. The rebate is possible 
because the PPM performs most of the administrative functions for the 
accounts, so the fund managers’ administrative costs are lower in the 
Premium	Pension	system	than	in	retail	financial	markets.	
The PPM passes on to the participants all of the savings from the 
rebate. An individual participant’s rebate consists of two parts: an indi-
vidual share and a general share. The individual share depends on the 
fees charged by the funds in which the person has invested and is given 
for funds whose usual fee exceeds 0.4 percent.3 Once the individual re-
bates have been distributed, the remaining rebate is apportioned among 
all participants based on account size. Because the remaining rebate is 
tied to the participants’ account balances and not to fees paid, it returns 
a higher percentage of fees to workers choosing low-fee funds. 
The mutual fund fee covers all of the fund’s expenses except trans-
action costs arising from its purchase and sale of securities.  Those fees 
are incorporated in the net rate of return the workers receive on their 
account balances.
Individuals participating in the system receive an annual statement 
indicating the amount in their accounts in the Premium Pension, and 
that provides no information on fees paid. Also, individual fund charges 
are not listed on the annual statements and are only available in percent-
age terms in the annual catalog of funds provided to participants. 
united	Kingdom	
The United Kingdom requires individual account providers to pub-
lish	figures	 showing	 the	 impact	 of	 their	 administrative	 costs	 on	plan	
account balances. Providers apply a mandated set of assumptions on 
rates of return and publish what the projected payouts would be after 
all charges have been imposed. Consequently, this system not only pro-
vides information on fees but also indicates the expected effect of these 
costs on account balances.
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GoveRnMenT	As	FunD	MAnAGeR
In mandatory individual accounts in some countries, the govern-
ment	acts	as	a	financial	manager.	For	example,	the	governments	in	Ar-
gentina and Uruguay manage one of the mutual funds. In Sweden, the 
government manages the default fund and another mutual fund. 
The main issue of agency risk that arises is whether the government 
can	be	trusted	to	manage	financial	assets	without	basing	investment	de-
cisions on political criteria. Another issue is that the government may be 
a high-cost investment manager. The evidence on these issues is mixed. 
While many of the provident funds in Africa appear to have been poorly 
managed	(World	Bank	1994),	that	finding	does	not	necessarily	indicate	
that government would perform inadequately in other countries. 
The Petroleum Fund in Norway, the Quebec Pension Fund in Cana-
da, funds for the Canada Pension Plan, and funds for the social security 
system in New Zealand appear to be successful examples of govern-
ment management (Gillion et al. 2000). The two funds managed by 
government agencies in Sweden have not been criticized for making 
investment decisions based on political considerations (Turner 2004). 
Those funds are actively managed by a government board that operates 
independently.  
Examples of good pension fund management by the federal govern-
ment	in	the	United	States	include	the	Pension	Benefit	Guaranty	Corpo-
ration (PBGC) and the Thrift Savings Plan. The PBGC is the govern-
ment	corporation	that	guarantees	benefits	for	U.S.	defined	benefit	plans	
and actively manages investments. The Thrift Savings Plan, which is 
like a 401(k) plan for federal government workers, passively manages 
investments (Gillion et al. 2000). 
State government pension plans in the United States are other ex-
amples of government management of funds. A survey of investment 
practices of state government pension funds has noted four possible 
ways	 that	 these	 funds	could	 try	 to	exert	political	 influence	(Munnell,	
Sundén,	and	Taylor	2000).	First,	pension	 funds	could	engage	 in	eco-
nomically targeted investments (ETIs), which are designed to meet 
some	special	need	within	the	state.	Second,	the	funds	could	try	to	influ-
ence the behavior of corporations through shareholder activism. Third, 
the funds could avoid investments in certain stocks for political reasons. 
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Fourth, the funds could be used by the state governments as a source of 
financing,	from	which	they	could	borrow.	This	survey	concludes	that,	
while	in	the	1980s	some	state	government	pension	funds	sacrificed	re-
turns by making politically motivated investments, in recent years these 
funds have performed as well as those in the private sector.
ConCLusIons
Scandals at Enron and WorldCom have highlighted the risks that 
U.S. pension participants bear from corporate mismanagement. These 
scandals exposed major weaknesses in the elaborate system of protec-
tion for U.S. investors. Other issues concern compensation of the lead-
ership of U.S. corporations and the use of corporate funds for political 
purposes.
The Swedish system offers a broad range of investment choices, a 
feature that increases costs. It has been able to keep expenses relatively 
low by using centralized administration. It has also attempted to reduce 
the scope for advertising and has regulated fees. The fee structure is 
complex but creates incentives for workers to participate in lower-cost 
funds. The net result of various design elements is that individual ac-
counts in Sweden provide considerably more choice of investment op-
tions than those in Chile, while being managed at lower cost.
Individual accounts are generally not transparent in their disclosure 
of	fees,	and	it	would	be	difficult	for	participants	to	obtain	that	informa-
tion if they attempted to do so. For example, in the Premium Pension 
system in Sweden, there is no statement of the total costs paid by in-
dividuals. In the Thrift Savings and 401(k) plans in the United States, 
total fees paid by individual participants are not indicated. In all these 
cases, participants are charged fees, but they do not know how much 
they are paying. The Chilean and Australian pension systems, however, 
have	a	clear	identification	and	disclosure	of	fees,	although	even	those	
systems do not list expenses that arise from the purchase and sale of 
securities. The United Kingdom has also taken steps to improve the 
disclosure of fees.
Fee information is usually provided in plan documents or in the 
prospectus	for	a	financial	market	instrument.	That,	however,	is	not	in	
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the most accessible or useful format; it does not disclose transaction 
expenses and soft dollar costs, and it does not disclose the total dollar 
amount in fees paid by an individual. Greater transparency in individual 
accounts would allow participants and plan sponsors to make better-in-
formed decisions. It would facilitate participants’ choosing among mu-
tual funds based on the level of fees and would thus result in pressure 




 2.  The effect on returns was very small. Simulations done by the fund indicate that 
the portfolio excluding the 30 companies had a rate of return that was 15 basis 
points (0.15 percent) lower than the full portfolio.
 3.  The rebate is 25 percent of the difference between the gross fee and 0.4 percent 
of assets.
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In individual accounts, workers are usually responsible for invest-
ment decisions. Since they bear the risk associated with their accounts, 
there is logic to the responsibility being assigned to them. Many work-
ers, however, are uninformed about capital markets and investment 
theory	and	lack	the	interest	to	learn	about	these	topics.	Given	the	fluc-
tuations	in	financial	markets,	 learning	by	doing	is	more	difficult	 than	
in many other areas because there is not always a direct relationship 
between poor planning and an adverse outcome. The considerations in-
volved in investing in such markets can be complex, and some basic is-
sues	in	individual	financial	management	remain	unresolved	by	financial	
experts.  
While the assumption of economic rationality is generally useful 
for economic theory, it is not necessarily the best basis for economic 
policy.	Behavioral	economists	have	identified	circumstances	related	to	
pension investment decisions that cause participants to make poor deci-
sions (Thaler 2005). These circumstances include situations involving 
a complex problem when the outcome is a long way off and thus feed-
back is delayed, and when the choice is made infrequently.
Investment mistakes made by unsophisticated (and sophisticated) 
pension	participants	include	insufficient	diversification,	excessive	trad-
ing, market timing, trading after market changes, and holding what 
would appear to be too much or too little risk when compared to the 
investment portfolios of professional investors. To provide examples of 
some	of	these	issues,	this	chapter	examines	individual	financial	man-
agement in both the mandatory Premium Pension system in Sweden, 
which gives workers a wide range of investment choices, and in the 
voluntary carve-out system in the United Kingdom. The discussion will 
then turn to why individuals make errors in managing their pension 
investments.
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Although the PPM, the government agency that is responsible for 
the Swedish Premium Pension system, has the goal that as many partic-
ipants as possible actively choose their account investments, a substan-
tial percentage of workers do not pick a mutual fund for the investment 
of their account, and the PPM puts their contributions in the default 
fund. 
The initial investment choices in the Premium Pension system were 
made by participants in 2000. Everyone who wanted to make an active 
decision was required to submit a form to the PPM, and people who did 
not choose or who wanted their funds to be invested in the government 
default fund did not have to take any action. About two-thirds of partici-
pants submitted the form. Women were somewhat more likely than men 
to make a selection, as were high-income individuals and participants 
aged 25–55 (PPM 2001). Investment behavior also varied with the level 
of contributions. Workers with large contributions were more likely to 
make an active choice, while about half of participants with low con-
tributions invested in the default fund. Since no action was necessary 
to invest in the default fund, it is impossible to separate that fund’s 
investors into those who wanted to invest in that option and those who 
ignored the selection process. 
Most new PPM participants, who are all recent entrants into the 
labor force, do not make investment fund choices. Of the 500,000 new 
contributors to the system in spring 2001, 325,000 were aged 18 to 27. 
Only 18 percent of the total chose their funds; the remainder had their 
contributions invested in the default fund (Betson 2001). The large per-
centage of new participants who took the default option may be a result 
of the number of investment choices they were offered: being over-
whelmed by the options, they decided to not make a selection, which 
resulted in their being placed in the default fund. This pattern of large 
numbers of participants failing to make a choice has been seen, how-
ever, in other mandatory individual accounts with far fewer possibilities 
for investment. In Argentina, for example, 75 percent of the 800,000 
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new participants in 1999 did not choose a fund and were randomly as-
signed to one (Grushka 2001). Thus, it appears that many workers do 
not put a high value on having a choice for their investments.
Traditional economics holds that more choices are always better 
than fewer because greater choice increases the likelihood that individ-
uals	with	diverse	preferences	will	find	something	suitable.	Behavioral	
finance,	however,	suggests	that	there	can	be	too	many	choices,	and	that	
when there are, individuals tend to make no selection (Iyengar, Jiang, 
and Huberman 2004).
Behavioral	finance	 also	 indicates	 that,	 because	of	worker	 inertia,	
the design of default options is important (Madrian and Shea 2001). 
Workers tend to stay in the default option even though it might not be 
the best one for them. Rather than the lack of change being purely a re-
sult of inertia, however, the default option can be considered as an issue 
of framing, with some workers viewing this fund as a recommendation 
by the government as to a reasonable investment. Presumably, workers 
are more likely to switch out of the default option the more it differs 
from their optimal choice, though some workers may take a passive 
approach. 
Survey results indicate that many Swedish participants have been 
confused about the investment process—while 18 percent of new par-
ticipants in 2001 actually made a choice, 34 percent thought they had. 
Also, a number of workers indicated that they opted for the default fund 
because they felt it was safer than other options. That, however, is an 
inaccurate assessment of its risk (Betson 2001). Another study indi-
cated that the majority of people who made an active choice could not 
remember which funds they had picked. Of those who made a choice, 
73 percent could not name all of the funds they had invested in, and 41 
percent could not name any of them (Jarvenpaa 2001). 
Of Swedish participants who made a choice, about two-thirds se-
lected equity funds, and half of the money invested was put in equity 
funds. Because balanced funds, generation funds (in which the portfolio 
mix changes with a participant’s age), and the default fund also invest 
in equities, taken together more than 80 percent of contributions were 
put in equities, which is far higher than the traditional advice of 60 per-
cent in equities and 40 percent in bonds. One resulting risk is that work-
ers	will	be	inadequately	diversified	if	they	invest	solely	in	the	Swedish	
economy, because of its relatively small size and narrow range of activ-
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ity, and with its stock market dominated by a few large corporations. 
The statistics on participants’ investments indicate, however, that a ma-
jority of workers have some international investments (Weaver 2002). 
Workers	can	invest	in	a	maximum	of	five	funds.	On	average,	they	
have	selected	three,	but	the	most	common	choice	was	to	pick	five	funds,	
and only 15 percent of participants who chose a fund chose only one. 
Because some funds invest in a fairly narrow segment of the stock 
market, such as high tech, it is possible for participants to invest their 
entire Premium Pension account so that it has high risk and is poorly 
diversified.	
Plan and Investment Information for Participants
Ensuring that workers receive adequate information is an important 
aspect of the Swedish government’s efforts to help participants make 
well-informed	decisions.	Providing	sufficient	information	is	especially	
important because of the large number of investment options employ-
ees face. As part of the implementation of the reform, the Swedish So-
cial Insurance Agency undertook a major campaign to educate people. 
Information about the Premium Pension was part of this effort. The 
PPM provided additional materials to participants in connection with 
the investment elections. 
The	PPM	recognizes	that	people	differ	in	their	financial	knowledge	
and	 their	 interest	 in	 investing.	 It	 identifies	 three	 groups:	 1)	motivat-
ed participants, mainly high-income males with a college degree and 
previous investment experience; 2) passive investors, who reported no 
interest in choosing mutual funds; and 3) those who were interested 
in choosing mutual funds but reported a lack of knowledge to make 
investment choices. The PPM estimated that about half of participants 
were in the third group. 
The PPM provides information that targets all three groups. For 
motivated investors, it is important to provide detailed information on 
the various funds, whereas for the second and third groups the PPM 
concentrates on increasing participants’ knowledge and motivation. To 
this	end,	the	PPM	provides	basic	financial	information,	such	as	explain-
ing	the	different	types	of	funds	and	the	value	of	diversification,	as	well	
as more in-depth material on the various choices. 
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The	PPM	provides	the	following	basic	information	about	financial	
markets: over the long term, stocks have had a higher rate of return than 
bonds, although there is no guarantee that this will continue to be the 
case. The value of stock funds varies more over time than does the value 
of bond funds. Although movements in exchange rates affect the value 
of funds invested abroad and are a source of uncertainty in international 
investments,	foreign	investments	provide	greater	risk	diversification.	
At the start of the system in 2000, the PPM mailed information 
to workers. It launched a major advertising campaign, which included 
newspaper advertisements, brochures, and public-service announce-
ments on television and radio. The PPM estimates that the television 
ads reached 86 percent of participants and that participants saw the ads 
an average of 12 times. The PPM also organized a series of outreach 
activities for groups with special needs—for example, immigrants 
with limited knowledge of the Swedish language and individuals with 
disabilities. 
The Swedish system was designed to reduce marketing costs, which 
have been high in some countries such as Chile. Because the fund man-
agers do not know the identity of their clients, they are unable to target 
workers who do not participate in their fund, or to offer incentives to 
specific	people	to	switch	funds.	The	funds,	however,	have	attempted	to	
target their advertising to particular groups by direct mail or by adver-
tising in certain publications appealing to high-income workers or in 
specific	areas	where	high-income	individuals	live.	
Before making a choice, every participant receives a catalog, which 
contains information about each fund’s investments, risk level, past re-
turns (for preexisting funds), and fees. The same material is also avail-
able on the PPM Web site. All of the background is provided in Swed-
ish as well as in the most common languages of immigrants, including 
English. 
Funds that participate in the system must provide daily informa-
tion on fund asset values. These statistics are available to participants 
through the major daily Swedish newspapers, over the Internet, and at 
social	security	offices.	Individual	participants	receive	a	single	year-end	
statement concerning their investments in the Premium Pension, but it 
does not provide information on the fees they have paid.  
Turner.indb   81 2/6/2006   10:28:33 AM




den’s are complicated enough to overwhelm many participants, as evi-
denced by the large numbers who take the default option, a voluntary 
carve-out system presents more complexities. 
Because of their lack of knowledge and information, participants in 
individual accounts may seek advice on whether to remain fully in the 
social security system or to take the voluntary carve-out. Pension ser-
vice providers with an interest in workers’ choosing those accounts may 
take	 advantage	 of	 this	 lack	 of	 financial	 sophistication.	That	 problem	
occurred	in	the	United	Kingdom	with	the	pensions	“mis-selling”	scan-
dal	 (Gillion	 et	 al.	 2000).	Because	many	workers	 possess	 insufficient	






With a voluntary carve-out, not only do workers need to understand 
the fundamentals of investing, as is necessary for other types of indi-
vidual accounts, but they must also be able to compare the risks and 
returns of individual accounts with those of traditional social security 
programs (Box 5.1). 
Because a voluntary carve-out reduces a person’s retirement income 
base	 of	 social	 security	 benefits,	 workers	may	 invest	 their	 individual	
accounts more conservatively than if the individual account were an 
add-on to social security. Their choices thus may be more conservative 
than those of U.S. workers who invest their 401(k) balances. If workers 
invest more conservatively, the expected returns on their individual ac-
counts will be reduced.
A survey of federal government workers who chose not to partici-
pate in the Thrift Savings Plan provides insights as to why workers 
may not choose a voluntary carve-out from social security. One in six 
men and women (16 percent) indicated that they did not participate in 
the Thrift Savings Plan because they did not understand the program, 
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while 12 percent of men and 15 percent of women reported that they 
did not participate because they did not have enough information. Ten 
percent of both men and women indicated that they did not contribute 
to the plan because they had not gotten around to considering whether 
to do so, while 14 percent of women and 7 percent of men said that they 
simply had not bothered to consider whether to participate (Hinz and 
Turner 1998). Thus, lack of knowledge and inertia may be important 
reasons for the behavior of people in a voluntary carve-out system.
Box	5.1		The	Mis-selling	of	Individual	Accounts
The United Kingdom has established the principle that a 
worker should only be encouraged to take a voluntary carve-out 
individual account plan when it is in the best interest of the work-
er to do so. In violation of that principle, the insurance industry in 
the United Kingdom has marketed these plans directly to workers, 
encouraging many workers during the 1990s to take voluntary 
carve-out plans when it was not in those workers’ best interest. 
This aggressive marketing has led to the mis-selling scandal in 
the United Kingdom. Because, under the leading proposals in the 
United States, individual account plans that replaced Social Se-
curity	would	not	be	marketed	directly	to	individuals	by	financial	
service providers receiving commissions for individual sales, the 
exact form of this scandal would not occur in the United States. 
Nonetheless,	 the	general	problem	could	occur	 in	 that	 the	finan-
cial services industry may use advertising to encourage workers 
to take voluntary carve-outs, even though it would not be in the 
interest of some of those workers to do so. Similarly, workers may 
be encouraged to take voluntary carve-outs by some people who 
have an ideological stake in the choice. Just as many workers in 
the United Kingdom made bad decisions based on bad advice, 
many	workers	in	the	United	States,	because	of	lack	of	financial	
sophistication,	could	end	up	making	bad	financial	decisions.
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why	InDIvIDuALs	MAKe	eRRoRs	In	MAnAGInG	
PensIon	InvesTMenTs
The discussion now turns to the errors individuals make in manag-
ing pension investments. This section draws primarily from U.S. ex-
perience and research, surveyed in Turner (2003). Understanding why 
people make mistakes and the types of errors they make may facilitate 
the development of policies to protect pension investors from them-
selves. Regulations may be particularly important if individual accounts 
are mandated with social security because those accounts then become 
part	of	the	worker’s	basic	benefits.	Some	workers	have	little	experience	
with	financial	institutions,	not	even	having	bank	accounts.
A Canadian survey found that workers on average rated choosing the 
right individual account investment (in Canada the account is known as 
the Registered Retirement Savings Plan [RRSP] pension) more stress-
ful than going to the dentist (Canadian Press 2005). Nonetheless, not all 
workers are equally likely to make investment mistakes. Presumably, 
those who are less sophisticated, educated, and experienced are more 
likely to make mistakes. Low-income workers with small amounts of 
money invested in individual accounts may not see a reason to exert 
effort	to	gather	complex	financial	information	about	managing	their	ac-
counts. These errors can have an important effect on retirement income 
and thus may affect a retiree’s well-being for decades. 
An	investor	error	can	be	defined	as	a	decision	made	counter	to	what	
economic	and	finance	theory	indicates	is	 the	appropriate	choice	for	a	
rational person who wants to maximize wealth, given the individual’s 
degree of risk aversion. It is important to distinguish between inves-
tor errors and bad luck. Also, while investor errors over the long term 
will generally lead to lower accumulated investment accounts, over the 
short term there may be no connection between errors and rate of return 
realized. An investor decision is judged to be an error if it is based on 
a faulty decision-making process or on the use of incorrect information 
or concepts concerning investments. It is not dependent on the investor 
having	suffered	a	financial	loss.	
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 
provides	a	legal	definition	of	investor	error	for	U.S.	employer-managed	
pension	plans.	That	definition	is	called	the	“prudent	man”	or	“prudent	
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expert”	rule.	In	managing	a	pension	plan’s	assets,	an	individual	must	act	
“with	the	care,	skill,	prudence,	and	diligence	under	the	circumstances	
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar 
with such matters would use in conducting an enterprise of like charac-
ter	and	with	like	aims”	(ERISA	§404[a][1][B]).	With	this	definition,	a	
portfolio’s overall performance is judged rather than the performance or 
choice of particular holdings in isolation. 
Pension participant investment errors fall into two broad categories: 
lack of information and poor information processing (New 1999). Lack 
of information can include inadequate knowledge of investing or of 
stock markets, and biased information about stock markets. Poor infor-
mation processing can be due to faulty logic (Bodie 2003).
Information may be so complex that, even if it is supplied, pension 
investors are not able to make rational choices (Barr 2001). This fail-




as investors, possibly because some males believe they have superior 
knowledge	concerning	the	mathematics	and	concepts	of	finance	(Bar-
ber and Odean 2001). 
TyPes	oF	InvesToR	eRRoRs
Pension investor errors resulting from these factors can be catego-
rized	under	three	broad	headings:	1)	insufficient	diversification,	2)	in-
appropriate	level	of	risk	holdings	in	a	diversified	portfolio,	and	3)	inap-
propriate portfolio adjustments. 
Insufficient	Diversification
Portfolio	diversification	can	only	be	 judged	within	 the	context	of	
the entire portfolio of participants or, if married, of their families, in-
cluding	their	expected	social	security	and	defined	benefit	pension	ben-
efits.	Thus,	 it	would	 be	 incorrect	 to	 view	 a	 pension	 portfolio	 that	 is	
undiversified	as	necessarily	representing	a	problem,	since	the	pension	
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participant	may	 achieve	 diversification	 in	 other	 assets	 that	 he	 or	 she	
holds. However, for many participants, the pension plan is their major 
financial	investment.	In	that	context,	pension	participants	may	make	the	




tion of the portfolio. Unsophisticated investors may wrongly think that 
investing	in	an	undiversified,	risky	portfolio	will	be	rewarded	with	a	com-
mensurately higher expected return. Lucas (2000), examining the portfo-
lios of 250,000 401(k) plan participants, found that, typically, portfolios 
are	poorly	diversified,	focusing	mainly	on	stable	value,	large	capitaliza-
tion stock, and company shares issued by the participant’s employer. 
Participants’	 portfolios	may	 be	 poorly	 diversified	 by	 not	 holding	
any bonds or by having a relatively small share of their portfolio in 
bonds. To the extent that investors base their portfolio decisions on their 
experience, young people who have never known a major decline in the 
stock market may overinvest in equities relative to bonds. Being well 
diversified	requires	holding	mutual	funds	in	various	asset	classes—in-
cluding foreign stocks, real estate, and bonds—and pension participants 
may not feel comfortable investing in that many different types of as-
sets.	Insufficient	diversification	has	been	a	common	problem	in	Sweden.	
Even though the Swedish economy represents less than 1 percent of the 
world economy, Swedish workers who chose funds invested nearly half 
of their assets in Swedish equity funds (Thaler 2005).
Dividing by n
This error involves dividing the investment portfolio equally among 
all available investment options (n being the number of investment op-
tions), which means that, if a pension plan offers three choices, the par-
ticipant making this error would split his or her contribution in thirds. 
This practice results in an asset allocation to stocks and bonds that de-
pends on the number and composition of stock and bond funds offered 
by the sponsoring employer (Benartzi and Thaler 2001). Holden and 
VanDerhei (2001) explored this pattern and found that only a small per-
centage of workers appear to manage their pension portfolios this way.
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Picking specialized mutual funds rather than broad-based funds 
This	strategy	makes	diversification	difficult	to	achieve	with	a	small	
portfolio. Pension investors may fail to adequately diversify if their 
plan gives them a large number of fund choices and allows them to pick 
funds that concentrate on a narrow segment of the market. For many 
years, the Thrift Savings Plan for federal government employees only 
allowed federal government workers a choice of three broad funds. In 
2001, it added a small cap fund and an international fund. Single-choice 
portfolios	 that	 in	one	fund	offer	a	broad	diversification	of	stocks	and	
bonds, including international investments, may be desirable because 
they make it easier for employees to diversify (Quinn 2002).
Picking	investments	one	is	familiar	with	rather	than	 
broadly diversifying 
This may explain why individuals fail to invest in foreign stocks. 
However, fees charged in foreign stock funds tend to be higher than in 
domestic funds, and investors may not have adequate protections in 
some foreign stock markets.
Too	Much	or	Too	Little	Diversified	Risk	
Even	 participants	 who	 understand	 diversification	 and	 have	well-
diversified	portfolios	may	hold	an	inappropriate	amount	of	diversified	
investment risk, given their time horizon and degree of risk aversion.1 
Risk aversion depends on a person’s attitude toward risk, but it may also 
be	affected	by	knowledge.	One	theory	that	connects	financial	knowl-
edge	 with	 investment	 choices	 is	 “uncertainty	 aversion.”	 This	 theory	
posits that individuals who think imprecisely about probabilities tend to 
behave in a more risk-averse manner than those with more precise be-
liefs (Ellsberg 1961, Lillard and Willis 2001). Lillard and Willis (2001) 
found that more precise probabilistic thinking by a person was linked to 
a willingness to take on more risks, and ultimately to a higher growth 
in wealth. Women are more likely to be averse to uncertainty than men, 
but their uncertainty aversion may decrease over time as they gain more 
experience with investments (McCarthy and Turner 2000).
Just as some people prefer chocolate ice cream to vanilla, some 
people prefer less risk to more risk. From an economic perspective, the 
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preference for chocolate or the preference for risk is not superior to the 
alternative. A policy issue arises, however, when conservative (overly 
low-risk) investing is caused by ignorance—that is, by lack of knowl-
edge	about	financial	markets	and	concepts.	 It	 is	 important	 to	discern	
why some workers invest conservatively because different reasons have 
different policy implications. 
The	government	may	have	a	legitimate	role	in	providing	financial	
education when a mandatory individual account requires the participant 
to make portfolio decisions. Changes in behavior based on increased 
information are desirable. Investment education provided to pension 
participants appears to affect pension investment decisions (McCarthy 
and Turner 2000) and to increase the equity holdings of pension partici-
pants in their nonpension portfolios (Weisbenner 1999).  
In	some	aspects	of	investing,	financial	advisers	do	not	agree	on	the	
appropriate strategy. Many advisers tell clients who are nearing retire-
ment to reduce the amount of risk they hold. Some counselors use a rule 
of thumb, for example, of subtracting the worker’s age from the number 
80: the remaining percentage, which declines as the worker ages, is the 
fraction of his or her wealth that should be invested in the stock market. 
Others argue that this rule of thumb is too conservative, but that replac-
ing the number 80 with 100 would be satisfactory. An alternative view 
is that older investors should continue to take risks, investing at age 60 
as they did when they were in their 40s (Pollan and Levine 2001). This 
advice would lead to a higher portfolio share of equities at older ages 
than would occur under traditional advice. 
Another factor that affects risk-bearing is a person’s ability and will-
ingness to postpone retirement in the face of adverse portfolio returns. 
Workers	with	more	flexibility	may	accept	a	riskier	pension	portfolio	be-
cause they can delay retirement if their assets fall short (Bodie 2001). 
Still others base their views as to appropriate pension investments 
on analysis of the effects of tax law. One recommendation is that par-
ticipants should invest their pension assets in heavily taxed investment 
instruments because pension plans are tax exempt. In the United States, 
this would lead one to invest in taxable bonds because these bonds do 
not receive the favorable tax treatment enjoyed by unrealized capital 
gains on stocks (Black 1980). Another analysis based on tax law argues, 
however, that most individual investors hold mutual funds, and the tax 
law creates advantages for holding equity mutual funds in the individual 
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account and bond mutual funds outside the individual account (Shoven 
1999). The comparison depends on the extent to which dividends are 
paid and the turnover of shares.
Because an investor’s aversion to risk is a factor in investment 
choice,	it	is	difficult	for	a	financial	analyst	to	determine	that	a	person	is	
holding too much or too little risk. Nonetheless, as we have seen, some 
investors may make choices out of a poor understanding of the uncer-
tainty of different investments.
The structure of an individual account may induce some workers to 
take	on	too	much	financial	market	risk.	In	the	Chilean	system,	there	is	
an incentive for low-income workers to invest in the most speculative 
mutual funds. If those funds perform well, individuals keep the gains, 
but if they perform poorly, the workers can claim social assistance ben-
efits	(James	2005).
Inappropriate Portfolio Choices and Adjustments 
In	addition	to	errors	concerning	risk	and	diversification,	individual	
account participants may make poor choices as to the assets in which 
they invest or the manner in which they adjust or fail to adjust their 
portfolios. These problems can lead to lower retirement income.
Failure to take fees into account
One source of error in making portfolio choices is to ignore invest-
ment fees when deciding among different investments. This mistake is 
abetted by the investment industry’s practice of only disclosing fees in 
the prospectus and not in other informational materials. Also, educa-
tional	materials	the	financial	industry	provides	to	pension	participants	
frequently do not list charges as a factor to consider in making portfolio 
choices. 
expectation-based	errors
Naïve expectations as to the stock market’s future course are an-
other reason for mistakes. Such expectations can involve the idea that 
the economy and the stock market have substantially changed so that 
past experience is of little relevance in terms of future market volatil-
ity or the possibility of a sustained downturn. For example, during a 
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prolonged bull market, some participants may believe that economic 
science has advanced to the point that the risk of a stock market decline 
has been substantially reduced. 
The view as to investor errors based on faulty expectations depends 
to some extent on the accepted theory of stock market price changes. 
This theory involves the possibility of overpricing of the stock market 
and	stock	market	bubbles	versus	pricing	that	perfectly	reflects	current	
knowledge	about	 factors	 that	 affect	 future	profitability.	Stock	market	
bubbles	occur	when	prices	are	bid	up	to	inflated	levels	and	then	drop	
precipitously. A dramatic example of this occurred in Japan, where the 
Nikkei stock market index rose to over 40,000 and subsequently fell to 
10,000. Thus, investor error based on faulty expectations depends on 
what	are	“rational”	expectations	for	future	stock	market	prices.	
Anticipating that trends will continue may be another source of er-
ror. This can be characterized as fear when the market is declining and 
greed when the market is rising. It can also be seen as erroneous belief 
in	the	“law	of	small	numbers”:	the	fallacy	that,	based	on	a	sample	of	a	
limited number of years, trends will continue. Some people may give 
too much weight to recent experience and extrapolate recent trends that 
are inconsistent with long-run averages. Expecting that a downward 
trend will continue may cause some participants to stop investing in 
equities, losing the advantage of dollar cost averaging, whereby partici-
pants always purchase the same dollar value of stocks, with more stocks 
being purchased when the price is low than when it is high. Participants 
may become discouraged when the stock market falls and sell at low 
points, perhaps expecting further erosion. For example, in July 2002, 
after a period of stock market declines, the Hewitt 401(k) Index found 
that	participants	had	a	tendency	to	sell	stock	funds	(Benefitnews.com	
2002). Expectations may be falsely based on herding behavior, where 
investors follow what they think other people are doing.
The opposite error is to believe that, because stock prices have fall-
en, it is a good time to buy equities. This approach is encapsulated in 
the folk wisdom that a stock market decline means that the market is 
having	a	“sale.”	
The error of following trends at a lag results in buying high and sell-
ing low. This occurs when investors shift their investments to the sector 
performing best at the time. For example, investors may switch out of 
stocks into bonds, or out of growth stocks into value stocks during a 
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market downturn. In Sweden, among workers making an active choice, 
the most commonly chosen fund in 2000 was a Swedish technology 
fund	that	had	risen	534	percent	in	the	five	preceding	years,	but	then	lost	
70 percent in the following three years (Thaler 2005).
Picking actively traded mutual funds that have outperformed the 
market, expecting that they will continue to do so, is also an error. Past 
performance does not predict future results, and, in fact, past winners 
tend to underperform the market (Baer and Gensler 2002). 
Errors due to inertia
Investor errors may occur because of inertia or from faulty views 
about one’s own abilities as an investor. Some people tend to be af-
fected by inertia and fail to revise their initial investment allocation 
when their pension plan starts to offer further options, or they fail to 
make other adjustments to their portfolios. One study found that most 
pension participants in TIAA-CREF made no adjustments to their asset 
allocation over their entire career (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). 
Another study found that nearly half of TIAA-CREF participants made 
no changes over a 10-year period (Ameriks and Zeldes 2004). (TIAA-
CREF is a national pension system for employees of educational and 
research institutions.) The effects of inertia can be overcome by invest-
ing in a lifestyle fund that adjusts its portfolio according to the age of 
the participant.
Participants’ failing to rebalance their portfolios after a run of stock 
price increases or decreases may be a manifestation of inertia. Lucas 
(2000) found that pension participants do not adjust their portfolios to 
their time horizon. Portfolios tend to have similar risk levels across age 
groups from 25 to 50. Equity exposure only decreases materially for the 
portfolio of the typical participant at age 60 or older. Lucas suggests 
that automatic rebalancing of a participant’s initial choice of asset al-
location may be a desirable way to deal with this issue.
Policy Implications
This discussion suggests a number of policies for controlling par-
ticipants’ investments that could minimize the common errors made by 
individual pension investors: 
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• Do not permit participants to invest in individual stocks.
• Do not allow participants to invest in mutual funds with a narrow 
market focus.
• Do not permit participants to invest an entire pension account in 
highly risky investments such as high-tech stocks.
• Encourage participants to put the majority of investments in pas-
sively managed funds.
• Advise participants to consider investment fees when choosing 
an investment.
• Educate employees on common investment mistakes participants 
make.
• Limit the number of investment choices. Too many choices may 
cause more workers to take the default option because they are 
overwhelmed by the number of options.
• Carefully consider the portfolio of the default fund so that that 
fund will offer a good choice for most workers.
• Present the default fund as being a good choice for workers not 
wanting to or able to choose a fund.
• Encourage the development of single-choice funds that are di-
versified	across	asset	classes,	 that	automatically	rebalance,	and	
that reduce their risk exposure as the participant approaches 
retirement.
woMen	AnD	PensIon	InvesTMenTs
Are individual accounts good for women? An individual account 
is	often	a	worker’s	 largest	 investment	 in	financial	markets.	The	 shift	
toward retirement sources that involve portfolio decisions by workers 
has important implications for the adequacy of retirement income for 
women. Evidence suggests that women are generally more conserva-
tive	 investors	 than	 men	 and	 are	 less	 knowledgeable	 about	 financial	
principles. Because of more cautious investing, women’s choices may 
contribute	to	the	persistence	of	a	gender-related	“pension	gap.”	Lower-
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risk investments have a lower expected return, causing investments by 
women to result in less retirement income than for men who contribute 
the same amount to their individual accounts. Empirical evidence indi-
cates that, on average, women hold lower amounts of risk in pension 
portfolios than do men.
women,	Men,	and	Risk-Bearing	in	Pension	Investments
The shift of investment fund management from professionals to 
pension participants allows individuals to choose portfolios suited to 
their needs and to their attitudes toward risk. Some people, particularly 
women, however, may be overly conservative, allocating too large a 
percentage of their pension fund account balance to bonds.
women,	men,	and	risk	aversion
Women are generally less prone to take risks than men, even when 
income, wealth, and other socioeconomic factors are taken into account. 
For example, women are less likely to engage in risky behaviors such as 
skydiving, drinking and driving, and smoking (Bajtelsmit and Bernasek 
1996; Barber and Odean 2001). 
Examining risk preference questions in the Survey of Consumer 
Finances, Jianakoplos (1999) found that 42 percent of women stated 
an	unwillingness	to	take	any	financial	risks,	compared	to	29	percent	of	
men. At the other extreme, 2.9 percent of women indicated a willing-
ness	to	take	substantial	financial	risk,	versus	4.4	percent	of	men.	Inter-
estingly, Jianakoplos found that women’s stated risk preferences often 
contradicted observed investment patterns. Of the women who reported 
that	they	were	willing	to	take	the	most	financial	risks,	46	percent	held	
only risk-free assets, compared to only 1 percent of the men stating that 
risk tolerance. Equally surprising, households that stated an unwilling-
ness	to	take	any	financial	risks	were	found	to	have	35	percent	of	their	
total assets in risky investments. Jianakoplos concludes that stated risk 
preferences provide an ordinal ranking of observed investment patterns, 
but that they are a poor predictor of quantitative ranking.  
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Gender	differences	in	wealth	and	income
While male-female differences in risk aversion have often been 
viewed as the cause of variations in investments among workers with 
similar characteristics, recent research has attempted to provide expla-
nations that do not rely on differences in attitudes toward risk. Gender 
differences in wealth and income are one such explanation. Other pos-
sible reasons include differences in investment knowledge, in precision 
concerning	thinking	about	probabilities,	and	in	confidence	about	one’s	
financial	knowledge.
Studies have found that gender differences in investment choices 
diminish	or	even	disappear	as	income	rises.	These	results	may	reflect	
the	fact	that	women	with	high	incomes	are	better	situated	to	bear	finan-
cial market risk than women with low incomes, or that they are more 
likely to have private pension income and other accumulated savings 
than are low- or moderate-income women. Another possibility is that 
income	is	correlated	with	education	and,	by	extension,	with	financial	
knowledge. Finally, women with higher incomes may have longer ex-
perience in managing their own savings.  
Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner (1996) analyzed how much of the gen-
der differential in risk-bearing could be explained by economic and de-
mographic attributes of the workers in their sample. Using data from a 
1990 survey of participants in the federal government’s Thrift Savings 
Plan for its employees, the authors examined the effects of salary, other 
family income, age, and marital status. During the survey year, federal 
government workers had the option to invest their pension money in 
three	funds:	stocks,	government	bonds,	and	a	fixed-income	fund	of	both	
government and corporate bonds. The authors found that 45 percent 
of men, but only 28 percent of women, placed any money in the stock 
fund. A large percentage of the sample, 65 percent of women and 52 
percent of men, invested only in the minimum-risk government bond 
fund.2 At the other end of the risk spectrum, 11 percent of men and 5 
percent of women invested the maximum allowable percentage (60 per-
cent of their own contributions) in the common stock fund. The analysis 
also	showed	that	higher	earners	of	both	genders	were	significantly	more	
likely than lower earners to contribute to the common stock fund; in 
this regard, the effect of one’s own salary was 10 times greater than 
that of other family income. The gender gap did not disappear with ris-
ing income, however: holding constant the worker’s salary and other 
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family income, men were still more likely to invest in the common 
stock	 and	 fixed-income	 funds	 than	 were	 women.	Additional	 studies	
have	also	found	that	women	were	more	likely	to	invest	in	fixed-income	
securities and less likely to put money in stock than men, even con-
trolling for other economic and demographic characteristics of workers 
(Bajtelsmit	and	VanDerhei	1996;	Agnew,	Balduzzi,	and	Sundén	2000;	
Muller 2000). These studies imply that in an individual account system, 
women’s conservative investments would tend to exacerbate the exist-
ing gender pension gap.
A prominent study that points in another direction found that in 
pension plans that included the choice of company stock, women held 
a	greater	proportion	of	their	portfolios	in	fixed-income	assets	than	men	
but a smaller portfolio share of the company stock than men (Clark et 
al. 1996). The picture changed dramatically for pension plans that did 
not offer company stock. In such plans, women at all income levels 
generally held a higher percentage of their portfolios in equities than 
did men, with the exception of young men at the low and high tails of 
the earnings distribution. 
Financial	knowledge,	precise	thinking	about	risk,	and	confidence
McCarthy and Turner (2000) studied the determinants of workers’ 
self-assessment	of	their	financial	sophistication	and	noted	a	large	gen-
der difference. (Self-assessment was done simply by having workers 




23 years older. McCarthy and Turner also found that workers with a 
higher	self-assessment	of	their	financial	knowledge	selected	riskier	in-
vestments and thus had portfolios with a higher expected rate of return. 
This study suggests that part of the gender difference in pension risk-





ly lower their returns because their belief in their own knowledge about 
securities	 exceeds	 their	 actual	 knowledge.	 Overconfident	 investors	
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trade excessively and hold portfolios that are riskier than the portfolios 
held by rational investors with the same degree of risk aversion. Barber 
and	Odean’s	study	of	 trading	at	a	discount	brokerage	firm	found	that	
single men traded 67 percent more than single women, thereby lower-
ing their returns net of trading costs by 1.44 percentage points per year 
compared to single women.
Muller (2000) studied the effects of taking a retirement class on 
workers’ asset allocation, using the Health and Retirement Survey 
(HRS) data. She found that for those with a high level of risk aver-
sion, retirement education substantially increased the percentage they 
invested in equities. Retirement education had no effect, however, on 
the equity choices made by other groups of participants. 
Pension	investment	experience	also	may	affect	the	financial	choices	
that participants make outside their pension plans. Bajtelsmit and Ji-
anakoplos (2001) found that households with individual accounts that 
offered investment choice were 5 percent more likely to hold stock out-
side their pensions than were households without individual accounts. 
They	ascribe	this	finding	to	the	theory	that	participation	in	an	individual	
account lowers the deterrents to stock ownership that may exist because 
of unfamiliarity.
household	decision-making	and	investment
The discussion thus far has assumed that married individuals make 
financial	decisions	without	consulting	 their	spouse.	An	added	dimen-
sion	 in	 pension	 investment	 and	other	financial	 decisions	of	men	 and	
women is how such choices are made within families. 
One hypothesis is that marriage provides insurance through income 
pooling, with the employment of husbands and wives when both work 
outside the home generally being subject to different risks. Conse-
quently, married couples might take greater investment risks even after 
holding constant family income. The analysis is complicated, howev-
er, by the fact that married people are more likely to have dependents. 
Moreover, married couples have longer life expectancies than single 
individuals. The direction of these combined effects on pension invest-
ments is unclear. 
As a result of spousal consultation, it might be expected that gen-
der differences in risk-bearing in individual accounts would be muted 
for	married	workers.	The	extent	to	which	spouses	made	financial	deci-
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sions independently or as a couple was explored by Elder (1999), us-
ing	the	first	wave	of	the	Health	and	Retirement	Survey.	Participants	in	
this study were between the ages of 51 and 61 in 1991. Their partners, 
who were also surveyed, included some younger and older individuals. 
Elder	found	that	40	percent	of	couples	agreed	that	financial	decisions	
were made equally in their household. The phrasing of the survey re-
sponse,	“we	equally	make	the	decision,”	unfortunately	does	not	shed	
much	 light	 on	whether	 respondents	 took	 “equally”	 to	mean	 that	 the	
spouses	coordinated	their	financial	decisions,	or	that	each	partner	made	
separate choices concerning his or her own assets. Thirty-six percent of 
couples	disagreed	on	which	party	made	financial	decisions.	Older	and	
white respondents were more likely to believe that the other individual 
made	the	financial	decisions,	or	that	these	were	made	jointly.
Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner (1996) found that marriage had a sig-
nificantly	negative	effect	on	a	participant’s	stock	investment	in	a	pen-
sion plan: marriage tended to make both men and women less likely to 
invest	in	either	stock	or	a	fixed-income	bond	fund	that	included	both	
government and corporate bonds. Married men and unmarried women 
tended to take similar risks. Married women were the most cautious, 
while unmarried men had the least conservative investments. One pos-
sible interpretation is that the combined husband-wife portfolio is inter-




Although human behavior affects the functioning of individual ac-
counts, the reverse may also occur. In the debate over the use of manda-
tory individual accounts for social security reform, a number of psycho-
logical effects on participants of having mandatory individual accounts 
have been posited.
The sanctity of the ownership rights to private property is a funda-
mental aspect of American political psychology (Lerner 1957). An is-
sue raised by those who favor individual accounts is that people would 
feel as if they own these assets: the account balance would be clear, and 
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the government could not take actions that would reduce its value (Box 
5.2). They also posit that people do not feel ownership of their Social 
Security	benefit,	in	part	because	it	could	be	diminished	by	future	legis-
lation. The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Flemming v. Nestor (63 U.S. 




Related to the feeling of ownership is that of control. People have 
some control over the investment of their individual account balance, 
while	they	have	none	over	their	Social	Security	benefit.	Individual	con-
trol is often cited by voters as the main reason for favoring individual 
accounts,	even	over	higher	benefits	or	the	ability	to	pass	on	the	account	
to their heirs (Biggs 2002).  
The President’s Commission (2001) argued that there were a num-
ber	 of	 psychological	 benefits	 to	workers	 holding	 assets	 in	 individual	
accounts. The commission said that asset holding has a substantial posi-
tive effect on long-term health and marital stability, even when control-
Box	5.2		Individual	Accounts	and	ownership
Individual accounts have been favored by some people as ex-
tending ownership rights in U.S. society. However, the ownership 
rights to individual accounts differ greatly between add-on ac-
counts and carve-out accounts. With an add-on individual account, 
the individual has ownership rights with no offsets against those 
rights. That is not the case with carve-out accounts. Carve-out ac-
counts are more like a loan than like outright ownership. When a 
worker takes a carve-out account, the government in effect gives 
the worker a loan. The loan is the reduction in Social Security tax 
payments, which the worker uses to contribute to the individual 
account. At retirement, the worker pays back the loan through a 
reduction	in	Social	Security	benefits.	Thus,	the	worker	does	not	
own the voluntary carve-out individual account in the same way 
that an add-on account is owned, because he or she must pay back 
the loan that was used to create the carve-out account.
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ling for income, race, and education. In addition, saving patterns are 
passed on from parents to children. Parents who save are more likely to 
have children who save. 
In Chile, some have argued that having funded individual accounts 
has turned workers into capitalists in their way of thinking. Partici-
pants are less likely to support government economic policies that are 
adverse to capital. Consequently, according to the rationale, this has 
caused workers to be more attached to the free market and to a free 
society.	This	in	turn	has	reduced	the	traditional	conflicts	between	work-
ers and owners of capital. It has depoliticized the Chilean economy and 
promoted political stability. Pensions are no longer an issue for political 
demagoguery (Rodriguez 2001). 
As	a	presumed	consequence,	Chile	is	the	first	South	American	na-
tion to sign a free trade agreement with the United States. It is argued 
that Chilean workers support free trade policies because of their capital 
market holdings through their pension accounts. While trade liberaliza-
tion and globalization are often cast as a battle between capitalists and 
workers, Chilean workers consider an anticapitalist to be both anticapi-
tal and antiworker (Piñera 2003). In the United States, some have ar-
gued that holding stocks in pension funds has made workers less likely 
to support other employees in collective bargaining disagreements.
ConCLusIons
Individual accounts as part of social security generally rely on the 
participant to make investment decisions. Many low-income and less-
educated people have no experience or knowledge in managing invest-
ments. Some do not even have bank accounts. Even high-income and 
well-educated	workers	make	predictable	mistakes	in	financial	manage-
ment. Experience with individual accounts as part of social security 
in Sweden indicates that many employees do not make an investment 
choice, and thus the structure of the default fund is an important aspect 
of the system design. 
This	chapter	has	discussed	a	number	of	 factors	 that	 influence	 in-
vestment decisions by individuals and that may result in poor choices: 
pension	portfolios	may	be	inadequately	diversified	or	not	reflective	of	
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an asset strategy appropriate to the age of the participant. One’s level 
of education, income, gender, and marital status underlie differences 
in investment approaches, which will result in differences in levels of 
retirement income.
Financial education may be an important aspect of an individual 
account system. A policy issue arises to the extent that conservative 
investing is caused by ignorance—that is, by lack of knowledge about 
financial	markets	 and	 concepts.	Thus,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 discern	why	
some workers invest conservatively, because different reasons have dif-
ferent policy implications. Employers and the government may have a 
legitimate	role	in	providing	financial	education	when	the	pension	plan	
they sponsor requires participants to make portfolio decisions. Changes 
in behavior based on increased information are desirable. There is evi-
dence that investment education provided to pension participants affects 
pension investment decisions and that it increases the equity holdings 
of participants in their nonpension portfolios.  
notes
	 1.		 A	 leading	scholar	 in	 the	field	writes,	 “There	 is	 currently	no	consensus	on	 the	
optimal	asset	allocation	strategy	for	investors…”	(Poterba	2001).
 2.  One possible explanation for the high rate of government bond ownership among 
both genders is that the Thrift Savings Plan statute required, in 1987, that all 
employee contributions be invested in the government bond fund. This require-
ment decreased every year by 20 percent and was eliminated in 1991. Thus, 
some employees may not have moved out of the bond fund because of inertia. 
The authors investigated this hypothesis in a separate regression by entering a 
variable for participation in the plan in 1987, but the variable was not statistically 
significant.





the labor market decisions of workers, reducing their hours of work, 
individual accounts are nondistortionary and thus would result in great-
er work by participants (World Bank 1994). Voluntary individual ac-
counts can be designed to affect neither the actions of employees and 
employers nor the distribution of income. However, the presumption 
that individual accounts are nondistortionary is considerably stronger 
for voluntary than for mandatory plans. With voluntary plans, people 
may choose not to take them, while, with mandatory plans, workers 
may view the contributions as a tax. 
An examination of the actual features of mandated individual ac-
counts indicates that those plans generally do affect retirement and job 
choice (Turner 2000). Any mandatory program that attempts to increase 
people’s retirement savings may change their labor supply behavior, as 
discussed in the following sections. This impact occurs because indi-
viduals act to minimize the program’s effects and because of the effects 
of the worker’s greater retirement savings, if the program succeeds in 
that regard. 
eFFeCTs	on	houRs	woRKeD
A mandatory individual account may affect hours worked if em-
ployees view the mandatory contributions as a tax rather than as being 
equivalent to voluntary savings (Burkhauser and Turner 1985). How 
people view the contributions depends on their expectations as to future 
benefits	derived	from	those	contributions.	If	 they	mistrust	 the	system	
and	are	skeptical	that	they	will	receive	commensurate	benefits	in	return,	
they will tend to view the payments they make as a tax (Box 6.1).
A mandatory contribution rate that is greater than what a worker 
would voluntarily pay may be viewed as a tax by individuals who can-
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not borrow at low rates to restore their consumption to the level desired. 
The higher that required contributions rise above what a worker would 
want to pay, the more likely the person will perceive the amounts as a 
tax. (See Appendix B at the end of this book.) To the extent that this 
occurs, the contributions would have the normal wealth and substitu-
tion effects associated with taxes and would presumably reduce hours 
worked. These effects of mandatory individual accounts (discussed in 
the next section) would probably not be relevant for voluntary carve-
out accounts because the total amount contributed to social security 
would be the same.
Coronado (1997) has attempted to estimate whether workers per-
ceive required contributions as a tax in the Chilean mandatory individ-
ual	account	system.	She	finds	that,	under	the	individual	account	system,	
the mandatory contributions were viewed as less of a tax than under the 
former pay-as-you-go system. However, she is unable to rule out that 
participants see some of the contributions under the mandatory indi-
vidual account system as a tax.
Box	6.1		The	Distorting	effect	of	Taxes
Taxes distort the labor supply decisions of workers by re-
ducing the monetary returns from work, and thus the incentive 
to work and presumably the amount of work done. Some econo-
mists have argued that switching from Social Security to carve-
out individual accounts would increase the amount of work done 
in the United States by reducing the distorting effect of taxes. This 
argument is based on workers viewing the Social Security pay-
roll tax as a tax for which they receive little or nothing in return. 
While the amount of government services a person receives has 
little direct connection to the income taxes he or she pays, that is 
not the case for Social Security. As indicated by the annual state-
ment workers receive from the Social Security Administration, 
the more they pay in Social Security payroll taxes, the higher will 
be	their	benefits.	Because	of	the	progressive	redistribution	within	
Social Security, for some workers Social Security may act as a 
wage subsidy rather than as a tax.
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Individual accounts may affect hours worked by older persons be-
cause	of	the	flexibility	of	such	plans.	These	accounts	may	facilitate	a	
phased reduction in work hours preceding retirement. For example, 
Sweden’s mandatory individual account system permits workers to 
take	 one-quarter,	 one-half,	 three-quarters,	 or	 full	 benefits.	 By	 taking	
partial	 benefits,	 a	 worker	 could	 finance	 a	 phased	 reduction	 in	 work	
hours.	Workers	are	eligible	to	take	either	partial	or	full	benefits	at	age	
61.	Defined	benefit	plans	 can	be	designed	with	 this	 feature,	 but	 it	 is	
more complex to do so.
eFFeCTs	on	ReTIReMenT	AGe
While it is generally thought that mandatory individual accounts 
do not affect the age at which workers retire, that may not be the case. 
Aspects of individual accounts that may affect the worker’s retirement 
age include the following: interaction with other programs, the current 
interest rate used for annuitizing the account balance versus anticipated 
interest rates, the extent to which past rates of return on the account 
balance have been unexpected, expected future rates of return, the riski-
ness associated with expected future rates of return, requirements as to 
the	age	at	which	benefits	can	or	must	be	taken,	rules	as	to	whether	work	
must	cease	when	drawing	benefits,	and	the	level	of	the	mandatory	con-
tribution rate. The effects of individual accounts on retirement age can 
be divided into those effects that relate to the accumulation of account 
balances	and	those	that	relate	to	the	way	in	which	benefits	are	paid.
Account Balances 
Account balances can affect the timing of retirement in several ways. 
First, there may be wealth effects associated with mandatory individual 
accounts or voluntary carve-out accounts. If individual accounts have 
received unexpectedly favorable rates of return, positive wealth effects 
may induce workers to retire (Diamond 1998). The reverse would be 
the case if the rates of return had been lower than anticipated. 
Hermes and Ghilarducci (2006) present evidence for the United 
States suggesting that negative wealth effects from the decline in stock 
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markets in the early 2000s caused some pension participants to post-
pone retirement. They argue that this effect of individual accounts de-




have a harder time securing a job.
Second, there may be a substitution effect related to anticipated 
rates of return on the assets held in the pension plan. The substitution 
effect can be thought of as the option value of delaying retirement and 
contributing to an individual account for another year. This effect would 
lead to postponed retirement if the worker expected to receive a rela-
tively high rate of return on the pension fund balance or on pension con-
tributions that depend on continued employment (Disney, Palacios, and 
Whitehouse 1999). For example, employees might be induced to delay 
retirement if they were forced to annuitize their account balances at 
retirement but felt they could receive a better rate of return on pension 
investments if they continued working and thus were able to continue 
investing their account balance.
Third, the higher the contribution rates and the more money ac-
cumulated in the plan, the more likely is the plan to affect retirement if 
the worker is liquidity-constrained. Being unable to borrow against his 
account	balance	to	finance	current	consumption,	the	worker	would	need	
to retire to gain access to the cash in his pension account.
The Chilean pension system has a feature that allows people in 
physically demanding occupations to retire earlier than other workers. 
In those occupations, the employer must contribute an additional 2 per-
cent of wages to each individual’s pension account. Economic theory 
suggests that workers would bear those added costs through reduced 
wages.	The	extra	payment	permits	workers	to	accumulate	sufficient	ac-
count balances to retire earlier than they otherwise would be able to.
Fourth, the riskiness of the plan’s investments will affect the degree 
of certainty that individuals attach to their intended retirement age. The 
riskier the plan, the more uncertain workers will be as to their likely 
account balances at the age at which they expect to retire. The effect of 
riskiness of the asset returns on retirement age may depend on workers’ 
attitudes toward risk-taking (Kingston 2000). Financially conservative 
persons, when the perceived risk-return trade-off improves, will tend to 
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stop	working	earlier:	retirement	has	become	cheaper	to	finance	in	terms	
of the risk that must be borne. However, workers who tolerate more risk 
will postpone retirement: by taking the same amount of risk, they will 
receive higher returns, which will allow greater future consumption. 
Finally, the early retirement age in social security may play an im-
portant psychological role, acting as a signal of the age at which the 
government considers it reasonable for people to retire. Thus, the age 
at	which	workers	can	begin	receiving	benefits	from	individual	accounts	





as a lump sum. At least two aspects of uncertainty are associated with 
whether a lump sum will provide adequate retirement income. First, 
length of life is unknown. Second, there is unpredictability as to the 
future	value	of	 the	 lump	sum	because	of	fluctuations	 in	market	 rates	
of return. These factors may induce workers, who are concerned that 
they not run out of money, to postpone their retirement age from the 




Individual accounts may affect retirement age because of their in-
teractions with other government programs. For example, by retiring at 
the	earliest	possible	age	with	nonannuitized	benefits,	low-income	work-
ers in Chile may be able to qualify later for government-subsidized 
minimum	benefits	after	 they	have	spent	down	their	pension	assets.	A	
similar strategy may be used by Australian low-income workers in or-
der	to	receive	increased	means-tested	benefits	at	a	later	age.	Australia’s	
individual account system suffers from an incentive for workers to re-
tire early and rely on the government pension once they are eligible. By 
taking	early	retirement,	workers	reduce	the	pension	benefit	that	is	based	
on	their	own	contributions	and	receive	a	larger	benefit	from	the	income-
tested and asset-tested age pension. 
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If workers are unable to borrow against their individual accounts, 
which is generally the case when individual accounts are part of so-
cial security, and they are otherwise liquidity-constrained, they may be 
induced to retire, as that would be the only way to access their funds. 
However, if people cannot withdraw funds from their account before 
a certain age, or cannot withdraw them before a certain age without 
tax penalty, or cannot withdraw them before other criteria are met (such 
as a minimum replacement rate provided by the account), workers 
may be induced to postpone retirement until they meet the necessary 
requirements.
If the account balance is annuitized, individual accounts, either 
mandatory or voluntary carve-out, may affect workers’ retirement deci-
sions because of the effect of changes in the interest rate on the level of 
monthly	benefits	provided	by	an	annuity.	The	lower	the	interest	rate,	the	
lower	 the	monthly	benefit	 resulting	 from	converting	 the	account	bal-
ance to an annuity. Workers with individual accounts may retire early or 
postpone retirement based on how favorably they view the interest rate 
in the annuity market compared to their expectations for future rates. 
This effect would not be considered to distort behavior since it is a reac-
tion to market prices rather than to the effect of taxes distorting prices. 
Fluctuations	 in	 annuity	 rates	 and	 in	 financial	 markets	 may	 have	
large	combined	effects	on	the	level	of	retirement	benefits	provided	by	
individual accounts, and thus on retirement age. Workers retiring in the 
United States in 1969 who had a pension plan invested entirely in stock 
over	their	career	and	who	annuitized	their	benefit	would	have	received	
a	pension	equal	to	100	percent	of	their	final	preretirement	earnings;	in	
contrast, because of the stock market downturn, workers retiring six 
years	later,	in	1975,	would	have	received	a	pension	benefit	providing	a	
42 percent replacement rate (Burtless 2000a).
One study, using the Health and Retirement Survey, tested empiri-
cally for the effect of individual accounts on the age at which workers 
retire	in	the	United	States	(Friedberg	and	Webb	2000).	The	finding	was	
that,	 for	workers	who	 have	 both	 a	 defined	 benefit	 and	 an	 individual	
account, the greater the balance in the individual account, the greater 
the probability of retirement in a given period. Given that effect, it was 
unexpected	that	the	authors	did	not	see	an	influence	of	account	balance	
on retirement age for workers having only an individual account. An-
other study found that U.S. workers whose employer provides only an 
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individual account plan tended to retire a year later than similar workers 
whose	employer	provides	only	a	defined	benefit	plan	(Munnell,	Cahill,	
and Jivan 2003).
Changes in Retirement Eligibility Age in Individual Accounts
With	gains	in	longevity,	a	given	account	balance	at	a	fixed	retire-
ment	age	provides	lower	annual	benefits	for	each	successive	birth	co-
hort. Perhaps for this reason, some mandatory individual account sys-
tems	have	raised	the	earliest	age	at	which	benefits	can	be	received.	
The	choice	of	the	earliest	age	at	which	benefits	can	be	received	is	
an important aspect of plan design. Some empirical work suggests that 
about a third of the U.S. population has a high time preference rate, 
which	 implies	 that	 they	will	 take	social	security	benefits	at	 the	earli-
est age at which they are available (Gustman and Steinmeier 2005). 
Because	 these	workers	may	 take	 benefits	 at	 an	 early	 age	 if	 they	 are	
available,	with	the	result	being	that	they	receive	a	low	level	of	benefits,	
the	age	at	which	benefits	are	available	will	affect	the	age	at	which	work-
ers actually retire. The following examples tell of countries that have 
raised	 the	 eligibility	 age	 at	which	 individual	 account	benefits	 can	be	
received.
Australia
For both men and women born before July 1, 1960, the minimum 
age	at	which	the	mandatory	superannuation	benefit	(the	Australian	ter-
minology for the mandatory individual account) can be received is 55. 
That age has been raised (as of 1999) for later birth cohorts, affecting 
those aged 38 and younger at the time of the change. For those born 
after July 1, 1960, but before July 1, 1961, the minimum age is 56. In 
similar fashion, the minimum age rises by one year for every subse-
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have contributed for 20 years, and at least 50 percent of their own aver-
age wage. These requirements will be raised to 150 percent and 70 per-




When Sweden reformed its retirement income system in 1999 
and	 introduced	 the	mandatory	defined	contribution	Premium	Pension	
system, it raised the early retirement age in 2000 from 60 to 61 (SSA 
1999). 
ConCLusIons
This chapter has explored various possible effects of mandatory in-
dividual accounts and voluntary carve-out accounts on workers in labor 
markets. In some instances, effects depend on whether the account is 
mandatory or voluntary, while in other cases, the same results would be 
expected for either one. The hypotheses discussed here in regard to how 
individual accounts may affect labor supply and demand await further 
analytical development and empirical testing. 
An important aspect of the labor market effects of individual ac-
counts depends on whether workers view mandatory contributions as 
being a tax or as being savings. The higher the mandatory contribution 
and	the	greater	the	extent	to	which	workers	are	myopic	or	lack	confi-
dence	 in	 the	 system	 (thus	placing	 little	value	on	 future	benefits),	 the	
more likely they are to see it as a tax (see Appendix B). 
Individual accounts may have wealth as well as substitution effects. 
Wealth	effects	due	 to	capital	market	changes	may	 influence	workers’	
decisions as to when to retire. This consequence may be destabilizing 
on labor markets because workers are induced to postpone retirement 
during	periods	of	economic	downturn,	at	the	same	time	that	firms	are	
laying off personnel. Individual accounts may affect the age of retire-
ment for some low-income workers because of the way those plans 
interact with poverty programs in certain countries. 
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A related issue is the effect of gains in longevity on the age at which 
workers	are	eligible	to	receive	benefits	from	individual	accounts.	As	life	
expectancy improves, either the contribution rate must increase or the 
age of early retirement must be raised in order to keep constant the ben-
efits	provided	by	individual	accounts.	Some	countries	have	raised	the	
earliest	age	at	which	individual	account	benefits	can	be	received,	which	
can be considered as containing an aspect of political risk.
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Individual accounts accrue in the form of an account balance, but 
retirees	need	to	receive	a	steady	flow	of	income	to	finance	their	con-
sumption over a number of years. Thus, a decision must be made as to 
how the account will be converted to an income stream for the retiree—
the	form	in	which	benefits	will	be	paid.	In	establishing	individual	ac-
counts,	difficult	issues	arise	concerning	payout	options	and	whether,	for	
example, participants should be required to fully annuitize their indi-
vidual account balances. Public policy also must determine the qualify-
ing	conditions	for	receiving	benefits.	The	structure	of	pension	benefits	




Pension participants in individual accounts face interest rate risk at 
the point of retirement if they wish to annuitize their account balances. 
In	 defined	 benefit	 plans,	 the	 plan	 sponsor	 bears	 that	 risk;	 the	 risk	 is	
nearly always borne by participants in individual accounts. 
To	provide	examples	of	ways	benefits	are	paid	from	individual	ac-
counts,	the	chapter	first	discusses	forms	of	benefit	payment	in	Sweden	
and Chile. It then discusses various issues in the determination and pay-
ment	of	benefits.	The	chapter	 concludes	with	a	discussion	of	 the	 tax	
treatment of individual accounts.
BeneFITs	In	The	sweDIsh	PReMIuM	PensIon	sysTeM
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Individuals	 can	 claim	benefits	 from	 the	mandatory	 individual	 ac-




come earners as a tax-advantaged way to accumulate inheritable wealth. 
A	worker	can	claim	benefits	at	the	same	age	as	he	or	she	initiates	ben-
efits	from	the	notional	account	plan,	or	that	worker	can	claim	benefits	
from the Premium Pension separately, starting at a different age. 
Facilitating	semiretirement	by	permitting	partial	receipt	of	benefits,	
the program allows workers to claim one-quarter, one-half, three-quar-
ters,	or	full	benefits.	They	can	continue	working	while	they	draw	ben-





older workers who are forced to retire because of ill health or because 
of losing a job. Interest rate risk in Sweden is limited by a guarantee. 
The interest rate used to determine the annuity varies with the market, 
but with a promised minimum of 3 percent. The guarantee is given by 
the PPM as part of its provision of annuities. 
When interest rates are low, the annuity resulting from a given ac-
count balance is also relatively low, because the expected income gen-
erated	from	the	account	is	low.	A	worker	can	begin	receiving	benefits	
from the notional account plan, but if the individual believes interest 
rates will rise, making it more favorable to annuitize Premium Pension 
benefits	 later,	 the	worker	can	postpone	annuitization	of	 the	Premium	
Pension.	 Once	 participants	 have	 claimed	 Premium	 Pension	 benefits,	
they can suspend payment or change the percentage of a full payment 
they receive. 
The PPM, the government agency that oversees the Swedish sys-
tem, is the sole provider of annuities for participants in the Premium 
Pension. Sweden is the only country where the government is the sole 
provider of annuities for participants in mandatory individual accounts 
(World Bank 2000). Typically, in individual accounts, workers who de-
sire to annuitize their account balances must purchase annuities on their 
own from private-sector life insurance companies. 





the Premium Pension be paid out fully as an annuity. Participants can-
not take lump sum payments of even a portion of their account; thus, 
once	they	begin	collecting	benefits,	they	cannot	bequeath	any	of	their	
account balance. 
Participants	 can	choose	 a	fixed	or	variable	 annuity.	 If	 the	person	
selects	a	fixed	annuity,	the	PPM	guarantees	a	set	monthly	payment	for	
life. The monthly amount may be increased by a bonus, however, de-




the personal income tax at the same rate as labor earnings.
The PPM uses unisex life tables, and it uses different life tables for 
each birth cohort. Because women and higher-wage workers have, on 
average, longer life expectancies than men and lower-wage workers, 
the system redistributes money in a complex way from men to women 
and from lower-wage to higher-wage workers. Consequently, the criti-
cism	that	traditional	defined	benefit	social	security	programs	redistrib-
ute income in a complicated manner also applies to individual accounts 
that mandate annuitization. 
Married	workers	are	not	required	to	provide	survivors	benefits	for	
their spouses. Participants may voluntarily choose the Premium Pen-
sion’s	survivor	benefit,	which	is	primarily	used	as	protection	for	wid-
ows. It is available on a separate basis for the preretirement and retire-






out	 regard	 to	 the	 participant’s	 account	 balance)	 for	 five	 years	 (PPM	
2001).	Beneficiaries	include	children	under	age	20	and	a	spouse,	regis-
tered partner, or cohabitant, including same-sex partners. 
If	the	individual	at	retirement	has	selected	the	survivor	benefit	op-
tion,	he	or	she	will	receive	a	reduced	benefit,	and	the	survivor	benefit	
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will be paid as a life annuity to the spouse, registered partner, or per-
son previously married to the deceased or with whom the deceased had 
children.	Workers	can	also	transfer	benefits	to	their	spouse	or	partner	by	
electing to have the contributions they make while working deposited 
into that person’s account instead of their own.
In some individual account systems, the possibility of accumulating 
bequeathable wealth is considered to be a desirable feature. This op-
portunity allows lower-income workers to amass funds that they might 
pass on to their heirs. If a worker dies before having annuitized his or 
her account balance, the Swedish pension system does not permit the 
bequest of the remaining sum. That amount is redistributed among all 
of	the	participants	in	the	system.	A	survivors	benefit	would	only	be	pro-
vided if the worker has purchased one.
BeneFITs	In	The	ChILeAn	PensIon	sysTeM
In	 Chile,	 women	may	 claim	 old-age	 pension	 benefits	 at	 age	 60,	
and	men	may	claim	benefits	at	age	65.	However,	the	system	is	flexible	
in	that	it	allows	workers	to	take	benefits	at	younger	ages	if	they	have	
saved enough in their individual accounts to qualify. They must have 
sufficient	 savings	 so	 that	 the	 annuitized	benefit	would	be	 at	 least	 50	
percent of their average indexed earnings over the previous 10 years, 
or at least 110 percent of the legal minimum wage, whichever is lower. 
Workers	who	have	 satisfied	 these	 requirements	can	 stop	contributing	
and begin withdrawing their money. They need not stop working to 
collect	benefits.	This	feature	allows	workers	to	take	partial	retirement	
or phased retirement and to combine employment with the receipt of 
pension	benefits.	
Workers	 may	 take	 their	 benefit	 as	 a	 price-indexed	 annuity,	 as	 a	
phased withdrawal, or as a combination of the two. With a phased with-
drawal, the funds that remain at death become part of the worker’s estate. 
Participants	may	also	take	out	a	lump	sum	benefit	from	their	individual	
accounts	if	the	remaining	amount	is	sufficient	so	that	they	meet	one	of	
two conditions: they purchase an annuity at least equal to 120 percent of 
the minimum guaranteed pension, or they take scheduled withdrawals 
of at least 70 percent of the participant’s price-indexed covered wages. 
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The option of a price-indexed annuity in the Chilean system is an 
unusual	feature.	While	price	indexation	of	benefits	occurs	frequently	in	
social	security	defined	benefit	systems,	in	individual	account	systems	it	
is uncommon because most countries do not have price-indexed assets 
in	which	to	invest	to	fund	price-indexed	benefits.	Chile,	however,	has	a	
well-developed market in price-indexed bonds.
With	phased	withdrawal,	 the	worker	 receives	a	benefit	 each	year	
that is based on his or her remaining life expectancy and on the amount 
in the person’s individual account. With the phased withdrawal, the 
retirement	benefit	 is	 recomputed	each	year,	 taking	 into	 consideration	
the fund’s investment performance and whether the worker’s spouse or 
other	beneficiaries	have	died.	Thus,	 the	benefit	provided	with	phased	
withdrawal	differs	each	year.	Pensioners	may	begin	taking	their	benefits	
as a phased withdrawal and later switch to a price-indexed annuity.  
Chilean pension fund management companies (AFPs) do not pro-
vide annuities. At retirement, the participants who choose an annuity 
must contract with a private insurance company to purchase it. If a mar-
ried man chooses an annuity, he must provide a survivors annuity for 
his spouse and minor children. A married woman must do so only if her 
husband is disabled. 
ACCRuAL	PATTeRn	oF	BeneFITs	 
In	InDIvIDuAL	ACCounTs
The accrual pattern in individual accounts determines how much 
a	worker	 is	gaining	 in	 future	benefits.	This	pattern	depends	on	four	
factors: the worker’s age, the worker’s earnings, the rate of return, 
and the accumulated account balance. The earnings of younger people 
have a larger effect on ultimate account balances than would the same 
level of earnings at an older age because of interest compounding 
(Box 7.1). 
The time pattern of rates of return can have a large effect on individ-
ual accounts. A negative rate of return on a small account early in life 
has a much smaller effect on balances at retirement than a negative rate 
of return on a large account near retirement. Thus, different cohorts of 
workers	will	receive	differing	generosity	of	benefits	depending	on	the	
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pattern of high and low rates of return over their working lives, which 
raises the issue of intergenerational equity.
Making contributions to an individual account nearly always re-
quires that the individual is working. However, the Swedish mandatory 





For a full-career worker in the United States, a period of un-
employment	may	have	little	effect	on	Social	Security	benefits	be-
cause	those	benefits	are	based	on	the	35	highest	years	of	earnings,	
with low-earnings years not being counted for work beyond 35 
years. However, with an individual account, any period of unem-
ployment	reduces	future	benefits	because	it	reduces	contributions	
to the account. Because lower-income workers are more likely 
to become unemployed than higher-income workers, unemploy-
ment has more of an effect on retirement income for lower-in-
come workers than for higher-income workers in an individual 
account system. A less obvious effect is connected with the tim-
ing of unemployment relative to the ups and downs of the stock 
market. If unemployment occurs during market downturns, then 
unemployed workers are not able to purchase stock when its price 
is low. Thus, the timing of unemployment affects the amount of 
lost retirement income. One study (Seligman and Wenger 2005) 
has found that the actual timing of unemployment tends to make 
the losses to participants in individual accounts greater than if the 
timing had been purely random.
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ReGRessIvITy	
Retirement income systems may affect the distribution of income 
among the older population. In some countries, the citizenry has a 
strong desire to use the retirement income system to redistribute income 
toward lower-income retirees, often women, who have higher rates of 
elderly poverty than men. Regressivity is redistribution from lower- to 
higher-income groups.
Individual accounts can be designed to redistribute income, for ex-
ample, through government subsidies to the accounts of workers with 
low earnings, but this is rarely done. Individual accounts are usually 
considered to be neutral in their effects on the distribution of income, 
being neither progressive nor regressive. This is indeed the case when 
the rate of return received on workers’ account balances, net of expens-
es and taxes, is constant across income classes. That situation would 
occur if administrative costs were allocated equally across dollars in-
vested	in	the	same	portfolio,	and	if	annuitization	of	benefits	recognized	
differences in life expectancy associated with different income classes. 
While plans could be designed with those features, frequently none of 
them are present. 
In actual practice, individual accounts may be regressive (Turner 
2000). Some regressive aspects of these plans affect the accrual of ac-
count balances, and others result from the annuitization of account bal-
ances. Other issues arise for voluntary carve-outs because of the rela-
tionship between social security and individual accounts. The following 
discussion considers causes of regressivity and possible remedies.
Effects on Account Balances
Regressivity in individual accounts can be the result of fees that 
fall disproportionately on low-wage workers. Alternatively, regressiv-
ity can result because low-wage workers invest more conservatively 
and end up with lower account balances relative to their contributions 
because of the lower returns (before fees) that they receive.
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Fees
Individual accounts may penalize low-income workers through the 
way charges for expenses are allocated. The costs of processing contri-
butions,	keeping	 records,	managing	 investments,	 and	paying	benefits	
are	primarily	fixed	per	worker	and	do	not	vary	by	transaction	size	or	
account	balance.	Charges	levied	by	for-profit	service	providers,	when	
not otherwise constrained by regulation, tend to follow the incidence of 
costs, with small accounts often having higher charges relative to assets 
than large accounts. Thus, the regulation of the fee structure may be an 
important policy issue. 
Some individual accounts in Australia and the United Kingdom 
impose a set entrance fee for opening an account. Individual account 
providers	in	Chile	charge	both	fixed	and	variable	costs.	In	some	plans,	
the fee diminishes as a percentage of the balance for large accounts, or 
fixed	charges	are	waived	for	larger	balances.	Mutual	funds	in	the	United	
States	often	charge	fixed	fees	for	small	accounts,	with	bigger	accounts	
being charged fees that are a lower percentage of assets.
Over the period 1981–1990, the average net rate of return for a 
worker with the maximum eligible earnings in one of the Chilean pen-
sion funds was 10.4 percent, and that for a worker with minimum eli-
gible earnings was 9.2 percent. The difference was due to the fee struc-
ture (Habitat 1991). Low-income workers on average actually received 
only 7.5 percent across funds, compared to 10 percent for high-income 
workers (Vittas and Iglesias 1991). This is a substantial difference, 
having	a	large	effect	on	retirement	benefits	when	compounded	over	a	
worker’s career.
Government intervention, however, can eliminate this source of re-
gressivity.	The	fixed	costs	of	accounts	can	be	borne	by	the	government	
and spread across workers in proportion to their account balances. This 
can be done, for example, if the government acts as a clearinghouse by 
collecting contributions and distributing them to pension fund manag-
ers, as in Sweden. 
There are other sources of regressivity in both mandatory individual 
account	and	defined	benefit	systems.	For	example,	 in	both	programs,	
when	benefits	are	annuitized	using	uniform	annuity	conversion	rates,	
income is redistributed from low-income to high-income workers be-
cause the latter outlive their low-income counterparts.




of account balance than do lower-income contributors when there is a 
progressive income tax system—one in which higher-income workers 
pay higher marginal income tax rates—and when contributions to indi-
vidual accounts and the investment earnings on those accounts receive 
preferential tax treatment. The amount of tax subsidy per dollar contrib-
uted is the same for low- and high-income workers if a tax credit rather 
than a tax deduction is offered, but that approach costs the government 
a lot in lost tax revenue and is rarely used.
Risk preference 
People differ in their preferences for risk-bearing. It is sometimes 
argued that a positive aspect of individual accounts with portfolio 
choice is that individuals can choose the amount of risk that matches 
their risk preference. A weakness, however, is that participants are gen-
erally poorly informed about investments, and, compared with profes-
sional money managers, tend to select portfolios that are lower in risk 
and in return.
Data from the Thrift Savings Plan for U.S. federal government 
workers suggest that lower-income workers tend to pick more conser-
vative portfolios and receive lower rates of return (Hinz, McCarthy, and 
Turner 1996). These data may understate the difference between in-
come classes over workers’ lifetimes because the upper-income work-
Annual salary ($) Average rate of return (%)






70,000 or more 12.4
SOURCE: U.S. Thrift Savings Plan data for 1990 (Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner 1996).
Table	7.1		Rate	of	Return	on	an	Individual	Account	Plan	with	Portfolio	
Choice, by Income Level
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ers in the cross-sectional data tend to be older, and their risk aversion 
may increase as they near retirement. Nonetheless, the difference of 
100 basis points (1 percentage point) between the lowest and highest 
income groups, as shown in Table 7.1, if it persisted over a worker’s ca-
reer, would make a considerable difference in retirement income. Thus, 
self-management of individual accounts causes the accounts to be re-
gressive because lower-income workers tend to be less sophisticated in 
managing their accounts and tend to receive lower rates of return.
Annuitization 
Annuitization of account balances at retirement insures workers 
against the risk of outliving their resources. How this is accomplished, 
however, may add regressive elements to individual accounts. When 
the	accounts	annuitize	benefits	on	a	uniform	basis	and	do	not	take	into	
consideration the longer life expectancy associated with higher income, 
they redistribute toward upper-income workers. When comparing with-
in a gender group, there is a clear pattern of upper-income workers hav-
ing greater life expectancy. When considering both men and women, 
however, the connection between income and life expectancy is not as 
clear. Women have longer life expectancy than men but tend to have 
lower income.  
Insurance companies in Chile, but not in most countries with man-
datory individual accounts, consider personal characteristics, including 
gender,	in	determining	the	level	of	annuity	benefits	provided	by	an	ac-
count balance. This limits regressivity when comparing high- versus 
low-income workers within a single gender, but at the cost of lower re-
tirement	benefits	for	women	than	would	be	the	case	if	unisex	life	tables	
were	used	to	calculate	annuitized	benefits.	
The transaction costs associated with an individual worker purchas-
ing	an	annuity	are	largely	fixed	and	do	not	depend	on	the	size	of	the	
account balance being annuitized. Thus, these costs have a regressive 
effect when charged on an individual basis. Annuity charges in Chile 
are a source of regressivity: larger commissions relative to annuity pay-
ments are often charged to lower-income workers (Vittas and Iglesias 
1991).
Annuity prices vary across insurance companies. If participants are 
required to shop for an annuity, as in Chile, low-income workers may 
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be adversely affected. If such individuals are less sophisticated in pur-
chasing annuities than people with higher incomes, they tend to receive 




their searches.  
Most mandatory individual accounts allow workers to avoid the re-
gressive effects of annuitization by taking a phased withdrawal of ben-
efits.	Providing	this	option,	however,	increases	the	problem	of	adverse	
selection in the annuity market and works in a regressive way against 
low-income participants. Because people who expect to be long-lived 
are more likely to buy annuities, insurers price the product on the as-
sumption that their purchasers are long-lived. These prices may be ac-
tuarially fair for upper-income workers with long life expectancies; the 
problem is that the high price keeps low-income workers out of the 
annuity market and deprives them of the protection traditional social in-
surance plans provide against the risk of outliving one’s resources. Not 
requiring	annuitization,	however,	allows	less	affluent	workers	who	die	
relatively young to bequeath some of their retirement income to their 
survivors,	which	may	be	the	only	form	of	survivors	benefits	provided	
by an individual account system (Box 7.2).
voluntary	Carve-outs	
Although voluntary carve-outs can be structured in different ways, 
they generally are not as favorable for low-income as for high-income 
workers. With voluntary annuitization, adverse selection occurs because 
of the longer life expectancy of high-income participants. Social secu-
rity forms a larger share of retirement income for individuals with low 
incomes than for those with high incomes, so lower-income workers 
are more affected by the change in risk-bearing caused by the carve-out 
accounts.	Disability	benefits	tend	to	be	more	important	to	low-income	
labor and may be less generous under voluntary individual carve-out 
arrangements. If primarily upper-income workers establish individual 
accounts but government general revenues are used to pay transition 
costs,	the	benefits	of	the	system	would	be	going	to	upper-income	work-
ers, while all workers would be paying for the transition.
Turner.indb   121 2/6/2006   10:28:36 AM
122   Turner
Box	7.2		The	effect	of	Increases	in	Life	expectancy	on	
social	security	Benefits	with	a	voluntary	Carve-out
Increases in life expectancy are a cause of Social Security’s pro-
jected	 insolvency.	As	 people	 live	 longer,	 they	 receive	 benefits	 for	
more years. When no countervailing changes in the program are 
made,	longer	life	expectancy	eventually	leads	to	financing	problems.	
Sweden	deals	with	this	issue	by	indexing	social	security	benefits	to	
life expectancy, since increases in life expectancy reduce the initial 
benefit	retirees	receive.
Private	account	plans	do	not	face	this	source	of	financial	insol-
vency caused by increasing life expectancy. Rather, the monetary 
burden of greater longevity is typically borne by workers individu-
ally. When annuity providers anticipate that people will live longer in 
retirement,	they	reduce	the	annual	benefits	they	provide	for	a	given	
account balance and retirement age. Workers may then decide to 
work longer and postpone retirement.
How does an individual account of the type proposed by Presi-
dent Bush deal with increased life expectancy? Under the president’s 
plan, individuals may voluntarily divert part of their contributions 
from Social Security into a private account. This account would be 
invested	in	the	financial	markets	and	yield	a	balance	at	retirement.
Diverting part of one’s Social Security contributions to a private 
account	would	 result	 in	 reduced	 Social	 Security	 benefits	 at	 retire-
ment. The Social Security Administration (SSA) would calculate the 
decrease	in	benefits	based	on	a	hypothetical	account	established	for	
each person who chooses a private account. This hypothetical ac-
count would be credited with the actual contributions made by the 
person to the private account. It also would be credited with a set in-
terest rate on the hypothetical balance, for example, 3 percent above 
inflation.
At retirement, the hypothetical account balance resulting from 
the crediting of contributions and interest would be converted into 
a hypothetical annuity. This would be based on a unisex life table 
reflecting	 life	 expectancy	at	 retirement	 as	of	 that	 time.	The	annui-
tized	monthly	benefit	calculated	for	the	hypothetical	account	would	
be	subtracted	from	the	individual’s	Social	Security	monthly	benefit	
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that the person would have received had he or she not chosen to 
contribute to the private account. The individual would receive the 
reduced	Social	Security	benefit	resulting	from	this	calculation.
Under	this	plan,	life	expectancy	increases	would	be	reflected	in	
the life table used to annuitize the hypothetical individual account 
and	would	reduce	the	monthly	benefit	calculated	for	the	hypotheti-
cal	 account.	Then,	 the	 hypothetical	monthly	 benefit	 that	 has	 been	
reduced by the increase in life expectancy would be subtracted from 
the	person’s	Social	Security	benefit,	as	previously	described.	Thus,	
increases	 in	 life	 expectancy	 would	 reduce	 the	 annuitized	 benefit	
from the hypothetical account, but they would augment by an equal 
amount	the	Social	Security	benefit	received	by	the	worker	taking	the	
individual account. Thus, if an increase in life expectancy before re-
tirement	 age	 reduced	 the	benefits	 calculated	 from	 the	hypothetical	
account	by	$10	a	month,	Social	Security	benefits	would	increase	by	
$10 a month.
The net result is that the person who chooses the private account 
does not bear the effect of increases in life expectancy—the reduc-
tion	in	the	benefit	from	the	hypothetical	account	is	exactly	offset	by	
an	increase	in	his	or	her	Social	Security	benefit.	The	net	impact	for	
the Social Security trust fund, however, is that it bears the higher 
benefit	cost	due	to	increased	life	expectancy	for	those	persons	taking	
individual accounts.
The president’s plan thus does nothing to solve the problem of 
increased	life	expectancy	raising	Social	Security	benefit	costs.	Rath-
er, the cost of greater longevity for individual account participants 
would	be	borne	by	Social	Security	out	of	increased	benefit	payments.	
Thus, the carve-out private accounts the president has proposed would 
destabilize	Social	Security’s	financing	as	life	expectancy	increases,	
eventually	 necessitating	 further	 changes	 in	 program	 financing	 or	
benefits.	This	effect	would	not	occur	with	add-on	private	accounts.	
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Progressive Features
Individual accounts could be structured so that they are progressive, 
with, for example, part of the contributions of higher-income workers 
being used to subsidize the accounts of lower-income workers. Some 
individual accounts do have explicitly progressive elements. The gov-
ernment	can	make	periodic	flat	payments	to	all	accounts,	as	is	done	in	
Mexico. That contribution provides a relatively large subsidy for low-
income workers with small accounts. The plan can also be structured 
to have the government offer matching contributions that phase out at 
higher income levels. In Australia, the government makes a contribu-
tion of up to AUD$1,000 per year to low-income workers who make 
voluntary payments on top of the mandatory ones for their individual 
accounts (Pensions Policy Institute 2003). In Sweden, the government 
provides pension contributions out of general revenue on behalf of 
persons serving in the military, students, and those receiving disability 
benefits.
BeneFIT	PRoTeCTIon	FoR	woMen
With	individual	accounts,	 issues	arise	as	 to	 the	benefits	a	woman	
receives	as	a	divorcée,	as	a	spouse	of	a	retired	worker,	and	as	a	widow.	
What	types	of	benefit	protection	are	available	to	women,	and	are	those	
protections mandatory? Australia and the United Kingdom both permit, 
but do not require, the splitting of pension assets in divorce proceed-
ings. Sweden allows a husband to assign his pension contributions to 
his wife’s account, or a wife to her husband’s. Sweden also provides 
contributions out of general revenue for women who are not working 
because they are taking care of children.
An issue in calculating annuities concerns to what extent variations 
in life expectancy arising from factors other than age should be taken 
into account. Notably, should longevity differences associated with 
gender be recognized? Not acknowledging this differential can be con-
sidered a form of sex discrimination against men (McCarthy and Turner 
1993). However, because women have lower average retirement ben-
efits	than	men,	public	policy	generally	determines	that	annuities	should	
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provided, while Chile does in the case of men for their wives if the men 
receive	their	benefits	in	the	form	of	an	annuity.







of	 interest	 accumulation	 and	 the	 five	 fewer	 years	 of	 benefit	 payouts	
(James, Edwards, and Wong 2003).
With voluntary carve-outs, as proposed in the United States, ques-
tions have arisen as to whether the account balances of husbands and 
wives that have accrued during marriage would be split at divorce. 
With these accounts, however, there is an associated liability, which is 
the	offset	against	future	Social	Security	benefits.	Splitting	the	liability	
could result in a divorced wife receiving a liability that exceeded the 
benefits	she	received.
AnnuITIZATIon	oF	BeneFITs
Returning	 to	 the	 theme	 of	 risks	 in	 individual	 accounts,	 financial	
market	risk	affects	individual	account	pensions	at	three	points.	The	first	
time is during the accumulation phase, because of the risk in equity and 
bond	markets.	The	second	impact	is	on	the	initial	annuitized	benefit	at	
the	stage	that	the	account	is	converted	into	an	annuity,	because	of	fluc-




tion,	defined	benefit	 social	 security	plans	 frequently	provide	 indexed	
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annuities, as in the United States, but that is rarely done with individual 
accounts (Chile being an exception). 
Burtless	(2000b)	examined	the	first	two	sources	of	risk	in	the	Unit-
ed States over the years from 1911 to 1999 and found considerable in-
vestment risk stemming from variation in the price of annuities, as well 
as	from	financial	market	risk	in	 the	value	of	account	balances.	Large	
fluctuations	 in	 income	 replacement	 rates	 for	 retirees	 can	 result	 from	
variations in the interest rates used to calculate annuities (Box 7.3). 
Some degree of mandatory annuitization may be viewed as desir-
able to ensure that workers will not outlive their retirement savings. 
However, it is not required in many countries with mandatory individ-
ual accounts (Table 7.2). Among the mandatory individual accounts in 
Latin America, seven countries allow their retirees to either purchase 
an annuity or to take programmed withdrawals throughout retirement, 
while two countries require annuity purchases (Kritzer 2000).2 The 
compulsory individual accounts in Hungary and Poland require an-
nuitization with private insurers (World Bank 2000). Sweden mandates 
annuity purchases through the government but gives workers consider-
Box	7.3		Interest	Rates	and	the	Conversion	
of an Individual Account into an Annuity
The	amount	of	pension	benefits	paid	out	annually	from	an	in-
dividual account plan that has been annuitized depends on the in-
terest rate at the time the account balance is annuitized. A pension 




account balance. However, the amount of capital to be converted 
may also be affected by the change in interest rates: for example, a 
decrease in interest rates causes an increase in the value of bonds. 
The	net	effect	of	a	change	in	interest	rates	on	the	level	of	benefits	
cannot be determined in the abstract; it depends on the associ-
ated changes in capital market valuations of the assets held in the 
account.
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able	flexibility	as	to	when	those	are	made	(Turner	2004).	When	annui-
ties are purchased through private insurers, the government may need 
to provide some form of insurance in case the insurer is unable to meet 
its	benefit	commitments.
The United Kingdom permits the gradual purchase over time of 
fixed	annuities.	Retirees	can	take	a	tax-free	lump	sum	of	up	to	a	quarter	
of their accumulated contracted-out individual account. They can draw 
down the rest of the fund gradually after retirement, but they must buy 
an annuity with the remainder by age 75. Australia allows participants 
to	take	their	mandatory	individual	account	benefit	either	as	an	annuity	
or	as	a	lump	sum	benefit.	Tax	laws	provide	substantial	incentives	to	take	
it as an annuity, but most people take a lump sum (Mitchell and Piggott 
2000). 
Workers could be permitted to take a lump sum of part of their ac-
count	if	 they	were	able	to	provide	an	annuity	of	sufficient	generosity	
with the remainder, with that level possibly being tied to average wages 
in the economy. Exceptions to mandatory annuitization might be of-
fered to the terminally ill (Mackenzie 2002).
Mandatory annuity purchases reduce annuity prices by eliminat-
ing adverse selection and expanding the market to cover individuals 
regardless of health and life expectancy. Compulsory annuities insure 
that individuals will not spend all of their resources in the early years 
of retirement. However, mandatory annuities cause redistribution from 
low- to high-income individuals because of the positive correlation of 
life expectancy with income within gender groups (Brown 1999).
Table	7.2		A	sampling	of	Countries	with	and	without	Mandatory	









UK (at age 75) El Salvador
Uruguay Hong Kong
SOURCE: Kritzer (2000) and author’s compilation.
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It	is	often	argued	that	benefit	levels	in	individual	accounts	are	less	
sensitive	 to	 demographic	 change	 than	 are	 defined	 benefit	 systems.	






Variations in interest rates can have a large impact on the level of 
annual	pension	benefits	received.	For	a	65-year-old,	a	4	percent	interest	
rate generates annual payments of $686 per $10,000 annuitized. This 
amount rises to $830 at 6 percent and to $982 at 8 percent (Ameriks 
2002). Higher interest rates increase annual payments because the in-
come produced by the account balance invested at those rates will be 
greater. Thus, if a 65-year-old had an account balance of $100,000 and 
the interest rate at the time of conversion was 4 percent, he or she would 
receive annual payments of $6,860 and monthly payments of approxi-
mately $570, which would continue at that level until death.
Under a guaranteed annuity conversion option, a pension plan 
promises to convert a worker’s account balance to a life annuity at a 
fixed	interest	rate,	or	at	an	interest	rate	no	lower	than	a	fixed	minimum.	
(See Appendix A at the end of the book for a discussion of rate-of-return 
guarantees.) A more extensive guarantee would also take into account 
the mortality table used. If the annuity rates provided under the guar-
antee	are	more	beneficial	to	the	participant	than	the	prevailing	market	
rates, the plan, employer, or some other entity must make up the differ-
ence in the purchase price of the annuity. 
The protection of pensioners provided by an interest rate guaran-
tee could be undermined if insurance companies were free to choose 
mortality	tables:	the	firms	could	choose	a	mortality	table	to	offset	the	
effect of low interest rates. Both the interest rates and the mortality 
tables used in the conversion would need to be regulated. For example, 
when converting an annuity stream to a lump sum payment, ERISA 
specifies	the	discount	rate	and	life	table	valuation	factors	in	discount-
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ing	 retirement	 benefits	 in	U.S.	 private	 sector	 pension	plans.	 For	 dis-
tributions in 2001, ERISA established the 30-year Treasury securities 
interest rate as the maximum discount rate in computing present value. 
For that year, ERISA also required the use of the 1983 Group Annuity 
Mortality unisex table in present value computations. Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) Revenue Ruling 2001-62, issued on December 31, 2001, 
requires	defined	benefit	plans	 to	adopt	a	new	mortality	 table	 for	cal-
culating	 the	minimum	present	 value	 of	 lump	 sum	benefits.	The	 new	
table is the 1994 Group Annuity Reserving Table (94 GAR), which is 
adjusted on a unisex basis and projected to the year 2002. The pres-
ent value of the annuity computed using this interest rate and mortality 
table is the minimum the plan could pay a participant. Annuity conver-
sion guarantees are not an issue with traditional social security plans 
because	those	plans	specify	the	benefit	level,	so	the	participant	does	not	
bear any interest rate risk.
PLAns	PRovIDInG	An	AnnuITy	ConveRsIon	 
RATe	GuARAnTee
Although some private sector voluntary individual accounts and 
some mandatory plans provide a rate-of-return guarantee for converting 
an individual account balance to an annuity, most do not. The following 
countries provide an example of the variety of practice.
Argentina 
Argentine insurance companies are required to use a 4 percent nom-
inal rate for annuity pricing for mandatory individual accounts. The 
Argentine annuity allows the holder to share in returns in excess of 4 
percent (World Bank 2000).
Latin America 
In all other Latin American countries with individual accounts than 
Argentina, the interest rate for conversion of the account balance to an 
annuity varies with the market. Chile provides a government guaran-
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tee	of	annuities	in	payment,	which	promises	a	certain	level	of	benefits	
against default of the insurance company.
sweden
Workers have a choice between annuitization through the govern-
ment, with a guaranteed conversion rate of at least 3 percent, or pur-
chasing a variable annuity, with the annuity recalculated annually (Eng-
ström and Westerberg 2003). A variable annuity guarantees payment 
until	 death,	 but	 the	 level	 of	 benefits	 fluctuates	with	 the	 value	 of	 the	
underlying investments. Thus, a variable annuity provides insurance 
against the risk of outliving one’s resources, but it does not provide a 
guaranteed	level	of	benefits.
switzerland
Until recently, Switzerland’s rate for converting account balances to 
annuities	was	7.2	percent	if	benefits	were	taken	at	age	65.	This	meant	
that	the	annual	annuity	benefit	had	to	equal	at	least	7.2	percent	of	the	
worker’s account balance. Thus, the guarantee, in effect, jointly guar-
anteed the mortality rates and the interest rates used for calculating an-
nuities. It mandated a sex-neutral conversion. Employers have lobbied 
the	government	 to	 reduce	 this	 return	 to	 reflect	 low	 interest	 rates	 and	
diminished mortality rates. In response, the government has decided 
to decrease the conversion rate at age 65 to 6.4 percent by 2011 to take 
into account the increase in life expectancy (Hewitt Associates 2002). 
united	Kingdom	
The United Kingdom does not have a rate-of-return guarantee for 
the annuitization of its contracted-out individual accounts. People must 
annuitize with private life insurance companies that vary the price of 
annuities	based	on	 the	market	 interest	 rate.	To	 facilitate	greater	flex-
ibility with respect to interest rate risk for annuitization, people are al-
lowed a window up to age 75 before they are required to annuitize their 
accounts.
Conversion rate guarantees for annuitizing account balances were 
popular in the United Kingdom in the 1970s and 1980s when long-
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term interest rates were high (Boyle and Hardy 2002). Insurance com-
panies apparently assumed that interest rates would remain high, and 
thus that the guarantees would never become active. In the early 1990s, 
when long-term interest rates began to fall, the guarantees became a 
concern. Two other factors added to the cost of these guarantees. First, 
strong stock markets meant the amounts to which the guarantees ap-




While conversion rate guarantees are unusual in the United States, 
the United Methodist Church of the United States since 1982 has guar-
anteed an interest rate that is the higher of the following two options: 
either 8 percent, or the market interest rate for annuitizing the account 
balances of persons in its Ministerial Pension Plan. Participants are re-
quired to annuitize at least 75 percent of their account balances. Be-
cause of the cost of that guarantee during a period of low interest rates, 
it is being phased out; starting in July 2003, it was only offered to per-
sons who had at least 35 years of service or who were aged 62 by July 
1, 2003. This guarantee is backed by a reserve fund. 
ALTeRnATIve	APPRoAChes
Fixed-rate guarantees are vulnerable to falls in interest rates. While 
they may be maintained for long periods when rates are stable, they 
may be revised or ended during periods of low interest rates. Alterna-
tive strategies can be used to limit the interest rate risk for participants 
associated with annuity conversions for individual account plans. One 
approach is to allow workers to partially annuitize in several steps, 
which reduces the risk associated with completely annuitizing at a sin-
gle point in time. Another tactic is to permit individuals to initially take 
phased withdrawals and to later take an annuity, giving workers greater 
flexibility	in	picking	the	point	at	which	they	annuitize.	
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TAX	PoLICy	TowARD	InDIvIDuAL	ACCounTs
Favorable tax treatment is generally used by countries with well-
developed pension systems to encourage worker participation (Reagan 
and Turner 1997). Such an inducement presumably is not needed for 
mandatory individual accounts since participation in them is required. 
Thus, it might be expected that mandatory individual accounts would 
not receive preferential tax treatment. That is not the case. Other issues 
that may hold reasons for granting favorable tax treatment include the 
fairness of the taxation of mandatory pensions versus other forms of 
retirement income, and the need to provide incentives for participation 
because of contribution evasion by workers and employers. 
Pensions can be taxed at three points in the process of accumulat-
ing	assets	and	paying	benefits:	contributions,	investment	earnings,	and	
withdrawals. The tax treatment of individual accounts can affect worker 
participation,	the	forms	of	payout,	and	benefit	levels	(NASI	2005).
Contribution Evasion
One of the reasons for providing favorable tax treatment of manda-
tory pensions is to address contribution evasion, which is the nonpay-
ment of contributions to compulsory plans. It occurs because of inter-
acting factors affecting workers and employers and because of the fail-
ure of government enforcement. Contribution evasion depends in part 
on whether people view mandatory payments to individual accounts 
as a tax (Burkhauser and Turner 1985). Consequently, this issue is an 
important aspect of tax policy toward mandatory individual accounts 
(Bailey and Turner 2001; see Appendix B). 
Contribution evasion is a problem in many social security programs, 
and favorable tax treatment may reduce the extent to which it occurs. 
Tax advantages may be provided to encourage participation in manda-
tory plans and as a matter of tax equity when plans that are voluntary 
receive preferential tax treatment. 
Tax evasion in the mandatory individual account systems in Latin 
America is a serious problem. Underlying factors appear to be the high 
level of mandatory contributions and the greater liquidity of other forms 
of savings (Gill, Packard, and Yermo 2005).
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Fundamental	Principles	of	Pension	Taxation
Three fundamental principles apply to the taxation of most pensions 
in the United States and in the majority of other countries providing 
favorable tax treatment for pensions: 
 1) Contributions are tax-exempt (excluded from income) or tax-
deductible	(E,	for	“exempt”).
 2) Pension investment earnings are tax-exempt until withdrawn (E).
	 3)	 Pension	benefits	are	taxable	(T,	for	“taxable”).	
This approach to the taxation of pensions is sometimes called the 
EET model. It is used, for example, by Chile for its mandatory indi-
vidual accounts. This is the most commonly used method for taxing 
pensions.	With	this	framework,	tax	payments	are	deferred	until	benefits	
are received in retirement, presumably for consumption. 
Consumption	Taxation
The tax treatment of pensions where the tax is levied only at the 
point	of	benefit	receipt	moves	countries	toward	a	consumption	tax	sys-
tem	rather	than	an	income	tax	system,	assuming	that	benefit	payments	
are consumed rather than saved. Under a consumption tax, retirees gen-
erally pay higher taxes than under an income tax raising equal revenue 
nationally. With this approach, consumption expenditures are taxed 
but savings, including investment earnings, are not. Earnings set aside 
through a pension are not taxed until received in retirement, when they 
are presumably consumed, which is how they would be treated under a 
consumption tax. A consumption tax avoids double taxation of savings 
(on the initial income that is saved and on the subsequent investment 
income) and thus does not distort the decision between current and fu-
ture consumption. This is a desirable aspect of a tax system, given the 
concern in many countries that people do not save adequately. 
With an income tax approach, employer contributions and pension 
investment	earnings	would	be	 taxed	but	benefit	payments	would	not.	
The consumption tax approach for pensions is not used in all countries. 
For	example,	in	the	United	Kingdom,	lump	sum	benefits	are	not	taxed.
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Taxation	of	social	security
In the United States, Social Security is taxed differently from pri-
vate pensions. Social Security receives equal contributions from work-
ers and employers. Workers’ contributions are made from after-tax in-
come (they cannot deduct the contributions from their taxable income). 
Employers’ contributions are from before-tax income (they can deduct 
them from their pretax income, and the contributions are not treated as 
taxable income to workers). Lower-income retirees are not taxed on 
their	Social	Security	benefits,	while	higher-income	retirees	must	include	
either	50	or	85	percent	of	their	benefits	in	taxable	income,	depending	
on their income level. The effective income tax rate on the employee’s 
share of Social Security contributions, and on the portion of the ben-
efits	that	the	employee	must	include	in	taxable	income,	depends	on	the	
employee’s income tax rate, which varies across people and is zero in 
some cases (NASI 2005). 
For lower-income retirees, Social Security receives more favorable 
tax treatment than private pensions, while the opposite holds for high-
er-income	retirees.	Tax	policy	regarding	U.S.	Social	Security	benefits	




ferent forms, however, and tax treatment may be designed to favor one 
mode over others. Most policy analysts agree that at least a substantial 
portion	of	benefits	 should	be	paid	as	an	annuity	because	 that	 insures	
against the risk of running out of money if the person lives longer than 
expected. Nonetheless, receiving lump sum payments is popular with 
workers, and some countries favor that form of receipt by not taxing it.
Taxation	of	voluntary	Carve-out	Accounts
If contributions from workers to a voluntary carve-out individual 
account were taken entirely from those workers’ payments to Social 
Security, the contributions would come solely from after-tax income. 
The usual consumption tax approach of exempting contributions and 




(TEE). They are mathematically equivalent if the tax rate is the same 
in	all	periods.	Thus,	if	investment	earnings	and	benefits	were	not	taxed	
under this proposal, the tax treatment would be equivalent to that of 
the EET tax treatment of pension plans such as 401(k) plans. However, 
it would not be equivalent to the tax treatment of Social Security ben-
efits.	 It	would	mean	 that	 lower-income	retirees	would	be	 taxed	more	
heavily and higher-income retirees less heavily than under Social Secu-
rity. Thus, the tax treatment of voluntary carve-out individual accounts 
could encourage their use by high-income retirees and discourage their 
use by low-income retirees. 
Tax	expenditures
Tax preferences for pensions and Social Security result in lost rev-
enue to the national government, called tax expenditures. The tax ex-
penditure is the cost side of the tax preferences given to pensions. Tax 
incentives include exempting contributions and investment earnings 
from income taxation. This approach provides greater inducements for 
higher-income workers than for lower-income workers in a progressive 
income tax system because marginal tax rates increase at higher income 
levels. With a progressive tax system, there may be little incentive for 
low-income workers to participate (Reagan and Turner 2000).
With add-on individual accounts, tax expenditures would rise to the 
extent that those accounts increased total tax-favored savings. With vol-
untary carve-out accounts, tax expenditure would presumably change 
little, since tax-favored savings through Social Security would be re-
placed with tax-favored savings in the individual accounts.
ConCLusIons
This	chapter	has	surveyed	issues	concerning	the	payment	of	benefits	
and the tax treatment of individual accounts. There are various options 
for	paying	benefits.	A	major	issue	is	the	extent	to	which	workers	should	
be required to annuitize their individual accounts. The provision of in-
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flation	protection	for	retirees	is	a	related	issue.	An	advantage	offered	by	
individual accounts is that they can be easily used in conjunction with a 
program of partial or phased retirement. 
Fluctuations in interest rates are a source of risk at the point of re-
tirement when converting an individual account balance to an annuity. 
The	lower	the	interest	rate,	the	lower	are	the	annual	benefits	that	result	
from annuitization. This risk can be dealt with in several ways. Sweden 
has a guaranteed minimum interest rate for converting account balances 
to	annuities,	although	at	a	 fairly	 low	 level.	Offering	flexibility	 in	 the	
timing of the conversion is another way of dealing with this risk.
Aspects	of	individual	accounts	may	result	in	their	benefit	structure	
being regressive. Mandatory annuitization results in regressive redis-
tribution because lower-income workers tend to have shorter life ex-
pectancies. The structure of fees may cause regressivity because of the 
fixed	costs	of	managing	individual	accounts.	That	problem	can	be	dealt	
with by mandating that fees be prorated based on account balances. 
With mandatory individual accounts, tax issues need to be consid-
ered. These may be complex when, as in the United States, Social Se-
curity	 and	 pension	 benefits	 are	 not	 taxed	 the	 same	way,	 and	 the	 tax	
treatment of Social Security differs for low- and high-income workers. 
It	may	be	difficult	to	achieve	neutrality	between	the	taxation	of	Social	
Security	benefits	and	the	taxation	of	individual	account	benefits	with-
out affecting the relative desirability of employer-provided individual 
account plans.
notes
	 1.		 The	provision	of	benefits	 in	Sweden	 is	explained	 in	greater	detail	 later	 in	 the	
chapter.
	 2.		 The	table	lists	only	five	Latin	American	countries	as	being	without	mandatory	
annuitization; it is meant to present examples rather than a complete listing.




Individual accounts as part of social security are being debated in 
the United States and have been adopted in a number of countries. They 
can be structured so that they are simple. However, actual individual 
accounts are generally complex in their design and effects, a fact that is 
often not appreciated, in part because of their relatively short history in 
social security systems. Policy analysts, for example, often treat them 
as not affecting the behavior of workers, being similar to voluntary sav-
ings plans. Research on individual account proposals has often focused 
on stylized versions of these plans, without careful consideration of the 
effects	of	their	specific	features.
With the introduction of individual accounts, many nations around 
the world have radically changed the way participants accrue, and later 
receive, retirement income. International comparisons of mandatory 
individual accounts may be particularly useful for U.S. policymakers 
because U.S. experience is limited to voluntary plans. 
This book analyzes public policy toward mandatory individual 
accounts. It examines them from numerous perspectives that include 
international experience and U.S. experience with voluntary accounts, 
and economic theory. Selective issues from each chapter are summa-
rized in the following discussion.
Policy analysts and reformers in a number of countries have made 
great strides in developing ways of providing retirement income through 
individual accounts. Reformers desiring to add individual accounts to a 
traditional system of social security now have a wide range of options 
from which to choose, with large differences across countries in ap-
proaches that have been taken. Major distinctions depend on whether 
they are add-ons to or carve-outs from social security and whether they 
are mandatory or voluntary.
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PeRsPeCTIves	FRoM	oTheR	nATIons
Individual accounts, used as part of social security, have grown 
considerably in importance in several regions of the world. Four path-
ways have been used to encourage the provision of individual accounts 
(Rein and Turner 2001). They are 1) voluntary with tax incentives, 
2) voluntary carve-outs from social security, 3) collective bargaining, 
and 4) mandatory. This book focuses on voluntary carve-outs from so-
cial security and the mandatory approach. For policy analysts desiring 
to increase retirement savings, voluntary plans can be an alternative to 
mandatory	ones	and	are	generally	tried	first.	
A second way of categorizing individual accounts is the relation-
ship approach whereby individual accounts can be add-ons to or carve-
outs from social security. Voluntary carve-out accounts reduce social 
security	benefits	and	contributions,	while	mandatory	add-on	accounts	
do not affect the social security system but require more contributions.
Combining the pathways and the relationship approaches, individual 
accounts	can	be	used	as	part	of	social	security	in	five	ways:	1)	voluntary	
carve-outs that partially replace social security, 2) mandatory add-ons 
to social security, 3) mandatory carve-outs that partially replace social 
security, 4) voluntary carve-outs that fully replace social security, and 
5) mandatory carve-outs that fully replace social security. Because of 
the focus on the U.S. debate, this book only considers voluntary carve-
outs that partially replace social security and mandatory add-ons.
A third way of categorizing individual accounts is according to how 
they are managed. Individual accounts can be managed in at least three 
ways. First, they can be managed by pension fund management com-
panies. In Chile and Mexico, individual workers choose a pension fund 
management company and direct their employer to send the individu-
al’s contribution to that company each month. Second, individual ac-
counts can be managed by employers, as in Australia and Switzerland. 
Third, the government can play a major role. In Sweden and Poland, the 
government serves as a clearinghouse, to which employers send their 
workers’ contributions. The government serves as a record keeper and 
disburses the appropriate amounts to each of the mutual funds in which 
each worker has elected to invest. In keeping with the U.S. debate, this 
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book focuses on the third approach, in which the government serves as 
a clearinghouse.
RIsK	AnD	PRIvATIZATIon
An important criterion in judging social security reforms is the ex-
tent to which they meet the income needs of low- and middle-income 
workers. Social security should provide a stable and secure retirement 
income for these people. For this reason, the role of risk is important in 
assessing different retirement income options. It is not possible to con-
clude that one system is the best for all countries because the risk inher-
ent	in	the	traditional	defined	benefit	social	security	system	varies	across	
nations,	as	does	the	risk	in	the	financial	markets	in	which	the	citizens	of	
a country invest. Even in the high-income nations of the OECD, it is not 
possible to conclude that one system would be superior because the so-
cial security programs already in place in these countries vary consider-
ably. In the international context, an important characteristic of the U.S. 
Social	Security	system	is	the	low	level	of	benefits	it	provides	relative	to	
preretirement income. This feature of the U.S. Social Security system is 
important to keep in mind when considering individual accounts.
Individual accounts are generally less secure for participants than 
are	 traditional	 defined	 benefit	 social	 security	 plans	 in	 high-income	
countries, such as the United States. Individual accounts are riskier in 
terms of investment risk, agency risk, individual management risk, the 
risk of adverse labor market outcomes, disability risk, the risk of pre-
mature death, replacement rate risk, annuitization (interest rate) risk, 
longevity	 risk,	 and	 inflation	 risk.	Defined	benefit	 plans	 are	 riskier	 in	
terms of dependency rate risk, and for younger workers they are riskier 
in terms of policy risk. Typically, for workers age 55 and older, there is 
little	policy	risk	in	defined	benefit	social	security	plans.
In Appendix A, rate-of-return guarantees for individual account 
investments are discussed. The argument for rate-of-return guarantees 
is stronger for carve-out than for add-on accounts because carve-out 
accounts are replacing part of the traditional social security program. 
(However,	rate-of-return	guarantees	may	be	difficult	to	maintain	during	
prolonged market downturns.) Rate-of-return guarantees are also more 
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important for carve-out accounts than for add-on accounts if the ac-
counts provide a relatively substantial part of retirement income.
Privatization of social security by incorporating individual accounts 
appeals to some people on both economic and ideological grounds. 
From the economic standpoint, it is argued that privatizing social se-
curity would increase national savings and economic growth. With a 
declining internal rate of return to pay-as-you-go social security due to 
slowing population and productivity growth, there is political support 
for reducing the role of traditional social security programs. Ideologi-
cally, privatizing social security is favored by some because it would 
lessen the role of the government and give people greater responsibility 
and choice. However, individual accounts that are voluntary carve-outs 
reduce the secure base provided by traditional social security programs, 
which in the case of U.S. Social Security is already rather low. It is 
difficult	to	construct	voluntary	carve-out	accounts	so	that	they	are	age-	
and	gender-neutral	and	are	neutral	in	their	effects	on	the	financing	of	
the traditional social security program. Further, individual accounts are 
subject to some of the same criticisms of traditional social security sys-
tems.	The	level	of	annuitized	benefits	they	provide	is	subject	to	longev-
ity	 risk,	and	annuitized	benefits	 tend	 to	 redistribute	 income	 to	higher	
income people.
The extent to which individual accounts have supplanted social se-
curity programs has varied, with a few countries fully replacing their 
social security systems but a larger number partially changing them. 
Until the reform in Chile in 1981, however, no country had private ad-
ministration of a social security individual accounts program. After ob-
serving the Chilean social security reform for more than a decade, other 
Latin American countries introduced individual accounts as part of their 
social security systems.
Following	the	1991	breakup	of	the	Soviet	Union,	the	benefits	pro-
vided by existing and recently created social protection systems of the 
new	countries	were	not	sufficient	to	handle	the	economic	problems	fac-
ing the region’s retirees. Many of these countries are rethinking their 
social security programs, with some adopting mandatory individual ac-
counts. Comprehensive social security reforms have been implemented 
in Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland. Russia 
has introduced mandatory individual accounts, based in part on the sys-
tem in Sweden.
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PRoBLeMs	ReLATeD	To	FInAnCIAL	MAnAGeMenT
While	the	term	“tiers”	is	often	used	to	describe	different	parts	of	a	
retirement income system, it is used in this book to refer to three lev-
els of management of participants’ investments in individual accounts. 
These	are	financial	management	by	corporations,	by	mutual	funds,	and	
by individual participants. Problems for individual account participants 
occur at all three levels.
In	considering	financial	management	by	corporations,	the	question	
arises of whether participants in individual accounts, and other inves-
tors,	have	sufficient	safeguards.	The	collapse	of	Enron	Corporation	ex-
posed	weaknesses	in	financial	protections	for	U.S.	investors.	For	mutual	
funds, the level of fees participants pay and the transparency of those 
fees need to be evaluated. Although individual accounts are sometimes 
considered to be transparent, the fees participants pay are generally far 
from transparent.
In	addition,	individual	accounts	place	a	burden	of	financial	market	
expertise on all workers. Many people are uninformed about invest-
ments	and	financial	theory,	do	not	have	any	interest	in	pursuing	these	
topics, and are perplexed when required to do so. Such issues can be 
complex, and even experts do not all agree on some basic strategies, 
such as how investment portfolios should change as workers age. Many 
low-income	 and	 poorly	 educated	workers	 have	 no	 background	 in	 fi-
nance and do not even have checking accounts. Financial education 
may need to be an aspect of an individual account system.
Experience with individual accounts as part of social security in 
Sweden indicates that frequently workers do not make an investment 
choice. Many people end up with the default fund for their pension 
investments (Sweden, Argentina). While some people may not make a 
choice, others may choose the default fund, thinking that it is the rec-
ommended alternative. Consequently, the portfolio held by the default 
fund is a critical aspect of system design. The default fund in Sweden 
is heavily invested in equities, and there is no provision to reduce expo-
sure to equity market risk as people approach retirement age. By com-
parison, in Chile the default funds vary by the age of the worker, with 
older workers being placed in default funds with less risk.
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Compared to professional money managers, individual workers 
tend to be more conservative and less sophisticated. Various factors 
may explain why women tend to be more cautious investors of pen-
sion funds than men, including the generally lower earnings of women. 
Investment mistakes made by unsophisticated (and sophisticated) pen-
sion	participants	include	insufficient	diversification,	excessive	trading,	
market timing (trying to anticipate the swings of the market), trading 
following market changes, and holding what would appear to be too 
much or too little risk when compared to the investment portfolios of 
professional investors. Inertia may keep workers from making needed 
adjustments to their portfolios.
Administrative	costs	vary	significantly	among	countries	with	indi-
vidual accounts. Fees can reduce workers’ investments substantially. 
In most individual account systems, fees paid are not clearly disclosed, 
and participants have little understanding of how much they have paid 
in fees.
BehAvIoRAL	eFFeCTs
Voluntary individual accounts can be designed so as not to have 
labor market effects. Mandated individual accounts, however, generally 
may	influence	aspects	of	labor	supply,	and	they	usually	contain	regres-
sive features, due in part to the shorter life expectancies of low-wage 
workers.
Individual accounts may affect hours worked and retirement age. 
They may have behavioral impacts because of the structure of their 
administrative expenses, the effects of worker myopia, capital market 
risks	on	account	balances,	and	interest	 rate	risks	on	monthly	benefits	
when	benefits	are	annuitized,	with	participants	possibly	timing	retire-
ment based on their expectations as to interest rates. If people delay re-
tirement because of declines in the values of their individual accounts, 
there	will	be	greater	difficulties	for	other	workers	who	are	trying	to	find	
jobs during an economic downturn.
Furthermore, individual accounts may change worker behavior 
through	 their	 relationship	 to	minimum	benefit	and	poverty	programs,	
which may provide incentives to low-wage employees to evade par-
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ticipation in individual accounts or to spend down those accounts so as 
to	qualify	for	social	assistance	benefits.	Thus,	the	impact	of	individual	
accounts may depend on the structure of the system as a whole rather 
than on just the accounts themselves. Further empirical and theoretical 
research is needed to assess the magnitudes of the effects discussed.
Issues related to contribution evasion and avoidance have impli-
cations for the labor market, particularly for lower-wage workers in 
the	informal	sector.	Contribution	evasion	and	avoidance,	reflecting	at-
titudes toward taxation in general, is a problem for employees as well 
as for the social security system.
BeneFIT	PAyouT
When a worker reaches retirement, the question arises as to how that 
worker’s individual account should be converted into a retirement ben-
efit.	Difficult	issues	need	to	be	addressed	concerning	the	payout	options	
that are provided and whether, for example, all participants should be 
made to fully annuitize their individual account balances. Alternatively, 
only	annuitization	of	a	minimum	amount	sufficient	to	guarantee	income	
above poverty could be required, or phased payments could be an op-





workers. Lower-income participants (within gender groups) tend to 
have shorter life expectancy, but women tend to have lower income and 
higher	life	expectancy.	While	traditional	social	security	defined	benefit	
plans	 typically	 provide	 price-indexed	 benefits,	 this	 is	 uncommon	 for	
individual accounts. Social Security in the United States is a bigger 
percentage of retirement income for low-income workers, and thus any 
changes in Social Security, including introducing individual accounts, 
have a bigger effect on them.
Generally, participants in individual accounts wishing to annuitize 
their balance are affected by interest rate risk because the calculation of 
their	benefit	depends	on	the	interest	rates	prevailing	at	the	time	of	con-
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version.	A	higher	interest	rate	means	a	higher	annuitized	benefit.	Annu-
ity conversion rate risk in individual accounts can be reduced through 
rate-of-return guarantees at the point of annuitization. While such guar-
antees have been fairly common during the accumulation phase, they 
are not nearly as common for annuity conversions.





A number of myths have been part of the Social Security reform 
debate. These myths persist because they contain an element of truth. 
This section discusses myths about voluntary carve-out individual ac-
counts. Some of these myths are true for mandatory or voluntary add-on 
individual accounts but not for voluntary carve-out accounts. Some of 
them are true for 401(k) plans or for the Thrift Savings Plan for federal 
government workers. Some of these myths arise from abstract analysis 
of idealized situations rather than from an examination of the actual ex-
perience of countries that have enacted the types of policies the United 
States is considering. Some of the myths contain an element of truth 
that is outweighed by considerations in a more complete analysis.
Myth	1:	voluntary	carve-out	accounts	are	like	401(k)	plans	or		
like	the	Thrift	savings	Plan	for	federal	government	workers.
The element of truth in this myth is that there is a similarity among 
these types of plans in that all three are examples of individual account 
plans. However, the popular 401(k) plan and the Thrift Savings Plan are 
both add-on accounts. Workers participating in those plans participate 
fully in Social Security—those plans do not reduce the Social Security 
benefits	of	workers	participating	in	them.
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Myth	2:	voluntary	carve-out	accounts	foster	 
an	ownership	society.
This myth also contains an element of truth. You own outright an 
add-on individual account, such as a 401(k) plan or the Thrift Savings 
Plan. However, a voluntary carve-out plan is a loan. While workers 
own the amount in the account, the money used to establish the account 
is a loan. The money contributed to the account is a loan because at 




The element of truth in this myth is that add-on accounts may in-
crease national savings. However, voluntary carve-out accounts are 
much	less	likely	to	increase	national	savings.	The	worker	finances	them	
by debt, which is the implicit borrowing from the Social Security pro-
gram. On a national basis, the government likely will need to borrow to 
finance	the	payment	of	the	benefits	of	current	retirees	that	would	have	
been	financed	by	the	payroll	tax	payments	that	no	longer	are	going	into	
Social Security but instead are going into individual accounts.
Myth	4:	An	individual	account	will	be	free	from	political	
interference or political risk that arises from changes in 
government policies.
The element of truth in this myth is that it is possible to construct in-
dividual accounts so that they are free from political interference. How-
ever, experience in other countries has shown that to not always be the 
case. For example, in Sweden, the default fund, which is the fund that 
most new participants invest in, does not invest in Coca-Cola because 
of the Swedish government’s objections to some of its policies. As for 
political risk, in the United Kingdom the terms of the tradeoff between 
the	reduction	in	social	security	benefits	and	the	contribution	to	the	in-
dividual	account	are	reset	by	the	government	every	five	years	to	adjust	
to changing economic and demographic conditions. This adjustment is 
subject to error and has added an element of risk to the U.K. system.
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carve-out account if that makes them better off.
Abstract analysis of an idealized situation indicates that people who 
voluntarily	choose	an	option	are	by	definition	made	better	off	by	having	
the option to choose and by their having viewed it to be in their interest 
to voluntarily choose it. In the United Kingdom, however, many people 
who have chosen voluntary carve-out accounts have been made worse 
off	by	their	choice	because	they	were	influenced	to	make	a	particular	
choice	in	what	is	known	as	the	“mis-selling”	scandal.	But	in	the	United	
Kingdom, the negative effects of this problem are limited by the ability 
of people to return fully to the social security system if they feel that 
their choice has made them worse off. Proposals in the United States 
have generally not provided the option of later returning to full partici-
pation in Social Security.
Myth	6:	voluntary	carve-out	accounts	will	reduce	government	
involvement in the retirement income system. 
The element of truth in this myth is that the government would 
provide a reduced percentage of retirement income. However, the gov-
ernment bureaucracy overseeing the retirement income system would 
expand	substantially.	The	staffing	of	the	Social	Security	Administration	
could easily double because of the record-keeping requirements for vol-
untary carve-out individual accounts (Hart et al. 2001).
Myth	7:	Poor	and	low-income	people	would	find	individual	
accounts to be a desirable option.
The element of truth in this myth is that poor and low-income peo-
ple tend not to have investments in the stock market, and having an 
individual account would diversify their sources of retirement income. 
However, people that rely entirely on Social Security for their retire-
ment income are not well situated to bear the risk that is inherent in 
investments in the stock market. The rate of return they receive from 
Social Security tends to be higher than for higher-income workers be-
cause	of	the	progressivity	of	the	Social	Security	benefit	formula.	Also,	
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the	level	of	financial	literacy	in	these	groups	tends	to	be	low,	so	they	




managers. However, experience with 401(k) plans and with the man-
datory individual accounts in Sweden indicates that many individuals 




The element of truth is that survivors will be able to inherit the 
balance of the individual account when workers die, assuming that the 
individual account has not been annuitized. However, the cost in doing 
so is that the worker gives up the survivors insurance provided by So-
cial Security. If a person dies young, the balance of his or her individ-





received from Social Security.
The element of truth is that stocks earn a higher rate of return than 
what workers can receive through participation in Social Security. How-
ever, if that rate of return is adjusted for the higher risk in stocks, and is 
adjusted for the higher taxes that ultimately would be needed to pay the 
transition costs to an individual account system, the rate of return would 
be essentially the same.
Myth 11: Individual accounts do not redistribute income.
Individual	 accounts	 can	 be	 constructed	 as	 lump	 sum	 benefits	 so	
that they do not redistribute income. However, when they are annui-
tized, as they nearly always are, they redistribute income from low- to 
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high-wage workers because high-wage workers tend to have longer life 
expectancy than do low-wage workers. Because high-wage workers 
receive	the	annuitized	benefits	for	more	years,	 the	accounts	are	more	
valuable to them.
Myth 12: Individual accounts do not affect labor supply and 
retirement age.
The element of truth in this myth is that individual accounts are 
not	financed	by	an	explicit	tax,	and	thus	do	not	affect	labor	supply	or	
retirement age through the distorting effect of an explicit tax. However, 
a high mandatory contribution can function as an implicit tax. Further, 
for any individual account plan, a sharp downturn in equity markets 
can cause workers on the verge of retirement to delay retirement. Their 
change in plans comes at a time when a weak economy has reduced the 
demand for labor. Thus, older workers are induced to work longer just 
when	firms	tend	to	be	laying	off	workers.	Their	hanging	onto	their	jobs	
only increases the number of layoffs that occur in such times.
ConCLusIons
An important criterion in judging social security reforms is the ex-
tent to which the reforms meet the needs of low- and middle-income 
workers. Social security should provide these workers a stable, low-risk 
retirement income. For this reason, the role of risk is important in as-
sessing different retirement income options. And, for the same reason, 
the	 risk	 of	 add-on	 individual	 accounts	 is	 less	 significant	 in	 Sweden,	
with its generous base system, than it would be for voluntary carve-out 
accounts that would reduce an already modest level of Social Security 
benefits	in	the	United	States.	
Individual accounts should not be viewed generically. Policy discus-
sion should delineate whether those accounts are add-ons or carve-outs 
and whether they are voluntary or mandatory. While voluntary carve-
out accounts have appeal in that they preserve an element of choice, in 
actual functioning—notably in the United Kingdom—serious problems 
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have been encountered in structuring the selection and in participants 
choosing wisely. 
Social security systems must adjust to changing economic and de-
mographic realities. It is safe to conclude that no social security system 
is without problems—a point, however, that is sometimes overlooked 
when new systems are being proposed. 
The U.S. Social Security program needs to be reformed to restore 
the	balance	of	contributions	and	benefits.	That	problem	rightfully	ranks	
high on the national agenda, and it requires changes in traditional ben-
efits	and	contributions.	Individual	accounts	do	not	help	restore	Social	
Security to solvency, and voluntary carve-out accounts worsen the 
financing	problem	over	a	 transition	period	 lasting	decades.	The	argu-
ments advanced for adding individual accounts to Social Security relate 
to	issues	of	national	savings,	economic	efficiency,	and	private	owner-
ship—areas where there is not a national consensus as to the analysis of 
the	issues,	nor	as	to	their	significance.	
When considering new programs, it is important that their strengths 
and weaknesses be evaluated, rather than focusing solely on the weak-
nesses	of	 existing	programs.	Sufficient	 time	has	now	passed	 that	 the	
functioning of individual accounts can be evaluated based on lessons 
learned from the experiences of the United Kingdom and Chile. The 
Swedish reform is relatively new, so its innovative features have not 
stood the test of time, though its approach appears to have desirable fea-
tures	with	respect	to	limiting	administrative	costs	and	providing	flexi-
bility	in	the	receipt	of	benefits.	In	both	the	voluntary	carve-out	accounts	
in the United Kingdom and the mandatory carve-out accounts in Chile, 
the individual account reforms have decreased in popularity: workers 
have	“voted	with	their	feet,”	and	participation	in	those	accounts	has	de-
clined. In the United Kingdom in 2005, a national pension commission 
recommended abolishing voluntary carve-out individual accounts.
Mandatory add-on accounts provided on top of a secure base Social 
Security	benefit	would	not	have	the	problems	of	carve-out	accounts	of	
worsening	Social	 Security	financing	 during	 the	 transition	 and	 reduc-
ing	Social	Security	benefits,	nor	 the	problem	of	how	 to	 structure	 the	
tradeoff	between	Social	Security	benefits	and	contributions	to	an	indi-
vidual account. They have some of the desirable features of individual 
accounts in that they could increase the amount of funded pension sav-
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ings and raise retirement income, but they would also raise the Social 
Security payments made by workers, including low-wage workers who 
may	have	more	pressing	financial	needs.	It	can	be	hoped	that	the	con-
tinuing	national	debate	on	these	issues	will	benefit	from	clear	thinking	
as to the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches.  






sion participants. This appendix focuses on rate-of-return guarantees during 
the accumulation phase. First, the Chilean pension system is examined, to pro-
vide examples of different types of guarantees, including those for minimum 
benefits.	
GuARAnTees	In	The	ChILeAn	sysTeM
The Chilean government provides four guarantees in its private individual 
account system. First, it promises a minimum pension to workers who have 
contributed at least 20 years. This commitment is targeted to long-term, low-
wage	workers	 and	 serves	 as	 an	 antipoverty	 benefit.	 Second,	 it	 guarantees	 a	
lower minimum pension to workers who have contributed less than 20 years. 
Third, it guarantees a minimum rate of return in case a pension fund manage-
ment company (an AFP) underperforms the limits set relative to the average 
rate of return received by other pension funds. Fourth, it ensures payments 
to	pensioners	receiving	annuitized	benefits	from	any	insurance	company	that	
becomes bankrupt.
The Chilean AFPs are required to provide a relative rate-of-return guar-
antee for workers while they are accumulating an account for retirement. This 
guarantee has served as a model in other countries. In the Chilean AFPs, if the 
rate of return received by a fund is above or below a band around the average 
rate of return received by all funds, the worker is credited with the maximum 
or minimum band rate rather than the actual rate of return. The minimum guar-
antee on the annualized monthly rate of return is 50 percent of the average real 
rate of return for all pension funds or below the average by 2 percentage points, 
whichever is lower. Chilean pension fund managers are required to set aside 
the	excess	amount	into	a	profitability	reserve	fund	maintained	for	each	pension	
fund whenever their real rate of return is 50 percent higher than the mean for 
all pension funds for the preceding 36 months or exceeds the industry average 
by 2 percentage points, whichever is higher.  
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Chile switched to a 36-month averaging period from the 12-month period 
it initially used in order to encourage investment in portfolios with greater risk 
and to give fund managers wider range for picking portfolios. A criticism of 
the guarantee with a 12-month averaging period was that it forced all of the 
pension funds to have similar portfolios, reducing the choices available to par-
ticipants.	That	effect	on	pension	portfolios	is	called	“herding”	(Chlon,	Góra,	
and Rutkowski 1999). 
The Chilean guarantee is an example of ways that a guarantee can be 
financed—it	has	 three	 sources	of	financial	underpinning.	Should	 the	 rate	of	
return on a pension fund fall below the guaranteed rate of return, the fund 
manager	is	required	to	make	up	the	difference	through	its	profitability	reserve	
fund, which contains revenues from times when the rate of return exceeded the 
maximum allowed. If the reserve fund is inadequate, the pension fund manager 
must make up the remaining difference from its own reserve fund, provided 
by the fund’s owners. The fund’s owners must maintain a separate reserve 
fund using their own money, equal to 1 percent of the pension fund’s assets, 
invested in the same portfolio as the pension fund. If that also is inadequate, the 
government makes up the remaining difference, the pension fund management 
company is liquidated, and the pension fund accounts are disbursed to other 
companies. The government, using general tax revenue, serves as guarantor of 
last resort. The government does not charge a premium but provides that insur-
ance without cost to the pension system. Employers play no role in providing 
guarantees.
This	type	of	rate-of-return	guarantee	limits	the	plan-specific	risk	to	work-
ers, which is the risk that the plan’s rate of return differs from the average for 
all	plans.	The	guarantee	has	little	impact,	however,	on	the	bearing	of	financial	
market risk, which affects the rates of return received by all plans. For ex-
ample,	during	1995,	the	average	real	rate	of	return	in	Chile	was	negative	(−2.5	
percent) for all pension plans, against which this form of risk-sharing provided 
no protection. 
RATe-oF-ReTuRn	GuARAnTees
The Chilean rate-of-return guarantee is a prominent example of rate-of-
return guarantees, but countries with mandatory individual accounts have 
structured those guarantees in a number of different ways. During the period 
of work and contributions before retirement, pension guarantees can provide 
either	a	minimum	level	of	benefits	at	retirement	or	a	minimum	rate	of	return.	
Minimum	benefit	guarantees	can	be	structured	as	antipoverty	benefits	that	only	
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so that the guaranteed amount differs for each worker, depending on how much 
has been contributed to his or her pension account. 
In structuring guarantees, there is a trade-off between the insurance pro-
vided by the guarantee and its cost. While the expected cost of a guarantee is 
an	important	factor	to	consider,	it	can	be	difficult	to	determine.
Rate-of-return	guarantees	may	be	absolute	with	a	fixed	minimum	rate	of	
return,	 or	 they	may	 be	 relative	 to	 an	 index.	One	 type	 of	 fixed	 guarantee	 is	
the return of principal: a guarantee of a zero nominal rate of return, which is 
required in Germany and Japan for voluntary individual accounts (Lachance 
and	Mitchell	2003).	A	more	generous	promise	is	to	return	the	real	(inflation-
adjusted) value of the principal. 
The structure of rate-of-return guarantees for individual accounts can be 
used as a framework for a survey of the guarantees that countries have provid-
ed. The design of these plans can be divided into three elements: the measure-




element of constructing a rate-of-return guarantee would be deciding exactly 
what is to be guaranteed. The rate-of-return guaranteed can be measured in 
different ways.
Real or nominal 
Uruguay uses a real rate-of-return guarantee for its individual account 
plans,	adjusting	for	inflation	as	measured	by	the	change	in	consumer	prices,	
while Switzerland uses a nominal one.
Fixed	or	indexed	
The	guarantee	can	be	a	fixed	rate	of	return	(either	nominal	or	real)	or	it	can	
be a rate of return that varies according to a capital market index. The index 
could be based on the rate of return received on a given asset or portfolio of as-
sets,	the	actuarial	rate	of	return	assumed	for	an	associated	defined	benefit	plan,	
or the rate of return received by a given group of investors, such as all pension 
fund	managers.	The	defined	contribution	plan	 for	 teachers	 in	 Indiana	offers	
a guarantee based on the actuarial rate of return assumed on the associated 
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defined	benefit	plan	(Turner	and	Rajnes	2004).	Uruguay	uses	a	fixed	rate-of-
return guarantee, while Chile uses one that varies according to an index.1 
The averaging period for the guaranteed rate of return 
The	time	dimension	on	the	rate	of	return	can	be	a	fixed	period,	such	as	a	
month, a calendar year, or each consecutive 12-month period, or it can be a 
cumulative rate of return based on compounding annual rates of return over 
a longer period.  Some plans for government workers in New Zealand use a 
cumulative rate of return. Before 1999, Chile used an annual rate of return 
over each consecutive 12-month period. Since then, it has guaranteed a rate 
of return averaged over rolling 36-month periods. When a longer time period 
is used, the cost of providing the guarantee declines. This occurs because the 
volatility of average rates of return is reduced the longer the averaging period. 
Thus, returns averaged over longer periods are less likely to fall below the 
guaranteed level.
explicit	or	implicit	rates	of	return	
A rate-of-return guarantee is equivalent to promising a minimum level of 
assets in the worker’s pension account, given the contributions. Thus, a guar-
antee of a minimum level of the pension fund implicitly guarantees a minimum 
rate of return. Chile uses a guarantee based on explicit rates of return, while 
the guarantee on mandatory individual accounts in Mexico has an implicit rate 
of	return,	that	being	the	rate	of	return	that	would	be	sufficient	to	provide	the	
guaranteed	minimum	benefit.
The rate of return guaranteed 
The rate of return guaranteed may be the actual one received on the pen-
sion portfolio of the participant, or it may be a benchmark rate of return. For 
example, the guarantee could stipulate that you would receive at least a zero 
rate of return assuming you had invested in the S&P 500, and, regardless of 
your actual investment, if the S&P 500 index rate of return was lower, you 
would	receive	the	difference	sufficient	to	raise	a	portfolio	of	your	amount	to	
a zero rate of return had it been invested in the S&P 500. A benchmark rate of 
return would eliminate the problem of moral hazard in the selection of invest-
ment portfolios by workers, employers, or pension fund managers, and would 
allow a wider range of portfolios to be selected. With moral hazard, if work-
ers managed their pension portfolios but the pension fund manager provided 
the guarantee, workers would have an incentive to invest in very risky assets 
if the guarantee were based on the actual portfolio returns, rather than on a 
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benchmark.	By	investing	in	risky	assets,	they	would	benefit	from	the	upside	
potential associated with the high risk but would not have to bear the downside 
risk since that would be limited by the guarantee. 
Generally, forms of investment protection generate moral hazard (White-
house 2000). Once the losses from a risk are insured, people will take less care 
to avoid that risk. Chile uses the actual rate of return received but offers work-
ers little choice as to the portfolio that is guaranteed. Feldstein, Ranguelova, 
and Samwick (1999) propose a guarantee based on a benchmark, which sepa-
rates worker choice from moral hazard, allowing participants greater choice as 
to the investment portfolio.
The	Guarantee’s	Payoff	Characteristics
The guarantee’s payoff characteristics can be analyzed in terms of the risk 
and expected return the worker faces when the guarantee is in place.
Risk-sharing in the guarantee 
A minimum guarantee (with the possibility of the worker receiving a high-
er rate of return) may be offered, versus a point guarantee, where the rate of 
return	the	worker	receives	is	specified.	Guarantees	differ	with	respect	to	who	
receives the investment returns when the rate of return is above the promised 
level. When this occurs, the institution providing the point guarantee, rather 
than the worker, receives the entire rate of return above the guarantee. 
With a minimum guarantee, the worker can receive the entire rate of re-
turn above the promised level, or the institution providing the guarantee may 
receive part of it. In Chile, workers receive the total rate of return above the 
minimum and below the maximum, but none of the rate of return above the 
maximum, that amount being deposited into a reserve that is used to fund the 
rate-of-return guarantee. This is a form of hedging, with the risk of loss being 
lowered by reducing the potential gain. In Poland, workers receive the entire 
amount above the minimum guaranteed level. In Switzerland, most mandatory 
plans	pay	the	fixed	guaranteed	rate	regardless	of	whether	the	actual	portfolio	
return is above or below that rate.
The application frequency of the guarantee 
The guarantee period determines the point at which the guarantee is ex-
ercised.	It	can	be	at	a	fixed	interval,	such	as	a	quarter	or	a	year,	so	that	it	is	a	
series of successive guarantees; alternatively, it can be a cumulative guarantee, 
so that the period is from the start until the end of the worker’s participation, 
and the guarantee is based on the termination value of the person’s account. A 
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cumulative guarantee can provide that the rate must exceed a minimum cumu-
lated rate at the end of every year or only that it must exceed that rate at the end 
of participation in the plan.  Some of the guarantee funds in Hong Kong require 
a minimum stay in the plan in order to qualify for the guarantee.
The	extent	of	liability	of	the	guarantor	
The guarantor, or the party making the guarantee, can have limited or un-
limited liability. When the guarantor has limited liability, there is a cap on the 
expenditure the guarantor is required to make. This is analogous to caps in 
health insurance policies.
The	risk	that	the	guarantee	will	be	changed	
The guarantee may be viewed as an enduring promise or as one that is 
likely to be revised in the future. All commitments have some likelihood that 
they	will	be	changed,	but	this	probability	is	greater	with	fixed	rate-of-return	
guarantees	than	with	relative	ones,	which	have	more	flexibility.	With	the	bear	
market in the early 2000s, a number of mandatory individual accounts with 
fixed	nominal	guarantees	 lowered	 the	guarantee	 rate.	For	example,	Switzer-
land, which had set its guarantee at 4 percent for many years, reduced that rate 
to 2.5 percent in 2003.
The type of insurance provided 
A guarantee can be set fairly high relative to the expected return (a non-
catastrophic guarantee), or it can be set low so that it only provides protection 
against a low rate of return (a catastrophic guarantee). 
Mandatory or voluntary 
The guarantee can be mandatory or voluntary, and this aspect can differ for 
employers and employees. For example, it could be voluntary for employers to 
offer, but employers could stipulate it for all their employees. Alternatively, it 
could	be	mandatory	that	employers	providing	a	defined	contribution	plan	offer	
a guarantee as an option, but it could be voluntary for employees to choose 
that option. In Norway, the parliament proposed, but subsequently rejected, 
a guarantee that would be voluntary for employers in that they would not be 
required	to	provide	such	a	plan,	but	would	be	mandatory	for	workers	at	firms	
that chose it. In Hong Kong, the mutual funds may offer a guaranteed fund as 
an alternative, and it is voluntary for employees to select that option.
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The	Financial	Backing	for	the	Guarantee
Guarantees	require	a	source	of	funds	to	provide	their	financial	backing.	
Funded or pay-as-you-go 
Guarantees can be fully or partially advance-funded or they can be pay-as-
you-go	financed.	The	guarantee	on	mandatory	individual	accounts	in	Chile	is	






received	on	 the	worker’s	 account	 is	 set	 aside	 to	finance	 the	guarantee.	 It	 is	
partially	financed	by	the	pension	fund	management	company,	which	must	set	
aside	some	of	its	own	money	to	finance	the	guarantee.	It	also	is	partially	fi-
nanced by the government, which is the insurer of last resort. 
The party insuring the guarantee 
The party insuring the guarantee, which is not necessarily the same as the 
party	financing	the	guarantee,	can	be	an	employer,	a	pension	fund	provider,	an	
insurance company, or the government. For the United States, Jefferson (2000) 
has	proposed	 a	 rate-of-return	guarantee	 for	 individual	 accounts	financed	by	
employer	premiums	paid	to	the	Pension	Benefit	Guaranty	Corporation,	which	
would then insure the guarantee.
The	Cost	of	Guarantees
Whether providing a guarantee is a desirable option depends in part on the 
cost of the guarantee, which varies greatly with its features. Clearly, the higher 
the rate of return guaranteed, the greater its expected cost. The guarantee of the 
return of principal has very low cost when applied over a period of years. 
The cost of a guarantee of return of principal when the underlying invest-
ments are restricted to bonds declines with increases in the investment period 
and is practically nothing after seven years. The cost of the same guarantee for 
an asset invested only in equities also falls with the length of the investment 
period but is still 2.7 percent after 20 years (Maurer and Schlag 2003). 
Turner.indb   157 2/6/2006   10:28:39 AM
158   Turner
Features of a guarantee that increase the likelihood that it will be effective 
also raise its expected cost in the following ways.
• A guarantee that restricts the underlying portfolio to bonds is less costly 
than one that is based on equity investments. Generally, the greater the 
investment risk, the greater the cost of the guarantee (Lachance and 
Mitchell 2003). 
• A real rate-of-return guarantee of zero (return of real principal) is more 
expensive than a nominal rate-of-return guarantee of zero because the 
real	return	would	have	to	compensate	for	inflation.	
• Similarly, real rate-of-return guarantees of greater than zero tend to 
be more expensive than nominal rate-of-return guarantees because the 
former promise automatically to adjust upward (in nominal terms) for 
changes	in	inflation.
• Rate-of-return guarantees that apply for short periods (such as a year) 
are more costly than guarantees for longer periods (such as three years) 
because	fluctuations	in	rates	of	return	can	be	averaged	out	within	the	
longer guarantee period.
• Guarantees in which there is no ceiling on the rate of return received 
are more expensive to provide than guarantees with a maximum limit, 
with	the	excess	returns	above	that	point	going	into	a	fund	to	finance	the	
guarantee in the future. 
To give an idea of the expense of guarantees, for someone with a 40-year 
investment horizon who holds a portfolio that is half bonds and half stocks, the 
cost of guaranteeing the 10-year Treasury bond return would be 0.65 percent 
of assets annually, nearly doubling to 1.27 percent for an all-stocks portfolio 
(Lachance and Mitchell 2003). This is expensive, considering that a low-cost 
equity index mutual fund would have fees of about 0.20 percent of assets an-
nually. If, instead, the guarantee was the return of nominal or real principal, 
the cost would drop to 0.02 percent for the real principal guarantee and ap-
proximately zero for the nominal principal guarantee (Lachance and Mitchell 
2003). 
what	Guarantees	Accomplish
The	 relative	 and	fixed	 rate-of-return	guarantees	 are	 designed	 for	 differ-
ent purposes. A relative guarantee ensures that, at a particular point in time, 
all participants will receive a similar rate of return. It, however, provides no 
protection	against	a	decline	in	market	rates.	A	fixed	guarantee	is	designed	to	
protect against declines in market return. However, the three-year decline in 
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world	capital	markets,	starting	in	2000,	showed	the	limits	to	fixed	rate-of-re-
turn promises. A number of countries with such policies reduced the guaran-
teed rate. For example, Switzerland, which requires a guaranteed rate of return 





mandatory	 defined	 contribution	 systems	 provide	 guarantees.	This	 survey	 of	
rate-of-return guarantees around the world indicates the range of approaches 
that have been developed. Table A.1 gives an overview, summarizing the pres-
ence	and	types	of	guarantees	found	in	mandatory	defined	contribution	systems.	
A few countries with mandatory individual accounts do not offer guarantees 
(e.g., Australia, Bolivia, Sweden). Among the majority that do provide them, 
the guarantees can be categorized as either being relative or absolute. Table 
A.1 is organized by type of guarantee, while the text, which provides greater 
detail, is organized by region of the world. Countries were selected for discus-
sion so as to provide examples of the different types of guarantees.
Latin America
Uruguay
Uruguay permits both private and government management of pension 
funds. For the state-owned fund management company, the government guar-
antees a minimum annual real rate of return equal to 2 percent. If the fund earns 
less for a year, the government transfers money to the fund to make up the 
difference. The private pension fund management companies must maintain a 
guarantee fund, used to supplement pension accounts of workers if the return 
of	 their	 portfolios	 falls	 below	 a	 defined	minimum	 rate	 of	 return:	 the	 lower	
of 2 percent real and the average industry return minus 200 basis points (2 
percentage points). This regulation may create a competitive disadvantage for 
the private companies, which must bear the costs of maintaining the guarantee 
fund (Mosconi 1997), and seems to have contributed to the dominance of the 
state-owned fund in the pension industry, which ranks among the most highly 
concentrated in Latin America.
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Table	A.1		Guarantees	in	Mandatory	Defined	Contribution	systems	
Country and type of guarantee Level of guarantee
Countries with no guarantee






Countries with an absolute level guarantee
   Denmark (ATP plan)
   Singapore




Countries with a relative guarantee
   Argentina (private only) 70% of the average nominal rate of return 
for all plans or 2 percentage points below, 
whichever is lower
   Chile 50% of the average real rate of return for 
all plans or 2 percentage points below, 
whichever is lower
   Colombia Minimum based on a composite of the 
average performance of all pension funds 
and the performance of the country’s three 
stock exchanges
   Hungary Minimum rate set each year, depending in 
part on expected market rates
   Poland 50% of the average nominal rate of return 
for all plans or 4 percentage points below 
the average, whichever is lower
   Uruguay (private only) 2 percent real or the average return of the 
system minus 2 percentage points (200 
basis points), whichever is lower
NOTE:	This	 table	necessarily	 involves	 some	simplification	 in	 its	 categorization	and	
description of guarantees. Refer to the text for a fuller description of the individual 
countries.
SOURCE: Turner and Rajnes (2001).
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In setting an absolute rate-of-return guarantee, Uruguay differs from most 
other reform countries in the region (Argentina’s absolute guarantee applies 
only to the state-run pension fund manager, Administradoras de Fondos de 
Jubilaciones y Pensiones [AFJP]). The return is calculated monthly on a roll-
ing basis. 
Mexico	
Mexico does not provide an explicit rate-of-return guarantee, but, during 
the transition phase of its system, it provides an implicit assurance through its 
minimum	pension	guarantee.	While	“transition”	may	suggest	a	short	time	pe-
riod, this phase actually lasts decades. Workers who were already participating 
in the old system when the reform was instituted have the option when they at-
tain	age	65	(with	25	years	of	contributions)	of	receiving	a	benefit	based	on	their	
defined	contribution	plan	or	on	their	former	social	security	plan.	If	the	former	
social	 security’s	 plan	benefits	 are	higher,	 the	defined	 contribution	 funds	 are	
taxed	at	100	percent	and	the	government	pays	the	old	benefit	level.	The	gov-
ernment	decided	 to	offer	 this	“life-switch”	option	 instead	of	acknowledging	
the previous contributions of transition workers through recognition bonds, as 
in Chile. There, workers were given special government bonds to compensate 
them	for	 the	benefits	 they	had	accrued	under	 the	old	social	security	system.	
Once the old system is completely phased out, this guarantee will no longer be 
provided.	The	government	supervisory	organization,	Comisión	Nacional	del	
Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (CONSAR), requires that at least 51 percent 
of	a	worker’s	account	balance	be	invested	in	inflation-linked	bonds;	this	stipu-




are required to choose a fund to which they contribute. Several guarantees 
apply to these pension funds. First, each year, prospectively, the Private Fund 
Supervisory Board sets the minimum and maximum rates of return that may 
be received on fund accounts. Second, at retirement, each worker is guaran-
teed	to	receive	a	minimum	benefit	from	his	or	her	pension	fund.	Hungary	has	
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The Hungarian mutual associations that manage pension funds are re-
quired to maintain rate-of-return guarantee reserves. If the rate of return on 
the fund’s investments exceeds the maximum rate of return, a portion of the 
surplus (the portion determined by government decree) is transferred to the 
return guarantee reserves. If the return on the fund’s investments is less than 
the required minimum return, funds from the reserves are transferred to the 
worker’s individual account. The reserves are required to be no lower than 0.5 
percent of the funds in the individual accounts. In years when the reserves are 
less, 0.5 percent of the workers’ contributions are deposited into the reserves.  
The	benefits	in	these	funds	are	further	insured	through	a	central	Guarantee	
Fund in which all pension funds must participate, at a required rate that varies 
between 0.3 and 0.5 percent of contributions to the pension funds. In addi-
tion, Hungarian law requires that the average annual value of the Guarantee 
Fund may not be less than 0.3 percent or more than 1.5 percent of the total 
combined assets of the funds it is insuring. The Hungarian government may 
order Hungarian pension funds to make special contributions to the Guarantee 
Fund	if	the	assets	of	the	fund	are	insufficient	to	meet	its	financial	obligations.	
Moreover, it may borrow from the National Bank of Hungary, with the central 
budget of the government of Hungary guaranteeing repayment of the loan. If 
the assets of the Guarantee Fund exceed the upper limits allowed, it will sus-
pend the required payment of contributions from pension funds. 




While most countries with mandatory individual accounts provide rate-
of-return guarantees, some do not. In certain cases, the latter have regulations 
that	limit	the	financial	market	risk	that	plans	can	take;	alternatively,	the	plans	
may provide a small part of retirement income, being a second tier on top of 
basic	social	security.	Latvia	has	established	a	second-tier	mandatory	defined	
contribution system without a rate-of-return guarantee. It has strict limits on 
the investments that pension funds can hold, which reduce the risk of these 
funds and form a partial substitute for a guarantee. Sweden has a mandatory 
second-tier	defined	contribution	plan	without	a	rate-of-return	guarantee;	how-
ever, the plan has a required contribution rate of only 2.5 percent, compared to 
one	of	16	percent	for	the	notional	defined	contribution	plan	that	forms	the	first	
tier. Australia does not provide a minimum rate-of-return guarantee, but it of-
fers	a	relatively	generous	means-tested	benefit	that	serves	as	a	form	of	benefit	
guarantee. If the contribution rate for the mandated individual accounts is com-
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paratively low, and the program is a second tier on top of a relatively generous 
social security plan, a rate-of-return guarantee is typically not provided.
ConCLusIons
Perhaps	 the	most	 important	criticism	of	mandatory	defined	contribution	
systems, although one not accepted by all pension analysts, is that they may 
place	too	much	financial	market	risk	on	workers.	This	view	depends	in	part	on	





Among countries that provide guarantees, these are typically backed by 
some type of reserve or insurance fund, often with the government providing 
further	support	if	those	sources	should	fail.	In	Switzerland,	by	contrast,	the	first	
source of backing is additional contributions by employers. The reserve funds 
are	often	financed	through	contributions	from	the	pension	fund	in	years	when	
the rate of return exceeds a set level, but in some countries special contribu-
tions are made by employers or employees into the funds.
Many of the countries providing rate-of-return guarantees do so relative to 
a	financial	market	index.	These	features	limit	the	extent	to	which	participants	
will receive different rates of return, which is an inherent aspect of allow-
ing participants choice as to how their accounts are invested, but do not pro-
tect against capital market risk. Absolute rate-of-return guarantees, however, 
may	provide	protection	against	some	degree	of	capital	market	fluctuations;	the	
three-year	decline	 in	financial	markets	starting	 in	 the	year	2000	proved	 that	
these types of guarantees can prove to be too expensive to maintain during a 
prolonged downturn.
note
 1.  Pennacchi (1999) has analyzed the guarantees used in Uruguay and Chile, while 
Lindset (2001) analyzes guarantees more generically.
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Appendix	B
Labor Market Distortions Due to 
Contribution Evasion and Avoidance
Contribution evasion occurs when employees and employers do not make 
required social security payments. This situation is pandemic in the mandatory 
account systems in Latin America, with only 10 to 60 percent of the work-
ers required to contribute actually doing so (Gill, Packard, and Yermo 2005). 
(See also the discussion in Chapter 7 of this book.) Even social security in the 
United States and other OECD countries has substantial underpayment due to 
workers’	participation	in	the	“underground”	or	“informal”	economy	(Gillion	et	
al.	2000).	While	it	is	difficult	for	wage	and	salary	earners	to	evade	mandatory	
social security contributions, it is much easier for self-employed and contract 
workers, household employees, owners and employees of small businesses, 
and casual laborers.  
Contribution	evasion	is	a	problem	in	both	mandatory	defined	benefit	and	
mandatory individual accounts. Such behavior occurs for several reasons with 
mandatory individual accounts (Bailey and Turner 2001). First, guaranteed 
minimum	or	means-tested	benefits	reduce	the	incentive	for	low-income	work-
ers to contribute if the outcome from their payments is not much larger than 
the	guaranteed	benefit.	 In	Chile,	 for	example,	 the	provision	of	a	guaranteed	
minimum	benefit	 after	 20	 years	 of	 contributions	may	 discourage	 low-wage	
earners from paying further. To avoid contributing, some workers may move 
into the informal sector.
Myopic workers prefer not to contribute toward their future retirement 
benefits	and	 to	keep	 their	money	for	current	consumption,	 regardless	of	 the	
type of retirement income system. Myopic workers have a high rate of time 
discount, meaning that they place little weight on planning for future periods. 
This perspective is a reason why social security programs are mandatory (Gil-
lion	et	al.	2000).	Because	myopic	workers	place	little	value	on	future	benefits,	
they are more likely to view required contributions as a tax. As a tax, the con-
tributions would have distortionary effects on their decisions relating to work.
Low-income	workers,	small	firms,	and	people	and	businesses	in	financial	
distress are more likely to evade making social security contributions because 
they place higher priority on expenses with more immediate payoff, such as 
health	benefits	(Bailey	and	Turner	2001).	Low-income	workers	may	feel	that	
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the level of the mandatory contribution rate is too high and not contribute for 
that reason.
The efforts of employers and workers to evade social security contribu-
tions for mandatory individual accounts may affect labor market outcomes. 
Employers may hire some workers informally, paying them in cash, rather than 
as	part	of	the	official	payroll.	Doing	so	not	only	eliminates	contributing	to	so-
cial security, it deprives workers of labor market protections of law. Similarly, 
employers may claim workers are contractors rather than employees, which 
would also have the dual effect of evading contributions and withholding labor 
protections provided to employees. 
Contribution evasion for mandatory individual accounts may be easier in 
some jobs than in others and may affect one’s choice of employment. People 
may work in the underground or informal economy in part to evade mandatory 
social security contributions and taxes.
Contribution avoidance is closely related. While contribution evasion is 
the illegal failure to make mandatory contributions, contribution avoidance 
occurs when workers and employers take legal steps so as not to be required 
to contribute. Contribution avoidance occurs when employers structure work 
and	payment	so	that	 the	people	who	work	for	 them	will	not	be	classified	as	
employees.	It	also	occurs	when	firms	structure	compensation	in	order	to	reduce	
the part that is covered by social security. This can be done by small enterprise 
owners	when	they	take	compensation	as	profits	rather	than	as	wages.		
Contribution evasion and avoidance may take place because of the effect 
of taxes and social security payments when collected together. Thus, social 
security contribution evasion often is an aspect of income tax evasion. It may 
distort labor market activity, which has resultant welfare costs. 
Contribution evasion is only possible when the government fails to enforce 
mandatory contributions. In Chile, for example, it is the employers’ responsi-
bility to ensure that their workers contribute, but the government makes little 
effort to enforce the mandatory contribution law. Lax enforcement in other 
Latin American countries is evident from the low participation rates there as 
well (Gill, Packard, and Yermo 2005).
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